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Umfang: 1 online resource (1175 p.)

ISBN: 9786611762704 , 9781281762702 , 1281762709 , 9780080887968 , 0080887961

Serie: Handbooks in economics, 1

Inhalt: Experimental methods in economics respond to circumstances that are not completely dictated by accepted theory or outstanding problems. While the field of economics makes sharp distinctions and produces precise theory, the work of experimental economics sometimes appear blurred and may produce results that vary from strong support to little or partial support of the relevant theory. At a recent conference, a question was asked about where experimental methods might be more useful than field methods. Although many cannot be answered by experimental methods, there are questions that can o

Anmerkung: Description based upon print version of record. , Front cover; Handbook of Experimental Economics Results; Copyright page; Introduction to the Series; Preface; Introduction; The Book Organization; References; Contents of Volume 1; Part 1: Markets; 1. Markets; References; Part 1.1: Institutional Environments; Part 1.1.1: Properties of the Double Auction; Chapter 1. Properties of Disequilibrium Adjustment in Double Auction Markets; References; Chapter 2. From Market Jaws to the Newton Method: The Geometry of How a Market Can Solve Systems of Equations; References , Chapter 3. Exogenous Uncertainty Increases the Bid-Ask Spread in the Continuous Double Auction1. Experimental Design; 2. Exogenous Uncertainty and the Bid/Ask Spread; 3. Conclusion; References; Chapter 4. Zero-Intelligence Robots and the Double Auction Market: A Graphical Tour; 1. Environment; 2. Robot Agents; 3. Literature - Robots and the Double Auction; References; Chapter 5. Effect of Non-binding Price Controls in Double Auction Trading; 1. Introduction; 2. Experimental Design; 3. Experimental Results; 4. Why Do Non-binding Price Controls Interfere with the DA Market Process? , 5. ConclusionsReferences; Part 1.1.2: Properties of Posted Offer Processes; Chapter 6. Fairness and Short Run Price Adjustment in Posted Offer Markets; 1. Introduction; 2. Market Experiments; 3. Hypothesis and Experimental Results; 4. Discussion; References; Chapter 7. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Predictions as a Means of Organizing Behavior in Posted-Offer Market Experiments; 1. Introduction; 2. Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Pricing Distributions; 3. Pricing Performance with Market Power; 4. Pricing Densities Relative to Static Nash Equilibrium Predictions , 5. Performance of Alternative Theories6. Summary; References; Chapter 8. Simulated and Real Buyers in Posted Offer Markets; 1. Introduction; 2. Summary of the Experimental Design; 3. Results; Acknowledgements; References; Chapter 9. The Performance of Double-Auction and Posted-Offer Markets with Advance Production; References; Part 1.1.3: Call Markets and Sealed Bids; Chapter 10. Strategy-Proof Equilibrium Behavior in Two-Sided Auctions; 1. Strategy-Proof Equilibria in the Sealed Bid-Offer Auction; 2. Strategy-Proof Equilibria in the Uniform Price Double Auction (UPDA); 3. Summary; References , Chapter 11. First Price Independent Private Values Auctions1. Tests of the RNM with Market Prices; 2. Tests of the RNM with Subject Payoff Data; 3. Tests of the CRRAM and the RNM with Individual Bid Data; 4. Tests of the LCM with Individual Bid Data; 5. Summary of the Test Results; Acknowledgement; References; Part 1.1.4: Alternative Market Institutions; Chapter 12. The Walrasian Auction; 1. Introduction; 2. Experimental Environments; 3. Walrasian Auction Design and Computerized Implementation; 4. Experimental Results; References; Chapter 13. The Matching Market Institution , 1. Experimental Procedures , English

Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9780444826428

Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 0444826424

Sprache: Englisch

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Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource

ISBN: 9780444826428

Serie: Handbooks in economics 28

Anmerkung: Bd. 1 (2008) im Rahmen einer Nationallizenz (ZDB-1-HBE) verfügbar.

Sprache: Englisch

Schlagwort(e): Wirtschaft ; Wirtschaftssystem ; Aufsatzsammlung

URL: Volltext

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Umfang: XLIII, 1097, I-31 S. , Ill., zahlr. graph. Darst.

Ausgabe: 1. ed.

ISBN: 0444826424 , 9780444826428

Serie: Handbooks in economics 28,1

Anmerkung: Literaturangaben , In der Vorlage fälschlich auch als Bd. 1 des GT bezeichnet , Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke

In: Vol. 1

Sprache: Englisch

Fachgebiete: Psychologie

Schlagwort(e): Handbuch

URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis

Mehr zum Autor: Smith, Vernon L. 1927-

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Umfang: Online Ressource (xliii, 1097, 31 pages) , illustrations (some color).

Ausgabe: 1st ed.

Ausgabe: Online-Ausg.

ISBN: 0080887961 , 9780080887968 , 9780444826428 , 0444826424

Serie: Handbooks in economics 1574-0722 [28]

Inhalt: Experimental methods in economics respond to circumstances that are not completely dictated by accepted theory or outstanding problems. While the field of economics makes sharp distinctions and produces precise theory, the work of experimental economics sometimes appear blurred and may produce results that vary from strong support to little or partial support of the relevant theory. At a recent conference, a question was asked about where experimental methods might be more useful than field methods. Although many cannot be answered by experimental methods, there are questions that can only be answered by experiments. Much of the progress of experimental methods involves the posing of old or new questions in a way that experimental methods can be applied. The title of the book reflects the spirit of adventure that experimentalists share and focuses on experiments in general rather than forcing an organization into traditional categories that do not fit. The emphasis reflects the fact that the results do not necessarily demonstrate a consistent theme, but instead reflect bits and pieces of progress as opportunities to pose questions become recognized. This book is a result of an invitation sent from the editors to a broad range of experimenters asking them to write brief notes describing specific experimental results. The challenge was to produce pictures and tables that were self-contained so the reader could understand quickly the essential nature of the experiments and the results

Inhalt: Experimental methods in economics respond to circumstances that are not completely dictated by accepted theory or outstanding problems. While the field of economics makes sharp distinctions and produces precise theory, the work of experimental economics sometimes appear blurred and may produce results that vary from strong support to little or partial support of the relevant theory. At a recent conference, a question was asked about where experimental methods might be more useful than field methods. Although many cannot be answered by experimental methods, there are questions that can only be answered by experiments. Much of the progress of experimental methods involves the posing of old or new questions in a way that experimental methods can be applied. The title of the book reflects the spirit of adventure that experimentalists share and focuses on experiments in general rather than forcing an organization into traditional categories that do not fit. The emphasis reflects the fact that the results do not necessarily demonstrate a consistent theme, but instead reflect bits and pieces of progress as opportunities to pose questions become recognized. This book is a result of an invitation sent from the editors to a broad range of experimenters asking them to write brief notes describing specific experimental results. The challenge was to produce pictures and tables that were self-contained so the reader could understand quickly the essential nature of the experiments and the results

Anmerkung: Includes bibliographical references and index. - Print version record , Abbreviated Contents. Introduction; Markets; Market Economics of Uncertainty and Information; General Equilibrium and the Economics of Multiple Market Systems; Games; Mechanism Design and Policy Applications; Non Market and Organizational Research; Individual Choice, Beliefs and Behavior; Methods. , Part 1.3.Dynamics of market adjustments.Ch. 26.Principles of market adjustment and stability , Part 5.Mechanism design and policy applicationsPart 5.1.Abstract, theory driven.Ch. 67.Incentive-compatible mechanisms for pure public goods :a survey of experimental research , Part 6.Non-market and organizational research.Part 6.1.Public goods, externalities and common pools.Ch. 82.Partners versus strangers :random rematching in public goods experiments , Part 6.3.Behavior and organizations.Ch. 96.Growing organizational culture in the laboratory , Part 1.MarketsPart 1.1.Institutional environmentsPart 1.1.1.Properties of the double auction.Ch. 1.Properties of disequilibrium adjustment in double auction markets , Part 3.General equilibrium and the economics of multiple market systems.Ch. 41.Comparative advantage and international trade , Part 2.Market economics of uncertainty and information.Ch. 35.Learning to forecast rationally , Ch. 36.Laboratory tests of job search models , Ch. 37.Reciprocity and contract enforcement , Ch. 38.Reciprocity in experimental markets , Ch. 39.Information cascade experiments , Ch. 40.Markets and information aggregation mechanisms , Ch. 68.The combinatorial auction , Part 5.2.Applied, problem driven.Ch. 69.Share trading and coupon banking interact to improve performance in emission trading markets , Ch. 70.Trading institutions and emission allowances , Ch. 71.Procurement contracting , Ch. 72.Electric power market design issues and laboratory experiments , Ch. 73.Energy, reserve and adjustment market behavior with industry network, demand and generator parameters , Ch. 74.Transmission constraints, incentive auction rules and trader experience in an electric power market , Ch. 75.A smart market for the spot pricing and pricing of transmission through a power grid , Part 5.3.From the lab to the field.Ch. 76.Asset market manipulation :a field experiment with racetrack betting , Ch. 77.Pre-testing international climate change policies :methods and results , Ch. 78.Quasi-experimental evaluation of regional employment subsidies , Ch. 79.Field-test elicitations of demand for public goods , Ch. 80.Results from a dozen years of election futures markets research , Ch. 81.Experimental evidence on the existence of hypothetical bias in value elicitation methods , Ch. 83.Differentiating altruism and reciprocity , Ch. 84.Voluntary provision of public goods :experimental results with interior Nash equilibria , Ch. 85.Spiteful behavior in voluntary contribution mechanism experiments , Ch. 86.Explaining the comparative statics in step-level public good games , Ch. 87.Cooperation in VCM experiments :results using the contribution function approach , Ch. 88.Voluntary provision of public goods , Ch. 89.Intrinsic motivation in a public good environment , Ch. 90.Theoretical explanations of treatment effects in voluntary contributions experiments , Part 6.2.Committees and voting groups.Ch. 91.Institutional modifications of majority rule , Ch. 92.Endogenous properties of equilibrium and disequilibrium in spatial committee games , Ch. 93.Structure induced equilibrium in spatial committee games , Ch. 94.Three-way experimental election results :strategic voting, coordinated outcomes and Duverger's law , Ch. 95.Participation game experiments :explaining voter turnout , Part 7.Individual choice, beliefs and behavior.Ch. 97.Motivation theory and experimental behavior under the decision cost hypothesis , Ch. 98.Intertemporal choice under habit formation , Ch. 99.Preference reversal :now you see it, now you do not! , Ch. 100.The endowment effect :evidence of losses valued more than gains , Ch. 101.The endowment effect , Ch. 102.The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism is not generally incentive-compatible in practice , Ch. 103.Utility maximization , Ch. 104.Preference reversals , Ch. 105.Rationality the fast and frugal way :introduction , Ch. 106.The recognition heuristic and the less-is-more effect , Ch. 107.The recognition heuristic :a fast and frugal way to investment choice? Andreas Ortmann ... [et al.]Ch. 108.One-reason decision making , Ch. 109.Cognitive illusions reconsidered , Ch. 110.Social heuristics , Ch. 111.Payoff scale effects and risk preference under rael and hypothetical conditions , Ch. 112.Rewards and behavior in first price auctions , Ch. 113.Men, women and risk aversion :experimental evidence , Part 8.Methods.Ch. 114.Experimetrics :the use of market experiments to evaluate theperformance of econometric estimators , Ch. 115.On the performance of the lottery procedure for controlling risk preferences , Part 1.1.2.Properties of posted offer processes.Ch. 6.Fairness and short run price adjustment in posted offer markets , Part 1.1.3.Call markets and sealed bids.Ch. 10.Strategy-proof equilibrium behavior in two-sided auctions , Part 1.1.4.Alternative market institutions.Ch. 12.The Walrasian auction , Part 1.2.Imperfect competitionPart 1.2.1. Market power.Ch. 15.Wage differentials in experimental efficiency wage markets / Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter ;Ch. 16.The paradox of power , Part 1.2.2.Collusion.Ch. 20.Price signaling and "cheap talk" in laboratory posted offer markets , Part 1.2.3.Non-convexities.Ch. 24.Non-convexities, economies of scale, natural monopoly and monopolistic competition , Ch. 42.Asset pricing , Ch. 43.Price discovery and allocation in chains and networks of markets , Ch. 44.Multiple market systems and the classical principles of price dynamics in general equilibrium , Part 4.GamesPart 4.1.Accuracy of the Nash model.Ch. 45.Experimental beauty contest games :levels of reasoning and convergence to equilibrium , Ch. 46.Reciprocity in ultimatum and dictator games :an introduction , Ch. 47.Preferences and property rights in ultimatum and dictator games , Ch. 48.Prompting strategic reasoning increases Other-regarding behavior , Ch. 49.Social distance and reciprocity in dictator games , Ch. 50.Fairness in ultimatum bargaining , Ch. 51.Coordination failure in market statistic games , Ch. 52.The problem of common choice in symmetric N -person coordination games , Ch. 53.Equilibrium convergence in normal form games , Ch. 54.Analyzing choice with revealed preference :is altruism rational? , Ch. 55.Testing theories of Other-regarding behavior :a sequence of four laboratory studies , Ch. 56.Focal points and bargaining , Part 4.2.Alternatives to Nash.Ch. 57.Differences in the economic decisions of men and women :experimental evidence , Ch. 58.Emergent conventions in evolutionary games , Ch. 59.Self-centered fairness in games with more than two players , Ch. 60.Quantal response equilibria :a brief synopsis , Ch. 61.Logit equilibrium models of anomalous behavior :what to do when the Nash equilibrium says one thing and the data say something else , Part 4.3.Learning in games.Ch. 62.Asymmetric two-person bargaining under incomplete information :strategic play and adaptive learning , Ch. 63.The effect of message space size on learning and outcomes in sender-receiver games , Ch. 64.Learning in entry limit pricing games , Ch. 65.Payoff uncertainty and cooperation in finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma games , Ch. 66.Learning and equilibrium in games , Front cover; Handbook of Experimental Economics Results; Copyright page; Introduction to the Series; Preface; Introduction; The Book Organization; References; Contents of Volume 1; Part 1: Markets; 1. Markets; References; Part 1.1: Institutional Environments; Part 1.1.1: Properties of the Double Auction; Chapter 1. Properties of Disequilibrium Adjustment in Double Auction Markets; References; Chapter 2. From Market Jaws to the Newton Method: The Geometry of How a Market Can Solve Systems of Equations; References , Chapter 3. Exogenous Uncertainty Increases the Bid-Ask Spread in the Continuous Double Auction1. Experimental Design; 2. Exogenous Uncertainty and the Bid/Ask Spread; 3. Conclusion; References; Chapter 4. Zero-Intelligence Robots and the Double Auction Market: A Graphical Tour; 1. Environment; 2. Robot Agents; 3. Literature - Robots and the Double Auction; References; Chapter 5. Effect of Non-binding Price Controls in Double Auction Trading; 1. Introduction; 2. Experimental Design; 3. Experimental Results; 4. Why Do Non-binding Price Controls Interfere with the DA Market Process? , 5. ConclusionsReferences; Part 1.1.2: Properties of Posted Offer Processes; Chapter 6. Fairness and Short Run Price Adjustment in Posted Offer Markets; 1. Introduction; 2. Market Experiments; 3. Hypothesis and Experimental Results; 4. Discussion; References; Chapter 7. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Predictions as a Means of Organizing Behavior in Posted-Offer Market Experiments; 1. Introduction; 2. Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Pricing Distributions; 3. Pricing Performance with Market Power; 4. Pricing Densities Relative to Static Nash Equilibrium Predictions , 5. Performance of Alternative Theories6. Summary; References; Chapter 8. Simulated and Real Buyers in Posted Offer Markets; 1. Introduction; 2. Summary of the Experimental Design; 3. Results; Acknowledgements; References; Chapter 9. The Performance of Double-Auction and Posted-Offer Markets with Advance Production; References; Part 1.1.3: Call Markets and Sealed Bids; Chapter 10. Strategy-Proof Equilibrium Behavior in Two-Sided Auctions; 1. Strategy-Proof Equilibria in the Sealed Bid-Offer Auction; 2. Strategy-Proof Equilibria in the Uniform Price Double Auction (UPDA); 3. Summary; References , Chapter 11. First Price Independent Private Values Auctions1. Tests of the RNM with Market Prices; 2. Tests of the RNM with Subject Payoff Data; 3. Tests of the CRRAM and the RNM with Individual Bid Data; 4. Tests of the LCM with Individual Bid Data; 5. Summary of the Test Results; Acknowledgement; References; Part 1.1.4: Alternative Market Institutions; Chapter 12. The Walrasian Auction; 1. Introduction; 2. Experimental Environments; 3. Walrasian Auction Design and Computerized Implementation; 4. Experimental Results; References; Chapter 13. The Matching Market Institution , 1. Experimental Procedures

Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9786611762704

Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 6611762701

Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9780444826428

Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Handbook of experimental economics results. [Volume 1]

Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Handbook of experimental economics results Amsterdam [u.a.] : North-Holland, 2008

Sprache: Englisch

Fachgebiete: Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Schlagwort(e): Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung ; Wirtschaftswissenschaften ; Methodologie ; Experiment ; Wirtschaftsforschung ; Methodologie ; Electronic books

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

URL: Volltext

Mehr zum Autor: Smith, Vernon L. 1927-

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ISBN: 0080887961

Inhalt: The use of monetary incentives may not affect behavior much in some contexts, or it may simply reduce the dispersion of data around some theoretical prediction. But the experiments indicate that incentive effects may be large and systematic in other contexts. In the absence of a widely accepted theory of when incentives matter, it is probably not advisable to derive scientific conclusions from laboratory studies that do not provide clear, salient motivation. The evidence surveyed here shows that relying on hypothetical payments can yield misleading results in some circumstances. Moreover, social scientists do not have a good feel for when to believe hypothetical choice patterns. Given this, they believe that performance-based incentives should be used in economics experiments, and results motivated by hypothetical incentives should be interpreted with caution.

In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 1047-1053, 0080887961

In: 9780080887968

In: 9780444826428

In: 0444826424

In: year:2008

In: pages:1047-1053

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00111-4

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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ISBN: 0080887961

Inhalt: This chapter reviews the results from experimental measures of risk aversion for evidence of systematic differences in the behavior of men and women. In most studies, women are found to be more averse to risk than men. Studies with contextual frames show less consistent results. Whether men and women systematically differ in their responses to risk is an important economic question. If women are more sensitive to risk than men, this will be reflected in all aspects of their decision making, including choice of profession (and so earnings), investment decisions, and what products to buy. Several recent studies investigate this difference directly. Most experiments that investigate preferences over risky choices deal with the question of whether people make choices that are consistent with expected utility maximization.

In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 1061-1073, 0080887961

In: 9780080887968

In: 9780444826428

In: 0444826424

In: year:2008

In: pages:1061-1073

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00113-8

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ISBN: 0080887961

Inhalt: Although certain government policies might be tested in controlled experiments during a pilot phase, such tests are rarely undertaken. Ideally, a policy could be tried, when feasible and meaningful, on a random subset of areas, firms or consumers exposed to the policy and be compared with the remaining subset over a significant period of time. The results reported here are from a test where the Swedish government introduced a regional employment policy in a limited part of a fairly homogeneous area with high chronic unemployment, hence creating a non-random division into an experiment region and a control region. Once the decision was made to introduce the policy, a quasi- experimental evaluation of the policy was proposed to the government; and, as a result, the government agreed to leave the two regions intact for a period of three years to allow this evaluation to take place and cover a non-trivial period of time a quite unusual, perhaps unprecedented, step for a government to take.

In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 733-735, 0080887961

In: 9780080887968

In: 9780444826428

In: 0444826424

In: year:2008

In: pages:733-735

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00078-9

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ISBN: 0080887961

In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite xiii-xliii, 0080887961

In: 9780080887968

In: 9780444826428

In: 0444826424

In: year:2008

In: pages:xiii-xliii

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00131-X

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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ISBN: 0080887961

Inhalt: This chapter is an introduction to the series of the book Handbook Of Experimental Economics Results. Each Handbook provides self-contained surveys of the current state of a branch of economics in the form of chapters prepared by leading specialists on various aspects of this branch of economics. These surveys summarize not only received results but also newer developments, from recent journal articles and discussion papers. Some original material is also included, but the main goal is to provide comprehensive and accessible surveys.

In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite vii, 0080887961

In: 9780080887968

In: 9780444826428

In: 0444826424

In: year:2008

In: pages:vii

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00116-3

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ISBN: 0080887961

Inhalt: Early in the development of experimental economics interest emerged in using the lab as a test bed for mechanism design and the examination of public policy questions.The contingent valuation method (CVM) is a hypothetical survey instrument that has been widely used and promoted in the assessment of environmental resource damages. Harrison and Rutstrm discuss the crucial issue of whether there is bias in CVM instruments arising from the fact that both the policy being evaluated and its damage prevention value are hypothetical with weak and distorted private incentives for respondents to accurately reveal their preferences. In these settings the question is whether people overstate their true evaluations. They provide a comprehensive review of a wide range of experiments allowing the existence of hypothetical bias to be determined, concluding that the existence of such bias, while highly variable, is persistent and cannot be ignored in the use of CVM instruments.

In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 619-623, 0080887961

In: 9780080887968

In: 9780444826428

In: 0444826424

In: year:2008

In: pages:619-623

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00122-9

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)