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  • 1
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press
    UID:
    b3kat_BV044871588
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 210 Seiten) , Diagramme
    ISBN: 9780472123469 , 9780472130641 , 9780472900923 , 0472130641 , 0472900927
    Inhalt: Why do rich countries flirt with fiscal disaster? Why did affluent countries - like Belgium, Greece, Italy or Japan - persistently accumulate so much debt between the 1970s and the 2000s, in times of peace and prosperity, that they became vulnerable and exposed themselves to the risk of default? In the past three decades, an extensive scholarly consensus emerged around the view that the answer is fiscal indiscipline, the lack of sufficient concern for budgetary constraints from policy makers as they try to please voters. Zsófia Barta argues that explaining why some countries accumulate substantial amounts of debt for decades hinges on understanding the conditions required to allow policy makers to successfully put into place painful adjustment measures
    Anmerkung: Includes bibliographical references and index. , The puzzle of relentlessly and alarmingly growing debt -- Fiscal polarization, international exposure, and sustained debt accumulation -- Evolving social coalitions, intense polarization, and moderate exposure : Italy -- Fiscal discord and accord in open economies : Belgium versus Ireland -- Fiscal discord in closed economies : Greece and Japan -- Variations on three themes : social coalitions, fiscal polarization, and international exposure
    Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, hardback ISBN 978-0-472-13064-1
    Sprache: Englisch
    Fachgebiete: Wirtschaftswissenschaften , Rechtswissenschaft
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Schlagwort(e): Industriestaaten ; Öffentliche Schulden ; Fiskalpolitik ; Geschichte 1970-2000 ; Electronic books. ; Electronic books
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: JSTOR
    URL: OAPEN
    URL: OAPEN
    URL: OAPEN
    URL: Image  (Thumbnail cover image)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 2
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Ann Arbor :University of Michigan Press,
    UID:
    almahu_9949292621402882
    Umfang: 1 online resource (xiv, 210 pages) : , illustrations, charts; PDF, digital file(s).
    ISBN: 9780472900923 , 0472900927
    Inhalt: Why do rich countries flirt with fiscal disaster? Between the 1970s and the 2000s, during times of peace and prosperity, affluent countries-like Belgium, Greece, Italy, and Japan-accumulated so much debt that they became vulnerable and exposed themselves to the risk of default. In the past three decades, an extensive scholarly consensus emerged that these problems were created by fiscal indiscipline, the lack of sufficient concern for budgetary constraints from policy makers as they try to please voters. This approach formed the foundation for the fiscal surveillance system that attempted to bring borrowing in European countries under control via a set of fiscal rules. In the Red demonstrates that the problem of sustained, large-scale debt accumulation is an adjustment issue rather than a governance failure. Irrespective of whether the original impetus for borrowing arose from exogenous changes or irresponsible decision making, policy makers invariably initiate spending cuts and/or tax increases when debt grows at an alarming rate for several years in a row. Zsófia Barta argues that explaining why some countries accumulate substantial amounts of debt for decades hinges on understanding the conditions required to allow policy makers to successfully put into place painful adjustment measures.
    Anmerkung: Intro -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- List of Abbreviations -- Acknowledgments -- One. The Puzzle of Relentlessly and Alarmingly Growing Debt -- Two. Fiscal Polarization, International Exposure, and Sustained Debt Accumulation -- Three. Evolving Social Coalitions, Intense Polarization, and Moderate Exposure: Italy -- Four. Fiscal Discord and Accord in Open Economies: Belgium versus Ireland -- Five. Fiscal Discord in Closed Economies: Greece and Japan -- Six. Variations on Three Themes: Social Coalitions, Fiscal Polarization, and International Exposure -- Notes -- References -- Index. , Also available in print form. , English.
    Weitere Ausg.: Print version: ISBN 9780472130641
    Sprache: Englisch
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 3
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : University of Michigan Press
    UID:
    gbv_1778515061
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource
    ISBN: 9780472900923
    Inhalt: Why do rich countries flirt with fiscal disaster? Why did affluent countries – like Belgium, Greece, Italy or Japan – persistently accumulate so much debt between the 1970s and the 2000s, in times of peace and prosperity, that they became vulnerable and exposed themselves to the risk of default? In the past three decades, an extensive scholarly consensus emerged around the view that the answer is fiscal indiscipline, the lack of sufficient concern for budgetary constraints from policy makers as they try to please voters. Zsófia Barta argues that explaining why some countries accumulate substantial amounts of debt for decades hinges on understanding the conditions required to allow policy makers to successfully put into place painful adjustment measures
    Anmerkung: English
    Sprache: Englisch
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 4
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press
    UID:
    gbv_1778551289
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource
    ISBN: 9780472900923
    Inhalt: Why do rich countries flirt with fiscal disaster? Between the 1970s and the 2000s, during times of peace and prosperity, affluent countries—like Belgium, Greece, Italy, and Japan—accumulated so much debt that they became vulnerable and exposed themselves to the risk of default. In the past three decades, an extensive scholarly consensus emerged that these problems were created by fiscal indiscipline, the lack of sufficient concern for budgetary constraints from policy makers as they try to please voters. This approach formed the foundation for the fiscal surveillance system that attempted to bring borrowing in European countries under control via a set of fiscal rules. In the Red demonstrates that the problem of sustained, large-scale debt accumulation is an adjustment issue rather than a governance failure. Irrespective of whether the original impetus for borrowing arose from exogenous changes or irresponsible decision making, policy makers invariably initiate spending cuts and/or tax increases when debt grows at an alarming rate for several years in a row. Zsófia Barta argues that explaining why some countries accumulate substantial amounts of debt for decades hinges on understanding the conditions required to allow policy makers to successfully put into place painful adjustment measures
    Anmerkung: English
    Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Barta, Zsófia In the red Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, [2018] ISBN 9780472123469
    Sprache: Englisch
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 5
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Ann Arbor :University of Michigan Press,
    UID:
    almafu_9958380408702883
    Umfang: 1 online resource (xiv, 210 pages) : , illustrations, charts; PDF, digital file(s).
    ISBN: 9780472900923 , 0472900927
    Inhalt: Why do rich countries flirt with fiscal disaster? Between the 1970s and the 2000s, during times of peace and prosperity, affluent countries-like Belgium, Greece, Italy, and Japan-accumulated so much debt that they became vulnerable and exposed themselves to the risk of default. In the past three decades, an extensive scholarly consensus emerged that these problems were created by fiscal indiscipline, the lack of sufficient concern for budgetary constraints from policy makers as they try to please voters. This approach formed the foundation for the fiscal surveillance system that attempted to bring borrowing in European countries under control via a set of fiscal rules. In the Red demonstrates that the problem of sustained, large-scale debt accumulation is an adjustment issue rather than a governance failure. Irrespective of whether the original impetus for borrowing arose from exogenous changes or irresponsible decision making, policy makers invariably initiate spending cuts and/or tax increases when debt grows at an alarming rate for several years in a row. Zsófia Barta argues that explaining why some countries accumulate substantial amounts of debt for decades hinges on understanding the conditions required to allow policy makers to successfully put into place painful adjustment measures.
    Anmerkung: Intro -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- List of Abbreviations -- Acknowledgments -- One. The Puzzle of Relentlessly and Alarmingly Growing Debt -- Two. Fiscal Polarization, International Exposure, and Sustained Debt Accumulation -- Three. Evolving Social Coalitions, Intense Polarization, and Moderate Exposure: Italy -- Four. Fiscal Discord and Accord in Open Economies: Belgium versus Ireland -- Five. Fiscal Discord in Closed Economies: Greece and Japan -- Six. Variations on Three Themes: Social Coalitions, Fiscal Polarization, and International Exposure -- Notes -- References -- Index. , Also available in print form. , English.
    Weitere Ausg.: Print version: ISBN 9780472130641
    Sprache: Englisch
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 6
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Ann Arbor :University of Michigan Press,
    UID:
    almahu_9949550333202882
    Umfang: 1 online resource (227 p.)
    ISBN: 9780472900923
    Inhalt: Why do rich countries flirt with fiscal disaster? Why did affluent countries â€" like Belgium, Greece, Italy or Japan â€" persistently accumulate so much debt between the 1970s and the 2000s, in times of peace and prosperity, that they became vulnerable and exposed themselves to the risk of default? In the past three decades, an extensive scholarly consensus emerged around the view that the answer is fiscal indiscipline, the lack of sufficient concern for budgetary constraints from policy makers as they try to please voters. Zsófia Barta argues that explaining why some countries accumulate substantial amounts of debt for decades hinges on understanding the conditions required to allow policy makers to successfully put into place painful adjustment measures.
    Sprache: Englisch
    Schlagwort(e): Electronic books.
    URL: Image  (Thumbnail cover image)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 7
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Ann Arbor :University of Michigan Press,
    UID:
    almahu_9949576449002882
    Umfang: 1 online resource (172 pages)
    Ausgabe: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 9780472900923
    Anmerkung: Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Acknowledgments -- One. The Puzzle of Relentlessly and Alarmingly Growing Debt -- Two. Fiscal Polarization, International Exposure, and Sustained Debt Accumulation -- Three. Evolving Social Coalitions, Intense Polarization, and Moderate Exposure -- Four. Fiscal Discord and Accord in Open Economies -- Five. Fiscal Discord in Closed Economies -- Six. Variations on Three Themes -- Notes -- References -- Index.
    Weitere Ausg.: Print version: Barta, Zsofia In the Red Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press,c2018 ISBN 9780472130641
    Sprache: Englisch
    Schlagwort(e): Electronic books.
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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