UID:
almafu_9960074470602883
Format:
1 online resource (424 pages)
Edition:
2nd ed.
ISBN:
0-12-821372-8
Content:
Reducing greenhouse gases and increasing the use of renewable energy continue to be critical goals for the power industry and electrical engineers to promote energy cost reductions. Engineers and researchers must keep up to date with the evolution of the power system sector, new energy regulations, and how different pricing techniques apply in today's market. Electricity Cost Modeling Calculations, Second Edition delivers an updated view on pricing models, regulation, technology and the role renewable energy is starting to take in electricity. Starting with fundamental concepts relating to market structure, an increase in international regulations is added to expand the engineer's knowledge. Cubic cost modeling and new modeling cases are included along with updated literature reviews for deeper research. The reference then extends into more advanced quantitative methods such as updated rate designs, and a new chapter is included on the marginal cost pricing of electricity in the United States with applications to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, making the reference relevant for today's power markets. This book provides engineers with a practical guide on the latest techniques in electricity pricing and applications for today's markets. --
Note:
Front Cover -- Electricity Cost Modeling Calculations: Regulations, Technology, and the Role of Renewable Energy -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Some Basic Economic Theory -- A New Regulatory Paradigm -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. ``Going Green´´ -- 1.3. And Talking About ``Going Green´´ -- 1.4. And Speaking of Economics -- 1.5. The Marginal-Cost Pricing Doctrine -- B. The Theory (2) -- 1.6. A Brief Overview of the United States Electric Market -- The Structure of the United States Electricity Industry -- The Players and Their Incentives -- Objective Functions: The Players -- Investor-Owned Utilities: Profit Maximization -- Publicly Owned Firms -- Cooperatively Owned Firms -- Other -- The United States Electric Power Industry-Regulation -- Regulation of Investor-Owned Electric Utilities in the United States -- ASIDE: Issues With Rate-of-Return Regulation-The Averch-Johnson Effect -- 1.7. Internalizing the Cost of Reducing Carbon Emissions-The Marginal Social Cost -- Policy Measures -- Update From First Edition -- 1.8. Optimal Rate/Tariff Design and Tax Credits to Promote Efficient Use of Energy and a Reduction in Carbon Emissions -- Tariff Design and Rate-Making Issues -- Marginal-Cost Pricing for Electric Utilities -- 1.9. Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 2: The Sustainability of a (Natural) Monopoly -- 2.1. Defining Natural Monopoly -- For a Single-Output Market -- Average Cost -- 2.2. Economies of Scale -- 2.3. Examples -- Efficient Industry Structure -- Degree of Scale Economies -- 2.4. Economies of Scale Applied to the Electric Utility Industry -- 2.5. Literature Review-Economies of Scale in Generation -- 2.6. Economies of Scale and Density in Transmission and Distribution -- 2.7. Network Economies -- 2.8. For a Multiple-Output Natural Monopoly -- 2.9. Multiproduct Natural Monopoly.
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2.10. Ray Average Costs -- 2.11. Degree of Scale Economies -- Cost Concepts Applicable to Multiproduct Cases for Nonproportionate Changes in Output -- 2.12. Product-Specific Economies of Scale -- 2.13. Economies of Scope -- 2.14. Subadditivity of the Cost Function -- 2.15. Trans-ray Convexity -- 2.16. Literature Review: Electricity as a Multiple-Output Industry and Related Concepts -- 2.17. Economies of Vertical Integration and Separability -- 2.18. Vertical Integration of Electric Utilities -- 2.19. Defining Vertical Integration -- Separability -- 2.20. Relevant Literature Review-Vertical Integration and Separability -- 2.21. Bringing It All Together: Vertical and Horizontal Scope Economies in the Regulated U.S. Electric Power Industry (Jo ... -- 2.22. Summary -- 2.23. The Sustainability of a (Natural) Monopoly -- 2.24. Arguments for Competition in the Electric Utility Industry-A Brief History and Literature Review -- Arguments for a Single Supplier of Electricity: Regulators -- 2.25. The Theory of Sustainability -- 2.26. Sustainability of Natural Monopoly-The Theory -- Single-Product Natural Monopoly -- Multiproduct Market Sustainability -- 2.27. ASIDE: Game Theory-A (Very) Brief Overview -- 2.28. On the Behavior of Costs for Sustainability of a Monopoly -- On the Issue of Sustainable Prices -- 2.29. The Theory of Contestable Markets: The Case of Electricity Markets -- 2.30. Real-World Examples of the Theory of Contestable Markets (TCMs): From Markets With High Entry Barriers to Competition -- A Brief History and Literature Review of Contestable Markets: The Airline Industry -- Case in Point: Southwest Airlines -- The Telecommunications Industry -- History of the Telecommunications Industry -- The Electric Industry -- The Energy Policy Act of 1992 -- FERC Orders 888 and 889 (1996) -- Mergers and Acquisitions -- 2.31. Conclusion -- References.
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Chapter 3: State Regulations, Policies, and Updates on States With Retail Choice -- 3.1. A History of Regulation in the U.S. Electric Utility Industry -- The Rise of Regulation -- The Public Utility Holding Company Act (1935) -- ASIDE -- The Era After PUHCA -- Focus on Reliability: The North America Reliability Council -- NERC Reliability Assessment Areas Names -- The 1970s-A Time of Change -- The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) -- The National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978 -- The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 -- Industry Restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s -- Natural Gas Utilization Act of 1987 -- The 1990s-The Pace of Industry Restructuring Accelerates -- The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) -- FERC Orders 888 and 889 (1996) -- FERC Order 2000 and Grid Regionalization -- The Energy Policy Act of 2005 -- The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 -- FERC Order 719 -- The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 -- FERC Order 890 -- The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 -- The American Energy and Security Act of 2009 -- The American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009 -- FERC Order 1000 -- 3.2. Conclusion -- 3.3. Regulation at the State and Local Levels -- 3.4. Retail Choice Participation -- Some Details -- Some History About Illinois -- A Little More History on Texas -- 3.5. Electricity Deregulation -- 3.6. Summary: Deregulation of the Electricity Industry-A Failed Experiment -- 3.7. Rate Making and Incentivizing Electricity Suppliers to Invest in Demand-Side Management and Energy Efficiency Programs -- Demand Reduction: Key to Lowering Costs and Emissions -- Traditional Rate Making in the United States -- 3.8. The Current Environment -- 3.9. Energy Efficiency Resource Standards -- 3.10. A Brief History of Energy Efficiency Resource Standards -- EERS Achievements Over Time.
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Other Benefits -- 3.11. The Future of the Electric Industry -- 3.12. Summary -- Appendix -- Case Study: The California Debacle (or, What Not to Do) -- Introduction -- The Electricity Crisis: Summer 2000 -- Factors Precipitating the Crisis -- Chronology of the California Electricity Crisis: Lessons Learned (or, What Not to Do) -- Mistakes -- Mistake #1 -- Mistake #2 -- Mistake #3 -- Mistake #4 -- The Ability to Game the System -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 4: The Economics (and Econometrics) of Cost Modeling -- 4.1. The General Cost Model -- Cobb-Douglas Cost Function -- Translogarithmic Cost Function -- 4.2. The Econometrics of Cost Modeling: An Overview -- Ordinary Least Squares Estimation -- Regression Analysis and Cost Modeling -- Examples: Examining Data-An Illustration of Salient Points -- Estimation Results: Basic Cost Model -- ASIDE: The Consequences of Heteroscedasticity -- Impure Heteroscedasticity -- Estimation Results-Quadratic Cost Model -- 4.3. A Brief History of Cost Models and Applications to the Electric Industry -- The Cobb-Douglas Functional Form -- Returns to Scale -- Nerlove's Cobb-Douglas Function -- Economies of Scale -- Minimum Efficient Scale -- Nerlove's Results -- A Priori Expectations -- Elasticities -- The Constant Elasticity of Substitution Functional Form -- The Generalized Leontief Cost Function -- ASIDE: Leontief Production Technology -- The Leontief Cost Function -- Hicks-Allen Partial Elasticities of Substitution -- The Translogarithmic Cost Function -- Digression: Use of Zellner's Method (Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Method) -- Quadratic Cost Models -- Digression: Why the Quadratic Is the ``Best´´ Suited for Modeling Industry Structure -- Multiple-Output Quadratic Cost Function -- The Degree of Scale Economies -- Ray Average Cost -- Product-Specific Returns to Scale -- Economies of Scope.
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Cubic Cost Models -- 4.4. Appendix -- Proof That Eq. (4.86) Allows for Concavity in Input Prices: Nonpositive Own-Price Effects -- 4.5. Exercises -- References -- Chapter 5: Case Study: Breaking Up Bells -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. The Natural Monopoly Conundrum -- Defining Natural Monopoly -- Economies of Scope and Subadditivity -- Economies of Scope -- Subadditivity of the Cost Function -- 5.3. Breaking Up Bell: The Case of AT& -- T -- The Evans and Heckman Methodology -- Discussion of Results -- Discussion of Results -- ASIDE: Quadratic Cost Model -- Discussion of Table 5.3. Bell Data Estimated via Greer's Quadratic Cost Model -- Literature Review: Other Studies on the Subadditivity of the Bell System -- 5.4. Economies of Vertical Integration: An Argument for Natural Monopoly? -- Economies of Vertical Integration -- Discussion: Economies of Vertical Integration-An Argument for Natural Monopoly? -- 5.5. Parallels Between Telephony and Electricity -- Discussion: Economies of Scope vs. Economies of Vertical Integration -- Vertical Integration-The Case of Telephony -- The 1982 Consent Decree -- Technological Change -- The 1996 Telecommunications Deregulation Act (or, the Reintegration of the Industry?) -- Select Provisions From the Telecommunications Deregulation Act -- ASIDE: First-Mover Disadvantage -- The Market for Electricity -- Vertical Stage 1: Generation -- Economies of Scope (Horizontal Production) Applied to Electricity -- Other Parallels Between Telephony and Electricity, and Reasons That Both Were Thought to be Subject to Gains from Deregulation -- Technological Change as a Parallel -- Parallels Between Individual Components -- Ownership Parallels-Non-Investor-Owned Entities, or Rural vs. Urban Service Territories -- 5.6. Lessons to be Learned -- Lesson 1: A Caution to Regulators re: Encouraging Entry.
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A Lesson for Electricity Deregulation.
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-12-821365-5
Language:
English
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