UID:
edoccha_9959851745502883
Format:
1 online resource (xvi, 329 pages)
ISBN:
1-00-314894-8
,
1-003-14894-8
,
1-000-38620-1
Series Statement:
Comparative Constitutional Change
Content:
"This book explores the relationship between populism or populist regimes and constitutional interpretation used in those regimes. The volume discusses the question of whether contemporary populist governments and movements have developed, or encouraged new and specific constitutional theories, doctrines and methods of interpretation, or whether their constitutional and other high courts continue to use the old, traditional interpretative tools in constitutional adjudication. Divided into four parts, Part I contains three chapters elaborating the theoretical basis for the discussion. Part II examines the topic from a comparative perspective, representing those European countries where populism is most prevalent, including: Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Part III extends the focus to the United States, reflecting how American jurisprudence and academia have produced the most important contributions to the theory of constitutional interpretation, and recent political developments in that country might challenge the traditional understanding of judicial review. This section also includes a general overview on Latin America, where there are also some populist governments and strong populist movements. Finally, the editors' closing study analyzes the outcomes of the comparative research, summarizing the conclusions of the book"--
Note:
Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Authors -- Introduction and Acknowledgements -- Part I: Theoretical implications -- Chapter 1: Populism and populist constitutionalism -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The impalpable concept of populism -- 1.3 Conceptualizing populism -- 1.3.1 Historical background -- 1.3.2 The dimensions of populism -- 1.3.3 Types of populism -- 1.4 The mysterious notion of populist constitutionalism -- 1.4.1 'Authoritarian', 'illiberal', or 'populist' constitutionalism? -- 1.4.2 Populist constitutionalism: an oxymoron, or a special kind of constitutional system? -- 1.4.3 Defining populist constitutionalism: positive and negative criteria -- 1.4.3.1 Negative criteria of populist constitutionalism -- 1.4.3.1.1 Criticism of the separation of law and politics -- 1.4.3.1.2 Anti-elitism -- 1.4.3.1.3 Anti-institutionalism -- 1.4.3.1.4 Anti-pluralism -- 1.4.3.1.5 Illiberalism -- 1.4.3.2 Positive criteria of populist constitutionalism -- 1.4.3.2.1 Popular sovereignty and direct democracy -- 1.4.3.2.2 Authentic popular representation -- 1.4.3.2.3 Extreme majoritarianism -- 1.4.3.2.4 The strong leader (personification of power) and the strengthening of executive power -- 1.4.3.2.5 The instrumentalization of law -- 1.4.3.2.6 Other (secondary) criteria -- Chapter 2: The art of constitutional interpretation -- 2.1 Defining constitutional interpretation -- 2.2 Classifying interpretive theories -- 2.2.1 Monist and pluralistic theories -- 2.2.2 Other classifications of interpretive theories -- 2.3 Main interpretive theories -- 2.3.1 Interpretive modalities -- 2.3.2 Substantive interpretation -- 2.3.3 Other interpretive aids: judicial doctrines, constructions, standards, tests and legal maxims -- 2.4 Conclusion.
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Chapter 3: An 'Instrument of Government' or 'Instrument of Courts'?: The impact of political systems on constitutional interpretation and the case of populism -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Do political systems generate their own rules of constitutional interpretation? -- 3.2.1 Hypotheses -- 3.2.2 Written rules on constitutional interpretation - in the liberal world and beyond -- 3.3 Populist constitutionalism and constitutional interpretation - instruments and limits -- 3.4 Escalating or de-escalating populism: the role of courts in constitutional interpretation -- 3.5 Conclusions -- Chapter 4: Can there be autochthonous methods of constitutional interpretation? -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Substantive constitutional provisions -- 4.3 Interpretations of substantive provisions -- 4.4 Methods of constitutional interpretation -- 4.5 Conclusion -- Part II: Constitutional interpretation and populism in Europe -- Chapter 5: Formalism and judicial self-restraint as tools against populism?: Considerations regarding recent developments of the Austrian Constitutional Court -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Populism in Austria -- 5.2.1 Populism - what kind of populism? -- 5.2.2 The Austrian Freedom Party and the rise of populism in Austria -- 5.2.2.1 Jörg Haider and the Austrian Freedom Party (1986-2000) -- 5.2.2.2 The European scandal: the Freedom Party in Austrian government - part I (2000-2006) -- 5.2.3 Recent development: the Freedom Party in Austrian government - part II (2017-2019) -- 5.3 The Kurz Governments -- 5.3.1 Kurz I (2017-2019) -- 5.3.2 Kurz II (2020-) -- 5.4 Changing approaches of the Austrian Constitutional Court -- 5.4.1 Judicial approaches towards populism -- 5.4.2 Promoting Rights in a European Context (1970-2008) -- 5.4.3 The Slovenian Minority Case Law -- 5.4.4 Protecting Rights in a European Context (2008-2020) -- 5.4.5 Surveillance Case Law.
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5.5 Conclusion - The Austrian Constitutional Court maintains its own approach -- Chapter 6: The Czech Constitutional Court in times of populism: From judicial activism to judicial self-restraint -- 6.1 The legal design of the Czech Constitutional Court and the rise of populism in Czech politics -- 6.2 The two decades of expansion of the powers of the Constitutional Court and the decade of slow retreat -- 6.3 Review of the constitutionality of legislation -- 6.4 Activism of the Constitutional Court in relation to the general judiciary (constitutional complaints) -- 6.5 The personal homogeneity of the first Constitutional Court and the heterogeneity of the second and third court? -- 6.6 Conclusions -- Chapter 7: Popular initiatives, populism and the Croatian Constitutional Court -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Popular initiative as the means of fostering populist claims -- 7.3 The game becomes serious: the introduction of the constitutional identity concept -- 7.4 Proportionality in action -- 7.5 Back to the linguistic approach -- 7.6 Systemic interpretation in play -- 7.7 The story continues: recent failed attempts -- 7.8 Conclusion -- Chapter 8: Constitutional identity as a populist notion?: The Council of State and the forging of the Greek constitutional identity through the crisis -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 The forging of the Greek constitutional identity through the crisis -- 8.3 Understanding the Court's use of the notion of constitutional identity -- 8.4 Lessons to be drawn from the Greek experience -- 8.5 Epilogue -- Chapter 9: Constitutional interpretation under the new Fundamental Law of Hungary -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 The new methods of constitutional interpretation -- 9.2.1 The Constitutional Court -- 9.2.2 The collection of the principles and methods of constitutional interpretation laid down in the Fundamental Law.
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9.3 A new populist set of the methods of interpretation, or the reformulation of the classical methods? -- 9.4 The use of binding interpretative methods in constitutional jurisprudence -- 9.4.1 The application of the new methods of interpretation -- 9.4.2 Cases advancing populist constitutionalism (favouring the populist agenda) and the use of the new methods of interpretation in these specific cases -- 9.5 Conclusions -- Chapter 10: The populist reforms in Italy and the instrument of the constitutionally conforming interpretation -- 10.1 Could the Italian context be defined as populist? -- 10.2 The so-called ' decreti sicurezza ' and the containment of illegal migrants -- 10.3 The application of the constitutionally conforming interpretation -- 10.4 The (missing) intervention of the Constitutional Court on the Security Decrees -- 10.5 Conclusions -- Chapter 11: Whatever works: Constitutional interpretation in Poland in times of populism -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Preliminaries -- 11.3 Change or continuity? -- 11.3.1 The limits of judicial power -- 11.3.2 The preferred methods of constitutional interpretation -- 11.3.3 The approach to earlier findings -- 11.3.4 The approach to international law and EU law -- 11.4 Why cherry picking? -- 11.4.1 Pragmatism -- 11.4.2 Ideology -- 11.4.3 Reputation -- 11.4.4 Rhetoric -- 11.5 Conclusions -- Chapter 12: Non sequiturs in constitutional adjudication: Populism or epistemic deficit? -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Romania's political landscape: populist or not? -- 12.3 Discourses of constitutionalism in the Romanian context -- 12.4 Interpreting the Constitution -- 12.4.1 Decision no. 358/2018 - a problematic constitutional intervention -- 12.4.1.1 The political background -- 12.4.1.2 The legal background -- 12.4.1.3 A formalist result -- 12.4.2 Other constitutional 'mischiefs'.
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12.5 Populism or epistemic deficit? -- 12.6 Conclusions -- Chapter 13: Constitutional interpretation and populism in contemporary Spain -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 The political and social context of Spain -- 13.3 Populist challenges to constitutional jurisprudence -- 13.4 The health crisis and the constitutional interpretation -- 13.5 Conclusions -- Chapter 14: Populism, UK sovereignty, the rule of law and Brexit -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 The Brexit referendum and populist politics -- 14.3 Brexit: parliamentary procedure and constitutional conventions -- 14.4 Brexit and the Courts -- 14.5 The interpretation of prerogative powers: Miller 1 - can the government trigger Article 50 by making use of prerogative powers? -- 14.6 Prerogative powers: Miller 2 - can the courts review the exercise of the prerogative to prorogue Parliament? -- 14.7 Has Brexit resulted in new constitutional theories or doctrines? -- 14.8 Conclusions -- Part III: An outlook -- Chapter 15: Born populist: The Trump administration, the courts and the Constitution of the United States -- 15.1 Introduction -- 15.2 The populist jurisprudence of Antonin Scalia -- 15.3 Originalism and American right-wing populism -- 15.4 Judicial populism before (and a bit after) the rise of right-wing populism -- 15.5 Populist pasts and presents -- Chapter 16: Constitutional interpretation: What can Europeans learn from US debates? -- 16.1 Introduction -- 16.2 What is a constitution? -- 16.3 The limits of interpretability -- 16.4 Methods of interpretation -- 16.5 Imitative constitutionalism -- 16.6 Conclusion -- Chapter 17: Populist and non-democratic reading of the Constitution: Sad lessons from Latin America -- 17.1 Foreword -- 17.2 Thesis and main inferences -- 17.3 Analysis -- 17.3.1 Brief methodological remarks -- 17.3.2 Starting points -- 17.3.3 What kind of foundations?.
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17.3.4 Which rights are meant to be constitutional rights?.
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-367-71009-9
Language:
English
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