Format:
344 p.
ISBN:
9781107042209
,
9781107324909
,
9781107660397
Series Statement:
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Content:
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable - and illegal - to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these questions, testing the theory with research from four developing democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 24 Nov 2014)
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9781107042209
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Brokers, voters, and clientelism New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013 ISBN 1107042208
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1107660394
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9781107042209
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9781107660397
Language:
English
Subjects:
Political Science
,
Ethnology
Keywords:
Demokratie
;
Klientelismus
;
Wahlverhalten
;
Verteilungspolitik
;
Internationaler Vergleich
;
Wahl
;
Manipulation
;
Broker
DOI:
10.1017/CBO9781107324909
URL:
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