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Umfang: 1 online resource (753 p.)

Ausgabe: 1st ed.

ISBN: 1-281-05107-1 , 9786611051075 , 0-08-047826-3

Serie: Handbooks in economics, 23

Inhalt: The Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism provides a comprehensive set of reviews of literature on the economics of nonmarket voluntary transfers. The foundations of the field are reviewed first, with a sequence of chapters that present the hard core of the theoretical and empirical analyses of giving, reciprocity and altruism in economics, examining their relations with the viewpoints of moral philosophy, psychology, sociobiology, sociology and economic anthropology. Secondly, a comprehensive set of applications are considered of all the aspects of society where nonmar

Anmerkung: Description based upon print version of record. , Front cover; Title page; Copyright page; Introduction to the Series; Contents of the Handbook; Preface to the Handbook; Contents of Volume 2; FAMILY TRANSFERS; Microeconomic models of family transfers; Abstract; Keywords; What families are made of; Altruism, or the power of families; The eight pillars of pure one-sided altruism, and redistributive neutrality; Two-sided altruism; Multiple recipients or multiple donors; Where altruistic fairness leads to inequality, and the Rotten Brother theorem; Free-riding on the other's altruism; Extending the model to endogenous incomes , Where the child may become rottenThe Samaritan dilemma and future uncertainty; Parents can't be rotten, but two goods complicate the picture; Daddy knows best; Impure altruism: merit good and transfers as a means of exchange; Child's effort as a merit good; Buying or extorting the child's services or the parent's inheritance; From transfer to transaction; The case of a dominant child; A strategy to buy the children's services; Transfers as family loans; Family insurance and banking; Decisions within the family: altruism and collective models; Pure and impure altruism , Non-altruism: transfers as old-age securityThe mutuality model or how to glue the generations together; Old age support: other mechanisms; The formation of preferences; To imitate or to demonstrate?; Cultural transmission and endogenous preferences; Cultural transmission; Endogenous altruism, prices and interest; Tests of family transfer models; Who gives what, and to whom?; Institutions and family transfers; The limited scope of pure altruism; Tests of family mutuality models; Conclusion: homo reciprocans, or living in a world of externalities; References , Altruism, exchange or indirect reciprocity: what do the data on family transfers show?Abstract; Keywords; Introduction; Motivations: transfers governed by indirect reciprocities; Outline of the paper; Altruism, exchange, and other motives: a quick reminder; ``Involuntary'' transfers: accidental or entrepreneurial bequests; Altruism; Zero bequests and inter vivos transfers; The limited importance of inter-vivos transfers relative to bequests; Altruism and the ``equal division puzzle''; Equal bequests but compensatory gifts?; Exchange , Summing up: distinctive predictions of basic transfer modelsHeterogeneity of (financial downward) transfers; Foreword: how to define ``transfers'' between living generations?; Three types of financial inter vivos transfers; Theoretical considerations; French and U.S. evidence in favor of the heterogeneity of financial transfers; The importance of ``inherited'' wealth in total wealth accumulation; The importance of ``gifts'' (inter vivos transfers) relative to bequests; Previous tests of transfer models; Accidental bequests do not apply to the richer part of the population , Do bequests depend on the existence of children? , English

Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 0-444-52145-3

Sprache: Englisch

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ISBN: 0444506977

Inhalt: Economists believe that a problem of team production results from the desirability of production in (sometimes large) groups, the difficulty of rewarding individual group members based on their (difficult or impossible to measure) individual contributions, and the presumed interest of each individual in avoiding effort and earning more, without regard to the outcomes of others. Although a possible response is to expend resources on monitoring each worker and paying accordingly, there are indications that this may be a less cost-effective approach than is drawing upon workers' propensities to reciprocate the trust and liberality of an employer by providing more effort, and to engage in mutual monitoring, social sanctioning of free riders, and emulation of others' efforts, when faced with group-based incentives. The large literature on incentives in producer cooperatives that sprang up during the 1960s through the 1980s predates economists' recent work on reciprocity, but it did concern itself with the interdependence of choices and it included remarks about mutual monitoring. This chapter considers the roles that altruism and reciprocity might play in cooperatives, and it discusses the recent, largely experimental literature on reciprocity and other social preferences, considering its relevance to cooperatives and to incentives in teams more generally.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 1409-1435, 0444506977

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In: year:2006

In: pages:1409-1435

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)02022-7

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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ISBN: 0444506977

Inhalt: This chapter examines the role of altruistic motives in the economic analysis of public social transfers, both from a positive and from a normative point of view. The positive question is to know whether we can fully neglect altruistic considerations to explain the development or sustainability of these transfers. Such is the implicit ambition of efficiency theories of the Welfare State. However, while these theories may be suited for explaining the development of public insurance or life-cycle transfers, they rapidly reach their limits when we try to explain more redistributive dimensions of social transfers. At the other extreme, descriptions of social transfers as systems of extended insurance (behind the veil of ignorance) implicitly do as if individuals were ready to completely abstract from their real world situations, and this can be analyzed as an extreme form of altruism. Actual motivations for support of social transfers certainly lay somewhere in between, i.e., a mix of well-understood selfishness and partial altruism. This explains why these systems can redistribute more than explained by pure efficiency motives, but less than what would be predicted under the extended insurance hypothesis. One additional limit to redistribution is the fact that even very altruistic agents can deliberately reduce its scope because of its potential disincentive effects. The second part of the chapter examines normative considerations which seem relevant to the evaluation of systems of social transfers. In particular, the idea of extended insurance has paradoxical implications in some circumstances, because of its structural similarity to utilitarianism. Therefore it appears useful to look for other normative theories, such as inequality-averse social welfare functions or fairness criteria. It is shown how both approaches can be useful in the study of second-best solutions under incentive constraints. The chapter ends with a critical examination of the incorporation of individuals' altruistic feelings in social welfare functions.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 1465-1503, 0444506977

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Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)02024-0

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ISBN: 0444506977

Inhalt: This chapter lists the important subjects that are discussed in Volume 2 of Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity , such as access to land, common pool, giving clubs, economic inequality, transfers, money supply, public education, and others. The terms are mentioned along with the page numbers on which they have appeared in the publication.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite I17-I28, 0444506977

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Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)02031-8

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ISBN: 0444506977

Inhalt: This chapter reviews the recent theoretical and empirical economic literature on migrants' remittances. It is divided between a microeconomic section on the determinants of remittances and a macroeconomic section on their growth effects. At the micro level we first present in a fully harmonized framework the various motivations to remit described so far in the literature. We show that models based on different motives share many common predictions, making it difficult to implement truly discriminative tests in the absence of sufficiently detailed data on migrants and receiving households' characteristics and on the timing of remittances. The results from selected empirical studies show that a mixture of individualistic (e.g., altruism, exchange) and familial (e.g., investment, insurance) motives explain the likelihood and size of remittances; some studies also find evidence of moral hazard on the recipients' side and of the use of inheritance prospects to monitor the migrants' behavior. At the macro level we first briefly review the standard (Keynesian) and the trade-theoretic literature on the short-run impact of remittances. We then use an endogenous growth framework to describe the growth potential of remittances and present the evidence for different growth channels. There is considerable evidence that remittances (in the form of savings repatriated by return migrants) promote access to self-employment and raise investment in small businesses, and there is also evidence that remittances contribute to raise educational attainments of children in households with migrant members. Investigation of the effects of remittances on outcomes such as children's education and health raise identification issues, however, as we explain below. Finally, the relationship between remittances and inequality appears to be non-monotonic: remittances seem to decrease economic inequality in communities with a long migration tradition but to increase inequality within communities at the beginning of the migration process. This is consistent with different theoretical arguments regarding the role of migration networks and/or the dynamics of wealth transmission between successive generations.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 1135-1198, 0444506977

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In: year:2006

In: pages:1135-1198

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)02017-3

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ISBN: 0444506977

Inhalt: We explore the contribution of reciprocity and other non selfish motives to the political viability of the modern welfare state. In the advanced economies, a substantial fraction of total income is regularly transferred from the better off to the less well off, with the approval of the electorate. Economists have for the most part misunderstood this process due to their endorsement of an empirically implausible theory of selfish human motivation. Drawing on anthropological, experimental, public opinion survey and other data we develop an alternative behavioral explanation for economic reasoning about sharing and insurance. In this alternative view, reciprocity motives are necessary for understanding support for and opposition to the welfare state. Modern citizens willingly share with those who uphold societal norms about what constitutes morally worthy behavior, while frequently seeking to punish those who transgress those norms, even when these actions are individually costly and yield no individual material benefit.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 1439-1464, 0444506977

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Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)02023-9

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ISBN: 0444506977

Inhalt: Philanthropy is one of the enduring areas of economic research. Why would people work hard only to give their earnings away? The paper explores the theoretical foundations, as well as the empirical and policy research on philanthropy. This paper reviews over 25 years worth of economic research, and points to the many challenging new questions that remain.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 1201-1269, 0444506977

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In: pages:1201-1269

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)02018-5

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ISBN: 0444506977

Inhalt: Standard homo economicus lives in a world of complete markets and maximizes utility which is a function of his personal consumption. This approximation cannot account for parents making transfers to adult children, children taking care of old parents, nor for gifts, inheritance and many other services exchanged within families. Such behavior can be derived from three main mechanisms. Firstly, in the so-called pure altruism model, the parent's utility is augmented by the utility of his child. This leads to transfers from the parent to his child. An important feature of this model is the strong property of redistributive neutrality: since parents and child pool their income, any government transfer to one will be undone by the other adjusting his transfer. In a second model, altruism is impure as the parents want the child to behave in a certain way: exchange and strategic considerations enter the picture, as both parents' and child's income become endogenous. Thirdly, in a non-altruistic setting, with imperfect credit market, transfers to children and to old parents correspond to a reciprocity contract and are an investment for old age. Families embody long term and widespread commitments: born as a needy child, one becomes a parent and ultimately a (perhaps) needy grandparent. Moreover for much of what is exchanged within families, there is no market substitute. These features explain why the network of reciprocities can be large both in time and space, why those transfers change but do not disappear as market or public insurance develop, and why displacing them can have perverse side effects. Family transfers influence intra- and inter-generational inequality, hence the importance to assess their motivation. Tests usually conclude that the income pooling predicted by pure altruism is not observed, but family transfers are also far from being entirely motivated by direct exchange considerations.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 889-969, 0444506977

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In: year:2006

In: pages:889-969

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)02013-6

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ISBN: 0444506977

Inhalt: Most models of family transfers consider only two generations and focus on two motives: altruism and exchange. They also assume perfect substitution between inter vivos financial transfers and bequests to children. On the contrary, this survey of recent developments in the literature emphasizes the strong heterogeneity of downward financial transfers and motives for these transfers over the life-cycle. In face of the empirical failure of standard models in developed countries (these models may perform better in less developed countries or in old Europe), it also advocates “ mixed ” motivations of transfers, such as strategic altruism, models with endogenous heterogeneous behavioral regimes (Becker, Cigno), and especially indirect reciprocities between three generations, which lead to the replication of the same type of transfer from one generation to the next. Indirect reciprocities appear able to accommodate several empirical puzzles: they are thus compatible (against altruism) with small compensatory effects of transfers both between and within generations, and (against exchange) with the lack of parents' observable counterpart to financial or time support given by their children. They also predict “3rd generation effects”—transfers between parents and children being determined by grandparents' transfers or again grandchildren's characteristics—which appear corroborated by (mainly French or U.S.) available evidence. We thus face the challenge of innovative modelling of indirect reciprocities within the framework of individual forward-looking rationality.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 971-1053, 0444506977

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In: year:2006

In: pages:971-1053

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)02014-8

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ISBN: 0444506977

Inhalt: This paper presents an overview of the economics of international aid, highlighting the historical literature and the contemporary debates. It reviews the “trade-theoretic” and the “contract-theoretic” analytical literature, and the empirical and institutional literature. It demonstrates a great degree of continuity in the policy concerns of the aid discourse in the twentieth century, and shows how the theoretical, empirical and institutional literature has evolved to address specific policy concerns of each period.

In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 1559-1588, 0444506977

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In: year:2006

In: pages:1559-1588

Sprache: Englisch

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)02026-4

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)