Ihre E-Mail wurde erfolgreich gesendet. Bitte prüfen Sie Ihren Maileingang.

Leider ist ein Fehler beim E-Mail-Versand aufgetreten. Bitte versuchen Sie es erneut.

Vorgang fortführen?

Exportieren
Filter
Medientyp
Sprache
Region
Bibliothek
Erscheinungszeitraum
Person/Organisation
  • 1
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,
    UID:
    edocfu_9958080752902883
    Umfang: 1 online resource (65 p.)
    ISBN: 1-4843-5726-4 , 1-4843-9787-8 , 1-4843-9449-6
    Serie: IMF working paper ; WP/13/114
    Inhalt: How should monetary policy respond to large fluctuations in world food prices? We study this question in an open economy model in which imported food has a larger weight in domestic consumption than abroad and international risk sharing can be imperfect. A key novelty is that the real exchange rate and the terms of trade can move in opposite directions in response to world food price shocks. This exacerbates the policy trade-off between stabilizing output prices vis a vis the real exchange rate, to an extent that depends on risk sharing and the price elasticity of exports. Under perfect risk sharing, targeting the headline CPI welfare-dominates targeting the PPI if the variance of food price shocks is not too small and the export price elasticity is realistically high. In such a case, however, targeting forecast CPI is a superior choice. With incomplete risk sharing, PPI targeting is clearly a winner.
    Anmerkung: Description based upon print version of record. , Cover; Contents; 1. Introduction; 2. Model; 2.1 Households; 2.2 Prices; 2.3 Domestic Production; 2.4 Market Clearing; 3. International Relative Prices, Risk Sharing, and Aggregate Supply; 3.1 Inflation and Marginal Costs; 3.2 The Phillips Curve; 3.2.1 The Perfect Risk Sharing Case; 3.2.2 The Financial Autarky Case; 4. Aggregate Demand, Dynamics, and Impulse Responses; 4.1 The Dynamic IS and the Natural Interest Rate; 4.2 Impulse Responses under Perfect Risk Sharing; 4.3 Impulse Responses under Financial Autarky; 5. Welfare and Policy Trade-Offs , 5.1 Social Planner's vs. Flex-Price Market Allocation5.2 Policy Trade-offs Under Perfect Risk Sharing; 5.3 Policy Trade-offs Under Financial Autarky; 6. Welfare Implications in a Calibrated Version of the Model; 6.1 Calibration; 6.2 Welfare Metrics; 6.3 Welfare Results; 7. Conclusion; Appendix; References; Figures; 1. World WPI and World Food Price Index; 2. Covariance Between the Terms of Trade and the Real Effective Exchange Rate with World Food Price; 3a. Effects of a Food Price Shock on Natural Output and Natural TOT under Complete Markets , 3b. Effects of a Food Price Shock on Natural Output and Natural TOT in Financial Autarky4a. Impulse-Responses to a Standard Deviation of z* Shocks under Complete Markets and PPI Targeting for Baseline Calibration and σ=2; 4b. Impulse-Responses to a Standard Deviation of z* Shocks under Complete Markets and Headline CPI Targeting for Baseline Calibration and σ=2; 4c. Impulse-Responses to a Standard Deviation of z* Shocks under Complete Markets and Expected CPI Targeting for Baseline Calibration and σ=2 , 4d. Impulse-Responses to a Standard Deviation of z* Shocks under Complete Markets and an Exchange Rate Peg for Baseline Calibration and σ=25a. Impulse-Responses to a Standard Deviation of z* Shocks under Financial Autarky and PPI Targeting for Baseline Calibration and σ=2; 5b. Impulse-Responses to a Standard Deviation of z* Shocks under Financial Autarky and CPI Targeting for Baseline Calibration and σ=2; 5c. Impulse-Responses to a Standard Deviation of z* Shocks under Financial Autarky and Expected CPI Targeting for Baseline Calibration and σ=2 , 5d. Impulse-Responses to a Standard Deviation of z* Shocks under Financial Autarky and Expected CPI Targeting for Baseline Calibration and σ=2Tables; 1. Food Expenditure Shares in National Consumption Baskets; 2.Model Calibration; 3. Welfare Gaps: Complete Markets with All Baseline Shocks and Strict Inflation Targeting; 4.Welfare Gaps: Complete Markets with Trivial Food Price Volatility and Strick Inflation Targeting; 5. Welfare Gaps: Complete Markets with All Baseline Shocks and Flexible Inflation Targeting; 6. Model Statistics Under Simulated Random Shocks , 7. Welfare Gaps: Incomplete Markets (Ψ=0.9) with All Baseline Shocks and Full-Fledge Inflation Targeting , English
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 1-4843-7156-9
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 1-299-67799-1
    Sprache: Englisch
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 2
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    UID:
    gbv_845817841
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (64 p)
    Ausgabe: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1484371569 , 9781484371565
    Serie: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 13/114
    Inhalt: How should monetary policy respond to large fluctuations in world food prices? We study this question in an open economy model in which imported food has a larger weight in domestic consumption than abroad and international risk sharing can be imperfect. A key novelty is that the real exchange rate and the terms of trade can move in opposite directions in response to world food price shocks. This exacerbates the policy trade-off between stabilizing output prices vis a vis the real exchange rate, to an extent that depends on risk sharing and the price elasticity of exports. Under perfect risk sharing, targeting the headline CPI welfare-dominates targeting the PPI if the variance of food price shocks is not too small and the export price elasticity is realistically high. In such a case, however, targeting forecast CPI is a superior choice. With incomplete risk sharing, PPI targeting is clearly a winner
    Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Catão, Luis World Food Prices, the Terms of Trade-Real Exchange Rate Nexus, and Monetary Policy Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2013 ISBN 9781484371565
    Sprache: Englisch
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
Meinten Sie 1484311469?
Meinten Sie 1484317564?
Meinten Sie 1484341589?
Schließen ⊗
Diese Webseite nutzt Cookies und das Analyse-Tool Matomo. Weitere Informationen finden Sie auf den KOBV Seiten zum Datenschutz