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  • 1
    Book
    Book
    Disagreement, deference, and religious commitment / (2020)
    New York, NY :Oxford University Press,
    Details
    UID:
    almahu_BV046258047
    Format: xiii, 339 Seiten.
    ISBN: 978-0-19-005181-5 , 0-19-005181-7 , 978-0-19-776651-4
    Content: "The striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is very often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. For this reason, many have argued that the only rational response to religious disagreement is to adopt a religious skepticism that eschews confident religious belief. This book contests this conclusion, explaining how it could be rational to maintain confident religious (or irreligious) belief even in the face of persistent disagreement. Part One argues against the commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality that underlies the case for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism, while also critiquing highly sanguine approaches to disagreement that allow for an unproblematic privileging of one's first-person perspective. According to the position defended in Part One, justified confidence in the face of religious disagreement is likely to require that one have rational insight into reasons that favor one's outlook. It is argued that many of the rational insights that are crucial to assessing religious outlooks are not achievable through analytical reasoning, but only through having the right sort of emotional experiences. Part Two considers the implications for religious commitment of accepting the impartiality requirement favored by 'disagreement skeptics.' Challenges are raised to the assumption that a commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality rules out confident religious belief. But it is further argued that such a commitment would likely make it irrational to pursue one's favored form of religious life and might lead to normative uncertainty that would prevent rational engagement in any religious or irreligious way of life whatsoever"--
    Note: Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke , Disagreement-motivated religious skepticism and the commitment to impartiality -- De-motivating reasons impartiality -- From impartiality to instrumentalism -- Partisan justification and religious belief -- Affective rationalism and religious insight -- Elusive impartiality -- Unpalatable conclusions and deliberative vertigo
    Language: English
    Subjects: Philosophy
    RVK:
    CC 8500
    Keywords: Religion ; Glaube ; Glaubenszweifel ; Skeptizismus ; Theologische Erkenntnistheorie
    URL: Klappentext
    URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis
    URL: Literaturverzeichnis
    URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Disagreement, deference, and religious commitment / (2019)
    New York, NY :Oxford University Press,
    Details
    UID:
    almahu_9948177429702882
    Format: 1 online resource.
    ISBN: 9780190051846 (ebook) :
    Series Statement: Oxford scholarship online
    Content: The striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is very often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. For this reason, many have argued that the only rational response to religious disagreement is to adopt a religious skepticism that eschews confident religious belief. This text contests this conclusion, explaining how it could be rational to maintain confident religious (or irreligious) belief even in the face of persistent disagreement.
    Note: Also issued in print: 2019.
    Additional Edition: Print version : ISBN 9780190051815
    Language: English
    URL: Oxford scholarship online
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    HU Berlin
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Disagreement, deference, and religious commitment (2020)
    New York, NY : Oxford University Press
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1681384159
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xiii, 339 Seiten)
    ISBN: 9780190051846
    Series Statement: Oxford scholarship online
    Content: The striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is very often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. For this reason, many have argued that the only rational response to religious disagreement is to adopt a religious skepticism that eschews confident religious belief. This text contests this conclusion, explaining how it could be rational to maintain confident religious (or irreligious) belief even in the face of persistent disagreement.
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780190051815
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Pittard, John Disagreement, deference, and religious commitment New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2020 ISBN 9780190051815
    Additional Edition: ISBN 0190051817
    Language: English
    Keywords: Religion ; Theologische Erkenntnistheorie ; Skeptizismus ; Glaubenszweifel ; Glaube
    DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190051815.001.0001
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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    Online Resource
    Online Access
    Open Access Request
    Stabi Berlin
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