Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

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Umfang: 1 online resource (949 p.)

Ausgabe: 1st ed.

ISBN: 1-281-05089-X , 9786611050894 , 0-08-047821-2

Serie: Handbooks in economics, 23

Inhalt: The Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism provides a comprehensive set of reviews of literature on the economics of nonmarket voluntary transfers. The foundations of the field are reviewed first, with a sequence of chapters that present the hard core of the theoretical and empirical analyses of giving, reciprocity and altruism in economics, examining their relations with the viewpoints of moral philosophy, psychology, sociobiology, sociology and economic anthropology. Secondly, a comprehensive set of applications are considered of all the aspects of society where

Anmerkung: Description based upon print version of record. , Front cover; Title page; Copyright page; Introduction to the Series; Contents of the Handbook; Preface to the Handbook; Contents of Volume 1; Introduction to the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity; Abstract; Foreword; Part I: General overview; The economics of moral sentiments; Motives for altruism and altruistic giving; Structures of altruism; Altruism and democracy: Altruistic joint giving and its public implementation; Motives and reasons for nonaltruistic giving; The structure of nonaltruistic giving; From motives to forms , Contradiction and possibilities in the logic of motivesThe inefficiency of individual giving when joint or public giving is possible: The perplexing joint giving theorem; Reciprocities; An overview; ``Human rocks on which societies are built''; The special games of reciprocity; Importance and scope of giving, altruism, and pro-social conducts; Overview; Families; The political and public sector; Public services and general political motives; Actors of the political and public system; Giving in philanthropy, solidarity, and charity; Social situation; Motives , General respect, civility, sociality, and helpThe correction of ``failures'' of exchanges and organizations; Associations, clubs, cooperatives; The workplace and labour relations; Social giving: Relation, symbol, status; Normative economics and the good society; Giving reactions; About two particular issues that caught the fancy of economists: Intertemporal giving and the internalization of the gift externality; Intertemporal giving, both ways: Bequest and the retro-gift public debt; Economic internalization of helping externalities; Interferences with altruistic giving: General view , Solving ``Adam Smith's problem''The causes of and reasons for altruism; Part II: Altruisms and giving; Altruisms: Types and causes or reasons; General presentation; Introduction; The twelve basic types of altruism; The objects of reasons for giving and altruisms; Gift or receiver's situation; ``Paternalism''; Natural or hedonistic altruism; Emotional contagion; Empathies; Affection and sympathy; Compassion and pity; Relations and nature of hedonistic altruism; Normative altruisms; The three types of normative altruism: moral, social, and rational; Moral and social normative altruism , Nature and distinctionApplications; Comparisons: natural, normative, moral, social; The ambiguous status of social normative motives; A society is more altruistic than its members; Self-image; Moral akrasia; Rational altruism; General principle; Substitution; Putative reciprocities; Justice; Universalization; Altruism and justice; impartial altruism; Altruism and justice; Impartial altruism; History; Altruism and justice: Consistency or conflict, force or freedom; Giving: An abundance and variety of motives and reasons; An overview; Social effects; Opinion; Situation; Relation , Intrinsically normative (non-altruistic) giving , English

Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 0-444-50697-7

Sprache: Englisch

UID:

ISBN: 9780080478210

Inhalt: The goal of this paper is to draw some lessons for economic theory from research in psychology, social psychology and, more briefly, in biology, which purports to explain the formation of social preferences. We elicit the basic mechanisms whereby a variety of social preferences are determined in a variety of social contexts. Biological mechanisms, cultural transmission, learning, and the formation of cognitive and emotional capacities shape social preferences in the long or very long run. In the short run, the built-in capacities are utilized by individuals to construct their own context-dependent social preferences. The full development of social preferences requires consciousness of the individual's similarities and differences with others, and therefore knowledge of self and others. A wide variety of context-dependent social preferences can be generated by just three cognitive processes: identification of self with known others, projection of known self onto partially unknown others, and categorization of others by similarity with self. The self can project onto similar others but is unable to do so onto dissimilar others. The more can the self identify with, or project onto, an other the more generous she will be. Thus the self will find it easier to internalize and predict the behavior of an in-group than an out-group and will generally like to interact more with the former than with the latter. The main social motivations can be simply organized by reference to social norms of justice or fairness that lead to reciprocal behavior, some kind of self-anchored altruism that provokes in-group favoritism, and social drives which determine an immediate emotional response to an experienced event like hurting a norm's violator or helping an other in need.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 545-613, 9780080478210

In: 0080478212

In: 9780444506979

In: year:2006

In: pages:545-613

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)01007-4

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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ISBN: 9780080478210

Inhalt: Behind my reciprocation of a friend's gift may lie both instrumental reasons (I expect further future gifts) and communicative reasons (I want to establish or confirm a friendship per se ). In a theory of rational individual action, such communicative reasons can be incorporated as an argument of an agent's objective function. This chapter starts by reviewing a recent literature that takes this direction and introduces relational concerns through the concept of socially provided goods. From a relational perspective, however, individual intentions are not all that matters: a relation is characterized by the two (or more) persons linked and by the kind of link they have. This perspective, which in our view should complement the more traditional, individualistic one, is particularly suited to embed individual motivations in their social context and to study their co-evolution. In particular, we focus on the conditions under which reciprocity and altruism may survive and even spread over as social norms. Drawing from the literature on the dynamics of social norms, we argue that the combination of individual incentives and the forces of social selection may lead to a contraposition between a society's material success and its well-being, i.e., between its vitality and its satisfaction. Finally, we consider that the recent literature on the economic analysis of human relationships invites to a new reading of the classics of economics and of moral and political philosophy. Both the new and the old literature point at the need to broaden the scope of economic modeling, to lay down the building blocks of a new, up-to-date approach to political economy that is equipped to tackle the challenges posed by advanced industrial societies in their social, cultural and economic selection dimensions.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 695-730, 9780080478210

In: 0080478212

In: 9780444506979

In: year:2006

In: pages:695-730

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)01009-8

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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ISBN: 9780080478210

Inhalt: Since homo sapiens is a social animal, one might expect human nature the set of psychological propensities with which our species is naturally endowed to equip human beings to live in social groups. In this chapter, we consider the implications of this idea for economics and game theory. We begin by discussing four classic accounts of the forces that hold human societies together those of Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, and Smith, who focus respectively on rational self-interest, convention, collective reasoning, and natural fellow-feeling. Turning to the modern literature, we review some of the ways in sociality has been introduced into decision and game theory by means of assumptions about non-self-interested preferences specifically, assumptions about altruism, warm glow, inequality aversion and reciprocity. We identify some of the limitations of these theories as explanatory devices, and suggest that these limitations derive from a common source: that sociality is being represented within a framework of methodological individualism. We then discuss more radical approaches to explaining social interaction, based on the concepts of expressive rationality and team reasoning. Finally, we pose the fundamental question of whether it is possible to explain social interaction all the way down without going beyond the bounds of methodological individualism.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 731-768, 9780080478210

In: 0080478212

In: 9780444506979

In: year:2006

In: pages:731-768

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)01010-4

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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ISBN: 9780080478210

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite vii, 9780080478210

In: 0080478212

In: 9780444506979

In: year:2006

In: pages:vii

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)01013-X

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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ISBN: 9780080478210

Inhalt: Reciprocity is one of the main basic social relations that constitute societies. It consists of being favourable to others because others are favourable to you (and not from an exchange in the strict sense). It rests on three possible rationales: (1) balance (comparison, matching), often related to equality and fairness, or to the desire to avoid moral indebtedness; (2) liking because being purposefully favoured induces liking which induces favouring, or because liking can directly result from being liked; (3) self-sustaining sequences of mutual favours, which can be solely self-interested (and are not in fact proper reciprocity). Reciprocity extends to important cases of aids inducing aids that are not strictly reciprocal. It has essential social roles in permitting general peace in freedom and respect of rights, the decentralized correction of many market failures, the efficient working of organizations of all types through mutual trust and support, and basic relations between individuals and collectivities and governments. It constitutes the essential relation in families and genuine cooperatives, and it is present in all communities. It explains deviations from competitive equilibria, and it is closely involved in questions of development. The theory of reciprocity shows and compares the various types of solutions of the reciprocity game. Reciprocity is compared with other modes of transfers. Ways of explaining it are proposed. Its normative uses associate efficiency, fairness, and the intrinsic quality of social relations.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 371-541, 9780080478210

In: 0080478212

In: 9780444506979

In: year:2006

In: pages:371-541

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)01006-2

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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ISBN: 9780080478210

Inhalt: This paper addresses the question of whether our evolutionary history suggests that humans are likely to be individually selected selfish maximizers or group selected altruists. It surveys models from the literature of evolutionary biology in which groups are formed and dissolved and where the reproductive success of individuals is determined by their payoffs in a game played within groups. We show that if groups are formed randomly and reproductive success of group founders is determined by a multi-person prisoners' dilemma game, then selfish behavior will prevail over maximization of group payoffs. However, interesting models can be found for which group selection sustains cooperative behavior. Forces that support cooperative behavior include assortative matching in groups, group longevity, and punishment-based group norms.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 771-817, 9780080478210

In: 0080478212

In: 9780444506979

In: year:2006

In: pages:771-817

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)01011-6

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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ISBN: 9780080478210

Inhalt: Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that material self-interest exclusively motivates all people. Experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence in recent years, however, that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis, suggesting that concerns for altruism, fairness, and reciprocity strongly motivate many people. Moreover, several theoretical papers demonstrate that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and tractable manner. These theories then induced a first wave of experimental research which offered exciting insights into both the nature of preferences and the relative performance of competing fairness theories. The purpose of this chapter is to review these developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for future research. We also discuss recent neuroeconomic evidence that is consistent with the view that many people have a taste for mutual cooperation and the punishment of norm violators. We further illustrate the powerful impact of fairness concerns on cooperation, competition, incentives, and contract design.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 615-691, 9780080478210

In: 0080478212

In: 9780444506979

In: year:2006

In: pages:615-691

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)01008-6

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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ISBN: 9780080478210

Inhalt: Economic anthropology is a contested area of interdisciplinary research. Although some practitioners define the task as the application of mainstream economic theorizing to the full range of human groups in time and space, many others argue in the light of the ethnographic evidence that it is impossible to generalize Western models, such as those which base themselves on concepts of utility maximization by individual agents. These objections have nowhere been more vociferous than in the domain of exchange. Bronislaw Malinowski identified many kinds of transaction among the Trobriand Islanders; after initially sketching a notion of the pure gift, he later modified this and argued instead that reciprocity, in the sense of calculated give and take, was the central principle underpinning all social life. A more significant theoretical challenge to the presuppositions of modern economics came in same period from Marcel Mauss, who outlined in his essay The Gift an evolutionary process that began with the total prestation and ends in the modern world, dominated by contracts and markets. Only in this modern world do we arguably have the possibility of altruism, understood as disinterested giving. After reviewing some of the more influential later contributions to the anthropological literature on these topics, notably those of Karl Polanyi, Marshall Sahlins and Stephen Gudeman, this paper goes on to present brief ethnographic illustrations. These include examples of food sharing among huntergatherers and cultivators, and the hospitality rituals of the contemporary western bourgeois classes. Illustrations from postsocialist societies show the difficulties of predicting economic behavior in this field: some people seem to respond to dislocation by using objects to strengthen their interpersonal networks, while others facing apparently similar conditions prefer to contract their gift-giving. Finally, brief critical note is taken of recent ethnographic experiments in this field.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 207-223, 9780080478210

In: 0080478212

In: 9780444506979

In: year:2006

In: pages:207-223

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)01004-9

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

UID:

ISBN: 9780080478210

Inhalt: Altruism, giving and pro-social conduct, and reciprocity, are the basis of the existence and performance of societies, through their various occurrences: in families; among the diverse motives of the political and public sector; as the general respect and moral conduct which permit life in society and exchanges; for remedying failures of markets and organizations (which they sometimes also create); and in charity and specific organizations. Altruism has various origins: it can be hedonistic or natural altruism in empathy, affection, sympathy, emotional contagion, pity, and compassion; or normative altruism of the moral, non-moral social, and rational types. Giving can be altruistic, aimed at producing some social effect in the fields of social sentiments, situations or relations, an intrinsic norm, or self-interested. Reciprocity, in which a gift elicits another gift, is a pervasive social relation due to either a desire of balance (and possibly fairness), or to liking a benevolent giver (moreover, self-interested sequential exchanges look like it). Joint giving for alleviating poverty and need makes giving a contribution to a pure public good for which efficient public transfers crowd out private gifts. Yet, private giving can be an intrinsic norm or a demand of reason, or it can be motivated by the non-moral concern about judgments of others or of oneself. Families the institutions for love and giving are networks of reciprocities. Intertemporal giving includes gifts to future generation through bequests, and to earlier generations through the relevant public indebtedness (retro-gifts). Normative opinions about societies, and in particular about justice, imply and require altruism and constitute a form of it. Moreover, altruism is the mark of good social relations and good persons. Altruism and giving have always been analysed by economics, notably by all great economists, with an upsurge of studies in the last third of the 20th century.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 1-122, 9780080478210

In: 0080478212

In: 9780444506979

In: year:2006

In: pages:1-122

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)01001-3

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)