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UID:

Format: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (352 p.)) , digital, PDF file(s).

Edition: Online-Ausg.

ISBN: 9780511753985

Content: This book presents, compares, and develops various techniques for estimating market power - the ability to set price profitably above marginal cost - and strategies - the game-theoretic plans used by firms to compete with rivals. The authors start by examining static model approaches to estimating market power. They extend the analysis to dynamic models. Finally, they develop methods to estimate firms' strategies directly and examine how these strategies determine market power. A detailed technical appendix reviews the relevant information-theoretic and other econometric models that are used throughout. Questions and detailed answers for students and researchers are provided in the book for easy use

Content: Introduction -- Structure-conduct-performance -- Industry models of market power -- Differentiated-product structural models -- Strategic reasons for a dynamic estimation model -- Dynamic games involving economic fundamentals -- Estimation of dynamic games involving economic fundamentals -- Estimation of market power using a linear-quadratic model -- Estimating strategies: theory -- Estimating strategies-case studies -- Statistical appendix -- Bibliography

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)

Additional Edition: ISBN 9780521804400

Additional Edition: ISBN 9780521011143

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Perloff, Jeffrey M., 1950 - Estimating market power and strategies Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge University Press, 2007 ISBN 052180440X

Additional Edition: ISBN 0521011140

Additional Edition: ISBN 9780521804400

Additional Edition: ISBN 9780521011143

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9780521804400

Language: English

Subjects: Economics

Keywords: Unternehmen ; Marktmacht ; Wettbewerbsstrategie ; Mathematisches Modell

DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511753985

URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (354 pages)

Edition: 1st ed.

ISBN: 9780521804400 , 9780511288692

Content: The book shows economists how to estimate the ability of firms to raise their prices above their costs and how to estimate firms' strategies. It is designed for graduate students, researchers, and practitioners. It can be used as a textbook or as a guide to conducting research

Note: Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Foreword -- ONE Introduction and Overview -- THREE MAIN QUESTIONS -- STRUCTURE-CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE -- STATIC MODELS -- DYNAMICS -- STRATEGIES -- TWO Structure-Conduct-Performance -- MEASURES OF MARKET PERFORMANCE -- RATE OF RETURN -- Price-Cost Margins -- Tobin's q -- MEASURES OF MARKET STRUCTURE -- Firm Size Distribution -- Concentration Measures -- Concentration Statistics -- Problems with Using Concentration Measures -- Summary Statistic Biases -- Barriers to Entry -- Unionization -- THE RELATIONSHIP OF STRUCTURE TO PERFORMANCE -- Rates of Return and Industry Structure -- Price-CostMargins and Industry Structure -- Price-Average Cost Margins -- Price-Marginal Cost Margins -- Other Explanatory Variables -- International Studies of Performance and Structure -- Performance and Structure in Individual Industries -- Measurement and Statistical Problems -- Conceptual Problems -- A MODERN STRUCTURE-CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE APPROACH -- Theory -- Exogenous Sunk Cost -- Endogenous Sunk Costs -- Empirical Research -- SUMMARY -- PROBLEMS -- THREE Industry Models of Market Power -- STRUCTURAL APPROACH -- Interpretations of λ -- Identification -- Estimation and Hypothesis Tests -- Taxes: An Application -- NONPARAMETRIC AND REDUCED-FORM MODELS -- Comparative Statics -- Hall's Reduced-Form Approach -- OLIGOPSONY -- Structural Oligopsony Model -- Hall's Reduced-Form Oligopsony Model -- HOW WELL THESE METHODS WORK -- Tests Based on Cost Evidence -- Oligopoly Simulations -- Structural Model -- Hall's Reduced-Form Model -- Empirical Comparisons -- SUMMARY -- PROBLEMS -- FOUR Differentiated-Product Structural Models -- RESIDUAL DEMAND -- NEOCLASSICAL DEMAND SYSTEM -- Multilevel Demand Specifications -- An Almost Ideal Demand System Example -- Estimation -- Identification -- Instruments , EMPIRICAL LIKELIHOOD, GENERALIZED METHOD OF MOMENTS, AND BAYESIAN METHOD OF MOMENTS MODELS -- Empirical Likelihood Formulation -- Linear Example -- Discussion -- Bayesian Method of Moments -- SUMMARY -- Bibliography -- Answers -- Index , Hypothesis Tests -- RANDOM PARAMETER MODEL -- Linear Random Utility Model -- Estimating the Random-Parameter Model -- Market Power -- PROBLEMS -- FIVE Strategic Reasons for a Dynamic Estimation Model -- SUPERGAMES -- EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS -- MODELS OF REPEATED GAMES WITH TRIGGER STRATEGIES -- MODELS OF REPEATED GAMES WITH CONTINUOUS STRATEGIES -- SUMMARY -- PROBLEMS -- SIX Dynamic Games Involving Economic Fundamentals -- FUNDAMENTAL REASONS FOR DYNAMICS -- Production Fundamentals -- Demand Fundamentals -- A DYNAMIC GAME WITH A QUASI-FIXED INPUT -- OPEN-LOOP RULES -- Time Consistency of Open-Loop Rules -- Different Approaches to Obtaining Necessary Conditions -- SUBGAME PERFECTION AND MARKOV STRATEGIES -- DIFFERENTIABLE MARKOV PERFECT STRATEGIES -- A STICKY PRICE MODEL -- Multiplicity of Equilibria -- Selecting a Particular Equilibrium -- COMPARING OPEN-LOOP AND MARKOV EQUILIBRIA -- MARKOV PERFECT EQUILIBRIA AND CONJECTURAL VARIATIONS -- EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS -- DIFFERENT WAYS TO INTERPRET OPEN-LOOP EQUILIBRIUM -- SUMMARY -- PROBLEMS -- SEVEN Estimation of Dynamic Games Involving Economic Fundamentals -- OVERVIEW OF TWO EXAMPLES -- THE STICKY PRICE MODEL -- The Dynamic Programming Equation -- The Euler Equation for a Special Case -- Other Approaches to Deriving the Euler Equation -- The Estimation Model -- The General Model -- An Additional Assumption about Demand -- Random Demand Shifters -- Estimation Using the Dynamic Programming Equation -- A Related Dynamic Oligopoly Model -- A DYNAMIC MODEL WITH ADVERTISING -- The Open-Loop Equilibrium to the Advertising Model -- The Markov Perfect Equilibrium to the Advertising Model -- The Hybrid Model -- ESTIMATION OF MARKOV PERFECT EQUILIBRIA -- SUMMARY -- PROBLEMS -- EIGHT Estimation of Market Power Using a Linear-Quadratic Model -- ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS -- THE STATIC ANALOG -- THE DYNAMIC MODEL , IMPLICATIONS OF THE LINEAR-QUADRATIC STRUCTURE -- The Recursive Structure of the Solution -- The Principle of Certainty Equivalence -- PROPERTIES OF THE EQUILIBRIA -- EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS USED FOR ESTIMATION -- Necessary Conditions for the Open-Loop Equilibrium -- Necessary Conditions for the Markov Perfect Equilibrium -- Additional Restrictions and Testing -- EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS -- Coffee -- Rice -- ESTIMATION RESULTS -- Classical Estimates -- Bayesian Estimates -- Simulations -- SUMMARY -- APPENDIX 8A: DERIVATION OF RESTRICTIONS -- The Markov Perfect Restrictions -- PROBLEMS -- NINE Estimating Strategies: Theory -- RELATED STUDIES -- MIXED STRATEGIES -- OLIGOPOLY GAME -- The Strategies and the Game -- Econometric Adjustments for the Game -- THE ESTIMATION MODEL -- Classical Maximum Entropy Formulation for the Multinomial Problem -- Incorporating the Sample Information -- Incorporating the Nonsample, Game-Theoretic Information -- Properties of the Estimators -- The GME-Nash Estimator: Hypothesis Testing -- SUMMARY -- APPENDIX 9A: PROOF THAT THE GME-NASH ESTIMATOR IS CONSISTENT -- PROBLEMS -- TEN Estimating Strategies: Case Studies -- AIRLINES GAME -- Airlines Model -- Estimates -- Comparing Estimators -- Hypothesis Tests -- Sampling and Sensitivity Experiments -- Airlines Summary -- COLA GAME -- Cola Model -- Estimates -- Basic Statistics and Tests of the Cola Market -- Lerner Measures of Market Power -- Effects of the Exogenous Variables -- Cola Summary -- SUMMARY -- APPENDIX 10A: EXPECTED LERNER MEASURE -- STATISTICAL APPENDIX New EconometricMethods -- ESTIMATING ILL-POSED PROBLEMS -- Information -- Maximum Entropy Principle -- GENERALIZED MAXIMUM ENTROPY MODEL -- Extensions -- Inference and Diagnostics -- Empirical Examples for the Linear Model -- Discrete Choice Problem -- Maximum Likelihood Approach -- GME Approach

Additional Edition: Print version Perloff, Jeffrey M. Estimating Market Power and Strategies Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,c2007 ISBN 9780521804400

Language: English

Keywords: Electronic books

URL: FULL  ((OIS Credentials Required))

UID:

Format: XI, 340 S. : , graph. Darst.

Edition: 1. publ.

ISBN: 978-0-521-01114-3 , 978-0-521-80440-0

Note: Includes bibliographical references and index

Language: English

Subjects: Economics

Keywords: Finanzierung

URL: Table of contents only

URL: http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015668086&sequence=000006&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (xi, 340 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).

ISBN: 9780511753985 (ebook)

Content: This book presents, compares, and develops various techniques for estimating market power - the ability to set price profitably above marginal cost - and strategies - the game-theoretic plans used by firms to compete with rivals. The authors start by examining static model approaches to estimating market power. They extend the analysis to dynamic models. Finally, they develop methods to estimate firms' strategies directly and examine how these strategies determine market power. A detailed technical appendix reviews the relevant information-theoretic and other econometric models that are used throughout. Questions and detailed answers for students and researchers are provided in the book for easy use.

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). , Introduction -- Structure-conduct-performance -- Industry models of market power -- Differentiated-product structural models -- Strategic reasons for a dynamic estimation model -- Dynamic games involving economic fundamentals -- Estimation of dynamic games involving economic fundamentals -- Estimation of market power using a linear-quadratic model -- Estimating strategies: theory -- Estimating strategies-case studies -- Statistical appendix -- Bibliography.

Additional Edition: Print version: ISBN 9780521804400

Language: English

URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511753985

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (xi, 340 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).

Edition: 1st ed.

ISBN: 1-107-17428-7 , 1-280-91737-7 , 9786610917372 , 0-511-28996-0 , 0-511-29056-X , 0-511-28869-7 , 0-511-30188-X , 0-511-75398-5 , 0-511-28937-5

Content: This book presents, compares, and develops various techniques for estimating market power - the ability to set price profitably above marginal cost - and strategies - the game-theoretic plans used by firms to compete with rivals. The authors start by examining static model approaches to estimating market power. They extend the analysis to dynamic models. Finally, they develop methods to estimate firms' strategies directly and examine how these strategies determine market power. A detailed technical appendix reviews the relevant information-theoretic and other econometric models that are used throughout. Questions and detailed answers for students and researchers are provided in the book for easy use.

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). , Introduction -- Structure-conduct-performance -- Industry models of market power -- Differentiated-product structural models -- Strategic reasons for a dynamic estimation model -- Dynamic games involving economic fundamentals -- Estimation of dynamic games involving economic fundamentals -- Estimation of market power using a linear-quadratic model -- Estimating strategies: theory -- Estimating strategies-case studies -- Statistical appendix -- Bibliography. , English

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-521-01114-0

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-521-80440-X

Language: English