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  • 1
    UID:
    almafu_9958279169102883
    Umfang: 1 online resource (93 p.)
    Ausgabe: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 0-8330-8244-2 , 0-8330-8242-6
    Inhalt: A comprehensive review of historical insurgencies that ended in settlement after a military stalemate shows that these negotiations followed a similar path that can be generalized into a "master narrative" of seven steps executed in a common sequence. Such a narrative could help guide and assess the progress of a similar approach to resolving the conflict in Afghanistan as U.S. forces prepare to withdraw.
    Anmerkung: Description based upon print version of record. , Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures and Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; From Stalemate to Settlement: Lessons for Afghanistan from Historical Insurgencies That Have Been Resolved Through Negotiations; Introduction; How to Reach a Negotiated Settlement in Counterinsurgency Warfare; The Notion of a Master Narrative; Methods: Getting to a Master Narrative; Previous RAND Research: Paths to Victory; Developing the Master Narrative; The Master Narrative; Step 1: Military Stalemate and War-Weariness , Step 2: Acceptance of Insurgents as Legitimate Negotiating Partners or Non-AdversariesStep 3: Brokered Cease-Fires (Not Always Respected); Step 4: Official Intermediate Agreements; Step 5: Power-Sharing Offers; Step 6: Moderation of Insurgent Leadership; Step 7: Third-Party Guarantors; Sequences in the Individual Cases; Extended Example: Northern Ireland, 1969-1999; Step 1: Military Stalemate and War-Weariness; Step 2: Acceptance of Insurgents as Legitimate Negotiating Partners; Step 3: Brokered Cease-Fires (Not Always Respected); Step 4: Official Intermediate Agreements , Step 5: Power-Sharing OffersStep 6: Moderation of Insurgent Leadership; Step 7: Third-Party Guarantor; Twelve Additional Cases of Historical Insurgency Settled Through Negotiation; Yemen, 1962-1970; Philippines (MNLF), 1971-1996; Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990; Western Sahara, 1975-1991; Mozambique (RENAMO), 1976-1995; Indonesia (Aceh), 1976-2005; Kampuchea, 1978-1992; Bosnia, 1992-1995; Tajikistan, 1992-1997; Burundi, 1993-2003; Chechnya I, 1994-1996; Democratic Republic of the Congo (Anti-Kabila), 1998-2003; Following the Master Narrative Toward an End Game in Afghanistan , Step 2: Acceptance of Insurgents as Legitimate Negotiating PartnersStep 3: Brokered Cease-Fires; Step 4: Official Intermediate Agreements; Step 5: Power-Sharing Offers; Step 6: Moderation in Leadership; Step 7: Third-Party Guarantors; Conclusion; References , English
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 0-8330-8237-X
    Sprache: Englisch
    Schlagwort(e): Electronic books.
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 2
    UID:
    gbv_1008660760
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (xvii, 73 pages)
    ISBN: 9780833082428 , 0833082426 , 9780833082435 , 0833082442 , 0833082434 , 083308237X , 9780833082374 , 9780833082442
    Serie: RAND Corporation research report series RR469
    Inhalt: "In June 2013, the Afghan Taliban opened a political office in Qatar to facilitate peace talks with the U.S. and Afghan governments. Negotiations between the United States and the group that sheltered al-Qaeda would have been unthinkable 12 years ago, but the reality is that a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan is one of several possible end games under the current U.S. withdrawal plan. Negotiating an end to an insurgency can be a long and arduous process beset by false starts and continued violence, but a comprehensive review of historical cases that ended in settlement shows that these negotiations followed a similar path that can be generalized into a "master narrative." This research examines 13 historical cases of insurgencies that were resolved through negotiated settlement in which neither side (insurgents or counterinsurgents) unambiguously prevailed. Taken together, these cases reveal that the path to negotiated settlement generally proceeds in seven steps in a common sequence. Although this resulting master narrative does not necessarily conform precisely to every conflict brought to resolution through negotiation, it can serve as an important tool to guide the progress of a similar approach to resolving the conflict in Afghanistan as U.S. forces prepare to withdraw."--Provided by publisher
    Inhalt: "In June 2013, the Afghan Taliban opened a political office in Qatar to facilitate peace talks with the U.S. and Afghan governments. Negotiations between the United States and the group that sheltered al-Qaeda would have been unthinkable 12 years ago, but the reality is that a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan is one of several possible end games under the current U.S. withdrawal plan. Negotiating an end to an insurgency can be a long and arduous process beset by false starts and continued violence, but a comprehensive review of historical cases that ended in settlement shows that these negotiations followed a similar path that can be generalized into a "master narrative." This research examines 13 historical cases of insurgencies that were resolved through negotiated settlement in which neither side (insurgents or counterinsurgents) unambiguously prevailed. Taken together, these cases reveal that the path to negotiated settlement generally proceeds in seven steps in a common sequence. Although this resulting master narrative does not necessarily conform precisely to every conflict brought to resolution through negotiation, it can serve as an important tool to guide the progress of a similar approach to resolving the conflict in Afghanistan as U.S. forces prepare to withdraw."--Provided by publisher
    Anmerkung: "This report builds on previous RAND Corporation research on the demonstrated effectiveness of a variety of concepts for counterinsurgency ... at the core of the current research is an analysis of the correlates and conditions of negotiated settlements in historical insurgencies."--Preface , "Approved for public release; distribution unlimited , Includes bibliographical references
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9780833082374
    Weitere Ausg.: Druck-Ausgabe
    Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Clarke, Colin P From stalemate to settlement Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 2014
    Sprache: Englisch
    Schlagwort(e): Electronic books ; Electronic books
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 3
    UID:
    gbv_1877797618
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource
    ISBN: 9780833082442 , 9780833082374
    Serie: RAND Corporation research report series RR469
    Inhalt: A comprehensive review of historical insurgencies that ended in settlement after a military stalemate shows that these negotiations followed a similar path that can be generalized into a “master narrative" of seven steps executed in a common sequence. Such a narrative could help guide and assess the progress of a similar approach to resolving the conflict in Afghanistan as U.S. forces prepare to withdraw
    Anmerkung: English
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9780833082374
    Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Clarke, Colin P From stalemate to settlement Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 2014 ISBN 9780833082374
    Sprache: Unbestimmte Sprache
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 4
    AV-Medium
    AV-Medium
    Berlin : Dt. Schallpl.
    UID:
    gbv_083308237
    Umfang: 1 Schallpl.: 33 UpM, mono ; 30 cm
    Sprache: Deutsch
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 5
    UID:
    gbv_1696615798
    Umfang: 1 online resource (104 pages)
    ISBN: 9780833082442
    Inhalt: A comprehensive review of historical insurgencies that ended in settlement after a military stalemate shows that these negotiations followed a similar path that can be generalized into a âÂÂmaster narrativeâ of seven steps executed in a common sequence. Such a narrative could help guide and assess the progress of a similar approach to resolving the conflict in Afghanistan as U.S. forces prepare to withdraw.
    Inhalt: Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Preface -- Contents -- Figures and Tables -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- From Stalemate to Settlement: Lessons for Afghanistan from Historical Insurgencies That Have Been Resolved Through Negotiations -- Introduction -- How to Reach a Negotiated Settlement in Counterinsurgency Warfare -- The Notion of a Master Narrative -- Methods: Getting to a Master Narrative -- Previous RAND Research: Paths to Victory -- Developing the Master Narrative -- The Master Narrative -- Step 1: Military Stalemate and War-Weariness -- Step 2: Acceptance of Insurgents as Legitimate Negotiating Partners or Non-Adversaries -- Step 3: Brokered Cease-Fires (Not Always Respected) -- Step 4: Official Intermediate Agreements -- Step 5: Power-Sharing Offers -- Step 6: Moderation of Insurgent Leadership -- Step 7: Third-Party Guarantors -- Sequences in the Individual Cases -- Extended Example: Northern Ireland, 1969-1999 -- Step 1: Military Stalemate and War-Weariness -- Step 2: Acceptance of Insurgents as Legitimate Negotiating Partners -- Step 3: Brokered Cease-Fires (Not Always Respected) -- Step 4: Official Intermediate Agreements -- Step 5: Power-Sharing Offers -- Step 6: Moderation of Insurgent Leadership -- Step 7: Third-Party Guarantor -- Twelve Additional Cases of Historical Insurgency Settled Through Negotiation -- Yemen, 1962-1970 -- Philippines (MNLF), 1971-1996 -- Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990 -- Western Sahara, 1975-1991 -- Mozambique (RENAMO), 1976-1995 -- Indonesia (Aceh), 1976-2005 -- Kampuchea, 1978-1992 -- Bosnia, 1992-1995 -- Tajikistan, 1992-1997 -- Burundi, 1993-2003 -- Chechnya I, 1994-1996 -- Democratic Republic of the Congo (Anti-Kabila), 1998-2003 -- Following the Master Narrative Toward an End Game in Afghanistan -- Step 2: Acceptance of Insurgents as Legitimate Negotiating Partners.
    Anmerkung: Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9780833082374
    Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9780833082374
    Sprache: Englisch
    Schlagwort(e): Electronic books
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
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