Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

UID:

Format: 1 online resource.

ISBN: 9781118328279 , 1118328272 , 9781118328330 , 1118328337 , 9781118328361 , 1118328361 , 9781118328408 , 111832840X , 1299664954 , 9781299664951 , 0470673702 , 9780470673706 , 9781118328385 , 1118328388

Series Statement: Blackwell Companions to Philosophy ; 53

Content: A Companion to Donald Davidson presents newly commissioned essays by leading figures within contemporary philosophy. Taken together, they provide a comprehensive overview of Davidson's work across its full range, and an assessment of his many contributions to philosophy. Highlights the breadth of Davidson's work across philosophyDemonstrates the continuing influence his work has on the philosophical communityIncludes newly commissioned contributions from leading figures in contemporary philosophyProvides an in-depth exposition and analysis of Dav.

Note: Includes index. , Cover -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- Introduction: Life and Work -- Life, Early Career, and the First Phrase of Davidson's Work through 1969 -- Second Phrase of Davidson's Work, 1970-1981 -- Third Phase of Davidson's Work from the 1980s On -- Organization and Contents of the Volume -- Bibliography -- Part I: Action Theory -- 1: Action Explanation -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Actions and Their Rationalization -- 3. Davidson's Challenge and the Problem of Wayward Causal Chains -- 4. The Logical Connection Argument -- 5. Reasons as Causes? -- 6. The Role of Laws in Action Explanations and the Causal Relevance of Mental Properties -- 7. Singular Causal Statements and Causal Explanations -- 8. Strict Laws, Generalizations, and Causal Concepts -- 9. Causal Powers -- 10. Propositional Attitudes as Causal Powers -- 11. The Explanatory Value of Action Explanations -- Acknowledgements -- References -- 2: Practical Reason -- 1. Three Degrees of Complexity -- 2. The Partitioned Model -- 3. Davidson's View -- 4. Final Thoughts: Why Not Partition? -- References -- 3: Action Individuation -- 1. Modifiers and Multiple Things Done -- 2. Primitive Actions -- 3. The Competition: Actions as Fine Grained -- 4. Preliminary Objections -- 5. "By," Cause, and Time -- 6. Deeper Problems -- 7. Actions as Extended Processes -- Conclusion -- References -- 4: Freedom to Act -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Davidson's Interest in His Work on Freedom -- 3. Davidson's Project and Its Relationship to Moore and Austin -- 4. Methodological Problems for Conditional Analyses -- 5. The Analysis of Freedom to Act and Abilities to Do x -- 6. Subjective Conditions and the Thinness of Davidson's Analysis -- 7. Concluding Discussion: The Challenge for a Causal Theory of Action -- References -- 5: Intention -- 1. The Initial Account -- 2. Agency. , 3. Weakness of Will -- 4. Intending -- References -- Part II: Metaphysics -- 6: Event Variables and Their Values -- 1. Quantifying over Events -- 1.1. Implications and logical form -- 1.2. Adverb reduction as conjunction reduction -- 1.3. Enough but not too many -- 2. Events to Quantify Over -- 2.1. Ordering participants -- 2.2. Timing -- 2.3. Intentions -- 2.4. Perspectives and direct objects -- 3. Logical Form and Grammatical Form -- 3.1. Thematic decomposition -- 3.2. Grades of decomposition -- 3.3. Thematic separation -- 3.4. Conclusion -- References -- 7: Causation -- 1. Actions, Reasons, and Causes -- 2. Mental Causes -- 3. Difficulties With This Account -- 4. Another Look at Davidson -- 5. Causation and Mental Causation -- 6. Concluding Remarks -- References -- 8: Davidson's "Method of Truth" in Metaphysics -- References -- 9: The Concept of Truth -- 1. Tarski, Truth, and Meaning -- 2. Satisfaction and Correspondence -- 3. Radical Interpretation and Coherence -- 4. Defining Truth and Deflationism -- 5. Objectivity and Truth -- References -- Part III: Philosophy of Language -- 10: Truth in the Theory of Meaning -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Compositionality -- 3. Criticism of Traditional Approaches -- 4. The Positive Proposal -- 5. Problematic Passages? -- 6. Later Work -- 7. Conclusion -- References -- 11: Parataxis -- 1. Indirect Discourse -- 1.1 Samesaying -- 1.2 Virtues of the paratactic account -- 1.3 Some problems for the paratactic account of indirect speech reports -- 2 Mood and Mood-Setting -- 3. Quotation -- 4. A Parting Shot -- References -- 12: Logical Form -- 1. The Idea of Logical Form and Its Philosophical Significance -- 2. Constraints on Accounts of Logical Form -- 3. Davidson's Account of Logical Form -- 4. Criticisms -- Acknowledgment -- References -- 13: Radical Interpretation and the Principle of Charity. , 1. What Is Radical Interpretation? -- 2. The Role of Radical Interpretation for Meaning Theory -- 3. The Principle of Charity -- 4. The Power of Charity -- 5. The Justification of Charity -- References -- 14: Davidson's Measurement-Theoretic Analogy -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Radical Interpretation and Indeterminacy -- 3. The Inscrutability of Reference -- 4. The General Case -- 5. Instrumentalism or Realism? -- References -- 15: Reference -- 1. Reference in T-Theories -- 1.1. Fitting an infinite capacity in a finite head -- 1.2. Conditions under which reference is required -- 2. The Inscrutability of Reference -- 2.1. Twisted T-theories -- 2.2. The grain of the data -- 2.3. Simplicity -- 2.4. The formulation of inscrutability: relativizations -- 3. Explanations and Reference -- 3.1. Reference-invoking explanations -- 3.2. Explanations involving beliefs about reference? -- References -- 16: Language and Thought -- 1. Davidson's View and Two Others -- 2. Davidson and the View that Thought Precedes Language -- 3. Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 17: Conceptual Schemes -- References -- 18: Interpretation and Value -- Interpretation and Value -- 1. The Interpretation Argument -- 2. The Application to Desires and Normative Beliefs -- 3. The Application to Values and Normative Truths -- 4. The Triangulation Argument -- References -- 19: Predication -- References -- 20: Convention and Meaning -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Public Nature of Meaning -- 3. Semantics and Ulterior Purposes -- 4. Word Meaning and Speaker Meaning -- 5. Is There Such a Thing as a Language? -- 6. Radically Interpreting Mrs. Malaprop -- References -- 21: Metaphor and Varieties of Meaning -- Davidson on Metaphor -- 1. "What Metaphors Mean" -- 2. "A Nice Derangement of Metaphors" -- 3. Evaluating a Hybrid Davidsonian View of Metaphor -- Acknowledgment -- References. , 22: Davidson and Literary Theory -- Davidson and Literary Theory -- 1. Locating Literary Language -- 1.1. Intention and language -- 1.2. The role of reference in "storytelling" -- 1.3. Triangulation in literary interpretation -- 2. Convention -- 2.1 Metaphor and figuration -- 3. Davidson's Influence on Literary Theory -- 3.1. Intentionalism and anticonventionalism -- 3.2. Metaphor -- 4. Texts -- 5. Sketch of a Davidsonian Account of Texts -- References -- Part IV: Philosophy of Mind -- 23: The Larger Philosophical Significance of Holism -- The Larger Philosophical Significance of Holism -- 1. Holism and Charity Defended -- 2. How to Formulate Relativism -- 3. The Davidsonian Strategy Against Relativism -- 4. Two Further Issues -- 4.1. Incommensurability in science -- 4.2. Reenvisioning Quine's metaphor of the web of belief -- 24: Anomalous Monism -- 1. Three Principles -- 2. Event Individuation -- 3. An Argument for Monism -- 4. Strict Laws -- 5. Anomalism -- 6. Irreducibility -- 7. Supervenience -- 8. Mental Causation -- References -- 25: Triangular Externalism -- 1. Outlines of Triangular Externalism -- 2. Externalism, Interpretation, and Holism -- 3. Davidson on Other Forms of Externalism -- 4. Triangulation and the Determination of Thought Content -- 5. Triangulation and the Objectivity of Thought -- References -- 26: Triangulation -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Triangulation Argument -- 2.1. Primitive triangulation -- 2.2. Linguistic triangulation -- 3. Objections to the Triangulation Argument -- 3.1. Fixing meanings does not require triangulation -- 3.2. Possessing the concept of objective truth does not require linguistic triangulation -- 3.3. Possession of a language and thoughts does not require possession of the concept of objective truth -- 3.4. The account of what makes language and thought possible is circular -- 4. Conclusion -- References. , 27: Rationality as a Constitutive Ideal -- 1. Kant, Carnap, and Quine -- 2. Davidsonian Interpretation Theory -- 3. Charity as a Constraint on Interpretation -- 4. Realism, Instrumentalism, and Eliminativism -- 5. Cognitive Science and Radical Interpretation -- 6. Representation and Rationality in Nonlinguistic Creatures -- 7. Davidson's Contributions to the Study of Rationality -- References -- 28: Irrationality -- References -- 29: The Rationality of the Emotions -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Emotions and Cognition -- 3. Emotions and their Causes -- 4. Objections -- 5. Privileged Access to Emotions -- 6. Emotions and Irrationality -- 7. Animal Affects -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Part V: Epistemology -- 30: Davidson and Radical Skepticism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Davidson on Radical Interpretation and the Principle of Charity -- 3. Davidson's Route to Antiskepticism I: The Omniscient Interpreter -- 4. Davidson's Route to Antiskepticism II: Triangulation and Content Externalism -- 5. Contra Davidson's Transcendental Antiskepticism -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 31: First-Person Authority -- 1. The Phenomenon of First-Person Authority -- 1.1. Davidson's critique of other accounts of self-knowledge -- 2. Davidson's Explanation of First-Person Authority -- 2.1. The general strategy -- 2.2. Knowledge of meaning: Disquotation -- 2.3. Knowledge of meaning: The determination of meaning -- 2.4. What Davidson's account does not explain -- 2.5. Davidson's dissatisfaction with his account -- 3. First-Person Authority and Semantic Externalism -- References -- 32: Knowledge of Other Minds in Davidson's Philosophy -- 1. The Measure of All Things -- 2. Understanding Others -- References -- Part VI: Influences and Influence -- 33: Quine and Davidson -- 1. Logical Pragmatism -- 2. Naturalism -- 3. Language, Meaning, and Use -- 4. Truth.

Additional Edition: Print version: Companion to Donald Davidson. Hoboken : Wiley, 2013 ISBN 9780470673706

Language: English

Keywords: Electronic book. ; Electronic books. ; Electronic book. ; Electronic books.

URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781118328408

URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781118328408

UID:

Format: 1 online resource.

ISBN: 9781118328279 , 1118328272 , 9781118328330 , 1118328337 , 9781118328361 , 1118328361 , 9781118328408 , 111832840X , 1299664954 , 9781299664951 , 0470673702 , 9780470673706 , 9781118328385 , 1118328388

Series Statement: Blackwell Companions to Philosophy ; 53

Content: A Companion to Donald Davidson presents newly commissioned essays by leading figures within contemporary philosophy. Taken together, they provide a comprehensive overview of Davidson's work across its full range, and an assessment of his many contributions to philosophy. Highlights the breadth of Davidson's work across philosophyDemonstrates the continuing influence his work has on the philosophical communityIncludes newly commissioned contributions from leading figures in contemporary philosophyProvides an in-depth exposition and analysis of Dav.

Note: Includes index. , Cover -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- Introduction: Life and Work -- Life, Early Career, and the First Phrase of Davidson's Work through 1969 -- Second Phrase of Davidson's Work, 1970-1981 -- Third Phase of Davidson's Work from the 1980s On -- Organization and Contents of the Volume -- Bibliography -- Part I: Action Theory -- 1: Action Explanation -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Actions and Their Rationalization -- 3. Davidson's Challenge and the Problem of Wayward Causal Chains -- 4. The Logical Connection Argument -- 5. Reasons as Causes? -- 6. The Role of Laws in Action Explanations and the Causal Relevance of Mental Properties -- 7. Singular Causal Statements and Causal Explanations -- 8. Strict Laws, Generalizations, and Causal Concepts -- 9. Causal Powers -- 10. Propositional Attitudes as Causal Powers -- 11. The Explanatory Value of Action Explanations -- Acknowledgements -- References -- 2: Practical Reason -- 1. Three Degrees of Complexity -- 2. The Partitioned Model -- 3. Davidson's View -- 4. Final Thoughts: Why Not Partition? -- References -- 3: Action Individuation -- 1. Modifiers and Multiple Things Done -- 2. Primitive Actions -- 3. The Competition: Actions as Fine Grained -- 4. Preliminary Objections -- 5. "By," Cause, and Time -- 6. Deeper Problems -- 7. Actions as Extended Processes -- Conclusion -- References -- 4: Freedom to Act -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Davidson's Interest in His Work on Freedom -- 3. Davidson's Project and Its Relationship to Moore and Austin -- 4. Methodological Problems for Conditional Analyses -- 5. The Analysis of Freedom to Act and Abilities to Do x -- 6. Subjective Conditions and the Thinness of Davidson's Analysis -- 7. Concluding Discussion: The Challenge for a Causal Theory of Action -- References -- 5: Intention -- 1. The Initial Account -- 2. Agency. , 3. Weakness of Will -- 4. Intending -- References -- Part II: Metaphysics -- 6: Event Variables and Their Values -- 1. Quantifying over Events -- 1.1. Implications and logical form -- 1.2. Adverb reduction as conjunction reduction -- 1.3. Enough but not too many -- 2. Events to Quantify Over -- 2.1. Ordering participants -- 2.2. Timing -- 2.3. Intentions -- 2.4. Perspectives and direct objects -- 3. Logical Form and Grammatical Form -- 3.1. Thematic decomposition -- 3.2. Grades of decomposition -- 3.3. Thematic separation -- 3.4. Conclusion -- References -- 7: Causation -- 1. Actions, Reasons, and Causes -- 2. Mental Causes -- 3. Difficulties With This Account -- 4. Another Look at Davidson -- 5. Causation and Mental Causation -- 6. Concluding Remarks -- References -- 8: Davidson's "Method of Truth" in Metaphysics -- References -- 9: The Concept of Truth -- 1. Tarski, Truth, and Meaning -- 2. Satisfaction and Correspondence -- 3. Radical Interpretation and Coherence -- 4. Defining Truth and Deflationism -- 5. Objectivity and Truth -- References -- Part III: Philosophy of Language -- 10: Truth in the Theory of Meaning -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Compositionality -- 3. Criticism of Traditional Approaches -- 4. The Positive Proposal -- 5. Problematic Passages? -- 6. Later Work -- 7. Conclusion -- References -- 11: Parataxis -- 1. Indirect Discourse -- 1.1 Samesaying -- 1.2 Virtues of the paratactic account -- 1.3 Some problems for the paratactic account of indirect speech reports -- 2 Mood and Mood-Setting -- 3. Quotation -- 4. A Parting Shot -- References -- 12: Logical Form -- 1. The Idea of Logical Form and Its Philosophical Significance -- 2. Constraints on Accounts of Logical Form -- 3. Davidson's Account of Logical Form -- 4. Criticisms -- Acknowledgment -- References -- 13: Radical Interpretation and the Principle of Charity. , 1. What Is Radical Interpretation? -- 2. The Role of Radical Interpretation for Meaning Theory -- 3. The Principle of Charity -- 4. The Power of Charity -- 5. The Justification of Charity -- References -- 14: Davidson's Measurement-Theoretic Analogy -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Radical Interpretation and Indeterminacy -- 3. The Inscrutability of Reference -- 4. The General Case -- 5. Instrumentalism or Realism? -- References -- 15: Reference -- 1. Reference in T-Theories -- 1.1. Fitting an infinite capacity in a finite head -- 1.2. Conditions under which reference is required -- 2. The Inscrutability of Reference -- 2.1. Twisted T-theories -- 2.2. The grain of the data -- 2.3. Simplicity -- 2.4. The formulation of inscrutability: relativizations -- 3. Explanations and Reference -- 3.1. Reference-invoking explanations -- 3.2. Explanations involving beliefs about reference? -- References -- 16: Language and Thought -- 1. Davidson's View and Two Others -- 2. Davidson and the View that Thought Precedes Language -- 3. Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 17: Conceptual Schemes -- References -- 18: Interpretation and Value -- Interpretation and Value -- 1. The Interpretation Argument -- 2. The Application to Desires and Normative Beliefs -- 3. The Application to Values and Normative Truths -- 4. The Triangulation Argument -- References -- 19: Predication -- References -- 20: Convention and Meaning -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Public Nature of Meaning -- 3. Semantics and Ulterior Purposes -- 4. Word Meaning and Speaker Meaning -- 5. Is There Such a Thing as a Language? -- 6. Radically Interpreting Mrs. Malaprop -- References -- 21: Metaphor and Varieties of Meaning -- Davidson on Metaphor -- 1. "What Metaphors Mean" -- 2. "A Nice Derangement of Metaphors" -- 3. Evaluating a Hybrid Davidsonian View of Metaphor -- Acknowledgment -- References. , 22: Davidson and Literary Theory -- Davidson and Literary Theory -- 1. Locating Literary Language -- 1.1. Intention and language -- 1.2. The role of reference in "storytelling" -- 1.3. Triangulation in literary interpretation -- 2. Convention -- 2.1 Metaphor and figuration -- 3. Davidson's Influence on Literary Theory -- 3.1. Intentionalism and anticonventionalism -- 3.2. Metaphor -- 4. Texts -- 5. Sketch of a Davidsonian Account of Texts -- References -- Part IV: Philosophy of Mind -- 23: The Larger Philosophical Significance of Holism -- The Larger Philosophical Significance of Holism -- 1. Holism and Charity Defended -- 2. How to Formulate Relativism -- 3. The Davidsonian Strategy Against Relativism -- 4. Two Further Issues -- 4.1. Incommensurability in science -- 4.2. Reenvisioning Quine's metaphor of the web of belief -- 24: Anomalous Monism -- 1. Three Principles -- 2. Event Individuation -- 3. An Argument for Monism -- 4. Strict Laws -- 5. Anomalism -- 6. Irreducibility -- 7. Supervenience -- 8. Mental Causation -- References -- 25: Triangular Externalism -- 1. Outlines of Triangular Externalism -- 2. Externalism, Interpretation, and Holism -- 3. Davidson on Other Forms of Externalism -- 4. Triangulation and the Determination of Thought Content -- 5. Triangulation and the Objectivity of Thought -- References -- 26: Triangulation -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Triangulation Argument -- 2.1. Primitive triangulation -- 2.2. Linguistic triangulation -- 3. Objections to the Triangulation Argument -- 3.1. Fixing meanings does not require triangulation -- 3.2. Possessing the concept of objective truth does not require linguistic triangulation -- 3.3. Possession of a language and thoughts does not require possession of the concept of objective truth -- 3.4. The account of what makes language and thought possible is circular -- 4. Conclusion -- References. , 27: Rationality as a Constitutive Ideal -- 1. Kant, Carnap, and Quine -- 2. Davidsonian Interpretation Theory -- 3. Charity as a Constraint on Interpretation -- 4. Realism, Instrumentalism, and Eliminativism -- 5. Cognitive Science and Radical Interpretation -- 6. Representation and Rationality in Nonlinguistic Creatures -- 7. Davidson's Contributions to the Study of Rationality -- References -- 28: Irrationality -- References -- 29: The Rationality of the Emotions -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Emotions and Cognition -- 3. Emotions and their Causes -- 4. Objections -- 5. Privileged Access to Emotions -- 6. Emotions and Irrationality -- 7. Animal Affects -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Part V: Epistemology -- 30: Davidson and Radical Skepticism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Davidson on Radical Interpretation and the Principle of Charity -- 3. Davidson's Route to Antiskepticism I: The Omniscient Interpreter -- 4. Davidson's Route to Antiskepticism II: Triangulation and Content Externalism -- 5. Contra Davidson's Transcendental Antiskepticism -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 31: First-Person Authority -- 1. The Phenomenon of First-Person Authority -- 1.1. Davidson's critique of other accounts of self-knowledge -- 2. Davidson's Explanation of First-Person Authority -- 2.1. The general strategy -- 2.2. Knowledge of meaning: Disquotation -- 2.3. Knowledge of meaning: The determination of meaning -- 2.4. What Davidson's account does not explain -- 2.5. Davidson's dissatisfaction with his account -- 3. First-Person Authority and Semantic Externalism -- References -- 32: Knowledge of Other Minds in Davidson's Philosophy -- 1. The Measure of All Things -- 2. Understanding Others -- References -- Part VI: Influences and Influence -- 33: Quine and Davidson -- 1. Logical Pragmatism -- 2. Naturalism -- 3. Language, Meaning, and Use -- 4. Truth.

Additional Edition: Print version: Companion to Donald Davidson. Hoboken : Wiley, 2013 ISBN 9780470673706

Language: English

Keywords: Electronic book. ; Electronic books.

URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781118328408