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  • 1
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    Handbook of game theory with economic applications : volume 4 (2014)
    Amsterdam : North Holland
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    UID:
    gbv_1655675486
    Format: Online Ressource (xv, 1008 pages)
    ISBN: 9780444537676 , 0444537678
    Series Statement: Handbooks in economics 11
    Content: The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mi
    Additional Edition: ISBN 0444537678
    Additional Edition: ISBN 044453766X
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780444537676
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780444537669
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Handbook of Game Theory
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics , Mathematics
    RVK:
    QH 430
    RVK:
    SK 860
    Keywords: Spieltheorie ; Wirtschaftswissenschaften ; Electronic books
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    URL: lizenzpflichtig
    URL: Inhaltstext
    Author information: Zamir, Shemuʾel 1939-
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  • 2
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    Chapter 18. Calibration and Expert Testing (2015)
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    UID:
    gbv_1831651726
    ISBN: 9780444537676
    Content: I survey and discuss the recent literature on testing experts or probabilistic forecasts, which I would describe as a literature on “strategic hypothesis testing” The starting point of this literature is some surprising results of the following type: suppose that a criterion forjudging probabilistic forecasts (which I will call a test) has the property that if data are generated by a probabilistic model, then forecasts generated by that model pass the test. It, then, turns out an agent who knows only the test by which she is going to be judged, but knows nothing about the data-generating process, is able to pass the test by generating forecasts strategically. The literature identifies a large number of tests that are vulnerable to strategic manipulation of uninformed forecasters, but also delivers some tests that cannot be passed without knowledge of the data-generating process. It also provides some results on philosophy of science and financial markets that are related to, and inspired by the results on testing experts.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2014, (2015), Seite 949-984, 9780444537676
    In: 0444537678
    In: year:2015
    In: pages:949-984
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00018-5
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 3
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    Chapter 17. Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility (2015)
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    UID:
    gbv_1831651734
    ISBN: 9780444537676
    Content: This chapter reviews developments in the theory of decision making under risk and uncertainty, focusing on models that, over the last 40 years, dominated the theoretical discussions. It also surveys some implications of the departures from the “linearity in the probabilities” aspect of expected utility theory to game theory. The chapter consists of two main parts: The first part reviews models of decision making under risk that depart from the independence axiom, focusing on the rank-dependent utility models and cumulative prospect theory. The second part reviews theories of decision making under uncertainty that depart from the sure thing principle and model the phenomenon of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2014, (2015), Seite 901-947, 9780444537676
    In: 0444537678
    In: year:2015
    In: pages:901-947
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00017-3
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 4
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    Chapter 15. Theory of Combinatorial Games (2015)
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    UID:
    gbv_1831651750
    ISBN: 9780444537676
    Content: Aim: To present a systematic development of the theory of combinatorial games from the ground up. Approach: Computational complexity. Combinatorial games are completely determined; the questions of interest are efficiencies of strategies. Methodology: Divide and conquer. Ascend from Nim to Chess and Go in small strides at a gradient that is not too steep. Presentation: Mostly informal; examples of combinatorial games sampled from various strategic viewing points along scenic mountain trails illustrate the theory. Add-on: Atasteof constraint logic , a new tool to prove intractabilities of games.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2014, (2015), Seite 811-859, 9780444537676
    In: 0444537678
    In: year:2015
    In: pages:811-859
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00015-X
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 5
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    Chapter 16. Game Theory and Distributed Control (2015)
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    UID:
    gbv_1831651742
    ISBN: 9780444537676
    Content: Game theory has been employed traditionally as a modeling tool for describing and influencing behavior in societal systems. Recently, game theory has emerged as a valuable tool for controlling or prescribing behavior in distributed engineered systems. The rationale for this new perspective stems from the parallels between the underlying decision-making architectures in both societal systems and distributed engineered systems. In particular, both settings involve an interconnection of decision-making elements whose collective behavior depends on a compilation of local decisions that are based on partial information about each other and the state of the world. Accordingly, there is extensive work in game theory that is relevant to the engineering agenda. Similarities notwithstanding, there remain important differences between the constraints and objectives in societal and engineered systems that require looking at game-theoretic methods from a new perspective. This chapter provides an overview of selected recent developments of game-theoretic methods in this role as a framework for distributed control in engineered systems.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2014, (2015), Seite 861-899, 9780444537676
    In: 0444537678
    In: year:2015
    In: pages:861-899
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00016-1
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 6
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    Chapter 1. Rationality (2015)
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    UID:
    gbv_1831651904
    ISBN: 9780444537676
    Content: This chapter is a very compressed review of the neoclassical orthodoxy on the nature of rationality on economic theory. It defends the orthodoxy both against the behavioral criticism that it assumes too much and the revisionist view that it assumes too little. In places, especially on the subject of Bayesianism, the paper criticizes current practice on the grounds that it has gone astray in departing from the principles of its founding fathers. Elsewhere, especially on the modeling of knowledge, some new proposals are made. In particular, it is argued that interpreting counterfactuals is not part of the function of a definition of rationality.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2014, (2015), Seite 1-26, 9780444537676
    In: 0444537678
    In: year:2015
    In: pages:1-26
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00001-X
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 7
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    Chapter 6. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics (2015)
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    UID:
    gbv_1831651858
    ISBN: 9780444537676
    Content: Traditional game theory studies strategic interactions in which the agents make rational decisions. Evolutionary game theory differs in two key respects: the focus is on large populations of individuals who interact at random rather than on small numbers of players; and individuals are assumed to employ simple adaptive rules rather than to engage in perfectly rational behavior. In such a setting, an equilibrium is a rest point of the population-level dynamical process rather than a form of consistency between beliefs and strategies. This chapter shows how the theory of stochastic dynamical systems can be used to characterize the equilibria that are most likely to be selected when the evolutionary process is subject to small persistent perturbations. Such equilibria are said to be stochastically stable. The implications of stochastic stability are discussed in a variety of settings, including 2 × 2 games, bargaining games, public-goods games, potential games, and network games. Stochastic stability often selects equilibria that are familiar from traditional game theory: in 2 × 2 games one obtains the risk-dominant equilibrium, in bargaining games the Nash bargaining solution, and in potential games the potential-maximizing equilibrium. However, the justification for these solution concepts differs between the two approaches. In traditional game theory, equilibria are justified in terms of rationality, common knowledge of the game, and common knowledge of rationality. Evolutionary game theory dispenses with all three of these assumptions; nevertheless, some of the main solution concepts survive in a stochastic evolutionary setting.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2014, (2015), Seite 327-380, 9780444537676
    In: 0444537678
    In: year:2015
    In: pages:327-380
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00006-9
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 8
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    Chapter 13. Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics (2015)
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    UID:
    gbv_1831651777
    ISBN: 9780444537676
    Content: Population games describe strategic interactions among large numbers of small, anonymous agents. Behavior in these games is typically modeled dynamically, with agents occasionally receiving opportunities to switch strategies, basing their choices on simple myopic rules called revision protocols . Over finite time spans the evolution of aggregate behavior is well approximated by the solution of a differential equation. From a different point of view, every revision protocol defines a map—a deterministic evolutionary dynamic —that assigns each population game a differential equation describing the evolution of aggregate behavior in that game. In this chapter, we provide an overview of the theory of population games and deterministic evolutionary dynamics. We introduce population games through a series of examples and illustrate their basic geometric properties. We formally derive deterministic evolutionary dynamics from revision protocols, introduce the main families of dynamics—imitative/biological, best response, comparison to average payoffs, and pairwise comparison—and discuss their basic properties. Combining these streams, we consider classes of population games in which members of these families of dynamics converge to equilibrium; these classes include potential games, contractive games, games solvable by iterative solution concepts, and supermodular games. We relate these classes to the classical notion of an evolutionarily stable state and to recent work on deterministic equilibrium selection. We present a variety of examples of cycling and chaos under evolutionary dynamics, as well as a general result on survival of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we provide connections to other approaches to game dynamics, and indicate applications of evolutionary game dynamics to economics and social science.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2014, (2015), Seite 703-778, 9780444537676
    In: 0444537678
    In: year:2015
    In: pages:703-778
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00013-6
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  • 9
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    Chapter 8. Combinatorial Auctions (2015)
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    UID:
    gbv_1831651823
    ISBN: 9780444537676
    Content: Many auctions involve the sale of heterogenous indivisible objects. Examples are wireless spectrum, delivery routes and airport time slots. Because of complementarities or substitution effects between the objects, bidders have preferences not just over individual items but over subsets of them. For this reason, economic efficiency is enhanced if bidders are allowed to bid on bundles or combinations of different assets. This chapter surveys the state of knowledge about combinatorial auctions.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2014, (2015), Seite 455-476, 9780444537676
    In: 0444537678
    In: year:2015
    In: pages:455-476
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00008-2
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  • 10
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    Chapter 7. Advances in Auctions (2015)
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    UID:
    gbv_183165184X
    ISBN: 9780444537676
    Content: As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a selective update of some of the developments and applications of auction theory in the two decades since Wilson (1992) wrote the previous Handbook chapter on this topic.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2014, (2015), Seite 381-453, 9780444537676
    In: 0444537678
    In: year:2015
    In: pages:381-453
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00007-0
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