UID:
almafu_9960074777402883
Format:
1 online resource (324 pages)
ISBN:
9780128165522
,
0128165529
Note:
Front Cover -- Networking Games -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1 Nash Equilibrium -- 1.1 Nash equilibrium -- 1.2 Cooperation and competition -- 1.3 Examples of load balancing games -- 1.4 Convex games -- 2 Congestion Games -- 2.1 Potential games -- 2.2 Congestion games -- 2.3 Player-speci c congestion games -- 2.4 Congestion games with strategy set constraint -- 3 Routing Games -- 3.1 The KP-model of optimal routing with unsplittable traf c. The price of anarchy -- 3.2 Pure strategy equilibrium. Braess's paradox -- 3.3 Completely mixed equilibrium in the problem with inhomogeneous users and homogeneous channels -- 3.4 The price of anarchy in the model with parallel channels and unsplittable traf c -- 3.5 The price of anarchy in the model with linear social cost and unsplittable traf c for an arbitrary network -- 3.6 The mixed price of anarchy in the model with linear social cost and unsplittable traf c for an arbitrary network -- 3.7 The price of anarchy in the model with maximal social cost and unsplittable traf c for an arbitrary network -- 3.8 The Wardrop optimal routing model with splittable traf c -- 3.9 The optimal routing model with parallel channels. The Pigou model. Braess's paradox -- 3.10 Potential in the model with splittable traf c for an arbitrary network -- 3.11 Social cost in the model with splittable traf c for convex latency functions -- 3.12 The price of anarchy in the model with splittable traf c for linear latency functions -- 3.13 Potential in the Wardrop model with parallel channels for player-speci c linear latency functions -- 3.14 The price of anarchy in an arbitrary network for player-speci c linear latency functions -- 3.15 The Wardrop model with parallel channels and incomplete information -- 3.16 Equilibria in the model with incomplete information.
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3.17 Potential and existence of Wardrop equilibrium in the model with incomplete information -- 4 Load Balancing Game -- 4.1 A model of the load balancing game -- 4.2 The price of anarchy in the general case of N processors -- 4.3 The price of anarchy in the case of three processors -- 4.4 A numerical method to calculate the price of anarchy -- 4.5 Computing experiments -- 5 Cover Game -- 5.1 A model of the cover game -- 5.2 The price of anarchy in the general case of N processors -- 5.3 The price of anarchy in the case of three processors -- 5.4 A numerical method to calculate the price of anarchy -- 5.5 Computing experiments -- 6 Networks and Graphs -- 6.1 Classical betweenness centrality for the nodes and edges of a graph -- 6.2 The PageRank method -- 6.3 Centrality measure for weighted graphs based on Kirchhoff's law -- 6.4 Centrality measure for weighted graphs as a solution of cooperative game -- 6.4.1 The Myerson value -- 6.4.2 Characteristic function -- 6.4.3 Allocation principle -- 6.4.4 Generating function for the number of paths -- 6.4.5 General case -- 6.4.6 The Myerson value for a linear graph and star -- 6.4.7 Transportation networks -- 6.4.8 The Myerson value as centrality measure for weighted networks -- 7 Social Networks -- 7.1 Graph construction for social network -- 7.2 Centrality measures for social networks -- 7.3 Modeling professional links by coauthored publications -- 7.4 Community detection in networks -- 7.5 Hedonic games -- 7.6 A search algorithm for Nash stable partition -- 8 Games on Transportation Networks -- 8.1 Transportation network and correspondence matrix -- 8.2 Traf c intensity calculation: an example -- 8.3 A model of public transport system -- 8.3.1 The system with two carriers -- 8.3.2 The system with K carriers -- 8.4 Optimal distribution and the Wardrop equilibrium principle -- 8.4.1 Cooperative solution.
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8.4.2 Wardrop equilibrium -- 8.4.3 The price of anarchy -- 9 Models of Transportation Market -- 9.1 Allocation model over a graph -- 9.2 Pricing game over a graph -- 9.3 Allocation game over a graph -- 9.4 Modeling of air transportation market -- 9.4.1 Modeling of passenger demand -- 9.4.2 Logit model of passenger traf c distribution -- 10 Games With Request Flows in Service Systems -- 10.1 Arrival time choice in a one-server system with sequential requests -- 10.1.1 Model of the system with two players -- 10.1.2 Nash equilibrium in the problem with two players -- 10.1.3 Model of the system with three and more players -- 10.2 Arrival time choice in a random-access two-server system with arbitrary requests -- 10.2.1 Two-server system. Noncooperative game -- 10.2.2 Game with rational random-access scheme -- 10.2.3 Deterministic number of players in the rational random-access scheme game -- 10.2.4 Poisson number of players in the rational random-access scheme game -- 10.2.5 Game with pure random-access scheme -- 10.2.6 Deterministic number of players in the pure random-access scheme game -- 10.2.7 Poisson number of players in the pure random-access scheme game -- 10.2.8 Comparison of random-access schemes in terms of ef ciency -- 11 Cloud Operator Games -- 11.1 Cloud computing market -- 11.2 Game-theoretical model -- 11.3 Two-player game -- 11.4 Symmetric case for n-player game -- 11.5 Numerical simulations -- 11.6 Two-sided telecommunication market -- 11.7 Generalized Hotelling speci cation for two operators -- 11.8 Two operators and company-dependent client preferences -- 11.9 Two operators and operator-dependent client preferences -- 11.10 M operators and company-dependent client preferences -- References -- Index -- Back Cover.
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9780128165515
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0128165510
Language:
English
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