UID:
edocfu_9959245596702883
Format:
1 online resource (xii, 203 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
1-139-80983-0
,
1-107-31613-8
,
1-107-32152-2
,
0-511-61572-8
,
1-107-31709-6
,
1-299-31878-9
,
1-107-31515-8
Content:
Why do governments turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and with what effects? This book argues that governments enter IMF programs for economic and political reasons, and finds that the effects are negative on economic growth and income distribution. By bringing in the IMF, governments gain political leverage - via conditionality - to push through unpopular policies. Note that if governments desiring conditions are more likely to participate, estimating program effects is not straightforward: one must control for the potentially unobserved political determinants of selection. This book addresses the selection problem using a dynamic bivariate version of the Heckman model analyzing cross-national time-series data. The main finding is that the negative effects of IMF programs on economic growth are mitigated for certain constituencies since programs also have distributional consequences. But IMF programs doubly hurt the least well off in society: they lower growth and shift the income distribution upward.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of Tables and Figures; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; A New Approach and New Findings; Where Do IMF Programs Come From?; Why Do Governments and the IMF Enter into Agreements?; The Data; Plan of the Book; 2 Analytically Significant Cases; Tanzania; Nigeria; Summary; Uruguay; Conclusion; 3 An Analytical Approach to the Politics of IMF Agreements; Preferences over Loans and Conditions; The Logic of Using IMF Conditionality; Extensions; Why Do Agreements Continue?; Conclusion; Appendix: The Decision of the Executive under Uncertainty
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4 Testing the Selection StoryA Statistical Model of Bilateral Cooperation; Filling in the Story; The Results; Loans Versus Conditions; The "Stripped" or "Large Sample" Model; Conclusion; Appendix: Dynamic Bivariate Probit with Partial Observability; 5 The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth; Previous Methods; Estimating the Counterfactual; The Intuition Behind the Model; Correcting for Selection Effects; The Effect of IMF Programs on Growth; Other Samples and Specifications; The 1990s; Appendix: Correcting for Selection Bias; 6 Distributional Consequences of IMF Programs
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Background on the IMF and DistributionEmpirical Approaches; The Effect of IMF Programs on Labor Share; Are the Owners of Capital Better Off?; Conclusion; 7 Conclusions; Selection Findings - Why Governments and the IMF Enter into Agreements; Performance Findings - The Effect of IMF Programs on Growth and Distribution; New Questions; Policy Implications; Appendix 1 Variables Used in This Study; Appendix 2 Country-Years in Samples; Countries grouped by region: Africa, North America,South America, Asia, Europe, and Oceania and Pacific Islands. 4,126 Observation sample: 135 Countries 1951-90
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1,024 Observation-sample: 79 Countries 1971-902,095 Observations of Labor Share of Income from Manufacturing for 110 Countries; References; Index
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English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-81675-0
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-01695-9
Language:
English
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