Format:
1 online resource (678 pages)
Edition:
1st ed.
ISBN:
9780198758105
,
9780191075605
Content:
A volume to mark the 30th anniversary of the journal Economic Policy. It brings together key articles that still matter today, and provides academics with important research markers. It also acts as a student reader that demonstrates how the field of economics progresses by responding to challenges of the time
Note:
Cover -- Thirty Years of Economic Policy: Inspiration for Debate -- Copyright -- Foreword -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Introduction -- Part I: Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy -- Chapter 1: Mexico: Stabilization, Debt and Growth -- Editor´s Introduction -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. An Overview -- 1.2.1. Macroeconomic Performance -- 1.2.2. Debt History -- 1.2.3. The 1982 Crisis -- 1.2.4. The Experience Since 1982 -- 1.2.4.1. Budget Consolidation -- 1.2.4.2. External Debt Service -- 1.3. Inflation Stabilization -- 1.3.1. Inertial Inflation and Coordination -- 1.3.1.1. Inertial Inflation -- 1.3.1.2. Coordination -- 1.3.1.3. Risks of Misalignment -- 1.3.2. The Budget and Inflation -- 1.3.3. Real Interest Rates During Stabilization -- 1.3.4. The Transition -- 1.4. External Debt and Growth -- 1.4.1. The Debt Problem -- 1.4.2. Debt and Growth -- 1.4.3. Market-related Mechanisms -- 1.4.3.1. Debt-equity Swaps -- 1.4.3.2. Buy-Backs -- 1.4.4. Recycling of Interest Payments -- 1.4.4.1. Advantages -- 1.4.4.2. Capital Flight and Bank Runs -- 1.4.5. Risks for Creditors -- Acknowledgements -- References -- Chapter 2: The collapse of the Mexican peso: What Have We Learned? -- Editor´s Introduction -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. The Conditions in Early 1994 -- 2.3. How did the Mexican Government Become Financially Vulnerable? -- 2.3.1. The Current Account and Foreign Exchange Reserves -- 2.3.2. Public Debt Maturity -- 2.3.3. Bank Weakness -- 2.4. The Policy Dilemma -- 2.4.1. Monetary Policy -- 2.4.2. Exchange Rate Policy -- 2.4.3. Policy Options -- 2.5. The December Panic -- 2.5.1. From Devaluation to Panic: Two Possible Interpretations -- 2.5.2. Contagion to the Private Sector -- 2.5.3. A Self-fulfilling Crisis -- 2.6. Mexico´s Policies and the International AID Package -- 2.6.1. Alternative Solutions -- 2.7. What Have We Learned?
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2.7.1. Difficulties of Automatic Adjustment under Fixed Exchange Rates -- 2.7.2. Financial Vulnerability and Currency Pegs -- Acknowledgements -- References -- Chapter 3: Immediate challenges for the European Central Bank -- Editor´s Introduction -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Something New is Coming -- 3.3. How Will the Board Vote? -- 3.4. Communicating with the Public -- 3.5. The Monetary Mechanism -- 3.5.1. Regional Effects and Initial Conditions -- 3.5.2. Lessons from the Pre-EMU Experience? -- 3.5.3. The Empirical Evidence Available -- 3.5.3.1. Evidence from Large Econometric Models -- 3.5.3.2. Evidence from Small Econometric Models -- 3.5.3.3. Summing up the Evidence to Date -- 3.5.4. New Empirical Evidence -- 3.5.5. Building a Monetary Condition Index (MCI) for the ECB -- 3.6. Why is the Monetary Mechanism Different Across Europe? -- 3.6.1. Channels of Monetary Transmission in Europe -- 3.6.2. Asymmetries in the Income Effect of Monetary Policy -- 3.6.3. Asymmetries in the Credit Channel: Is the Relevant Lending Rate Short or Long? -- 3.6.4. Summing up the Evidence on Financial Structure and the Monetary Mechanism -- 3.7. The Monetary Mechanism: Implications for the ECB -- 3.8. Changing Structure -- 3.8.1. The Demise of European Banks -- 3.8.2. The Wage-Price Process -- 3.9. Conclusions -- Acknowledgements -- References -- Chapter 4: Will there be a dollar crisis? -- Editor´s Introduction -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. The Case for a Plunge: a Wile E. Coyote Approach -- 4.3. Wile E. Coyote Analytics -- 4.4. Novel Arguments Regarding Capital Flows and the Dollar -- 4.4.1. Global Savings Glut -- 4.4.2. Return Differentials -- 4.4.3. Bretton Woods II -- 4.4.4. Dark Matter -- 4.4.5. Secular Dollar Decline -- 4.5. Macroeconomics of a Plunge -- 4.6. Summary and Conclusions -- Acknowledgements -- References -- Part II: FISCAL Policy
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6.7. Political Determinants of Fiscal Expansions and Adjustments -- 6.8. Discussion -- 6.9. Conclusions -- Appendix -- Acknowledgements -- References -- Chapter 7: What should fiscal councils do? -- Editor´s Introduction -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. Trends in Government Debt -- 7.3. Optimal Debt Policy and the Inadequacy of Fiscal Rules -- 7.3.1. Fiscal Rules -- 7.3.2. Optimal Debt Policy -- 7.3.3. The Difficulty with Fiscal Rules Alone -- 7.4. Understanding Deficit Bias -- 7.4.1. Informational Problems -- 7.4.2. Impatience -- 7.4.3. Electoral Competition -- 7.4.4. Common-pool Theory -- 7.4.5. Time Inconsistency and Inflation Bias -- 7.4.6. Exploiting Future Generations -- 7.4.7. Procyclicality -- 7.5. The Potential Contribution of Fiscal Councils -- 7.5.1. Advisory or Decision-making Councils -- 7.5.2. Different Roles for Advisory Councils -- 7.5.2.1. Information and Forecasting Problems -- 7.5.2.2. Impatience, Electoral Competition or Time Inconsistency -- 7.5.2.3. Common-pool Problems -- 7.5.2.4 What Can Fiscal Councils Achieve? -- 7.5.3. Fiscal Council Tasks -- 7.5.3.1. Commenting on Fiscal Rules -- 7.5.3.2. Forecasting -- 7.5.3.3. Normative Analysis -- 7.5.3.4. Countercyclical Policy -- 7.5.3.5. Broader Scope -- 7.5.4. Independence -- 7.5.5. Viability -- 7.6. Existing Fiscal Councils -- 7.6.1. Tasks -- 7.6.2. Resources, Composition and Independence of Fiscal Councils -- 7.6.3. Impact -- 7.7. Two Case Studies -- 7.7.1. The Swedish Fiscal Policy Council -- 7.7.1.1. The FPC´s Analyses -- 7.7.1.2. The FPC´s Impact -- 7.7.1.3. The Scope of the Remit -- 7.7.1.4. Political Fragility -- 7.7.2. The Office for Budget Responsibility in the UK -- 7.7.2.1. Forecasting and Independence -- 7.7.2.2. Policy Analysis -- 7.7.3. Comparison Between the FPC and the OBR -- 7.8. Conclusions -- Acknowledgements -- References -- Part III: European Integration
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9.4.2. Tax Harmonization
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Chapter 5: A guide to public sector debt and deficits -- Editor´s Introduction -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. Public Sector Debt and Deficits in the United Kingdom: Some Statistical Facts -- 5.3. Deficits, Debt and Inflation -- 5.3.1. Amortizing the Public Debt Through Inflation -- 5.3.2. Debt, Deficits, and Monetization -- 5.4. Deficits, Debt, and Solvency -- 5.4.1. The Solvency Constraint -- 5.4.2. Sustainable Fiscal-Financial-Monetary Plans -- 5.4.3. The `Permanent Deficit´ -- 5.4.4. Debt Repudiation -- 5.5. Crowding Out -- 5.5.1. The Neutrality of Debt and Deficits -- 5.5.2. Old-fashioned Keynesian Short-run Crowding Out -- 5.5.3. Old-fashioned Classical Short-run Crowding Out -- 5.5.4. Old-fashioned Keynesian Long-run Crowding Out -- 5.5.5. Portfolio Crowding Out -- 5.5.6. Rational Expectations-augmented Keynesian Crowding Out -- 5.5.7. Rational Expectations-Augmented Classical Crowding Out and the Impossibility of Cutting Taxes -- 5.6. Measures of Fiscal Stance -- 5.7. Conclusions -- Appendix 5A: Arithmetic of the Government Budget Constraint -- Appendix 5B: Negative Impact Multipliers From Budget Deficits in a Keynesian Model with Rational Expectations -- Appendix 5C: Measures of Fiscal Stance -- 5C.1. Keynesian Measures -- 5C.2. Blanchard's Measure -- Acknowledgements -- References -- Chapter 6: Fiscal expansions and adjustments in OECD countries -- Editor´s Introduction -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.1.1. The Questions -- 6.1.2. The Answers -- 6.1.3. Relationship with the Literature -- 6.1.4. Summary -- 6.2. The Fiscal Impulse -- 6.2.1. The Discretionary Component of Fiscal Policy -- 6.2.2. Loose and Tight Fiscal Policies -- 6.3. Aggregate Expenditures and Taxation and the Fiscal Stance -- 6.4. Disaggregating Expenditure and Taxation -- 6.5. Successful and Unsuccessful Adjustments -- 6.6. Robustness of the Results
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Chapter 8: The growth effects of 1992 -- Editor´s Introduction -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. Scale Economies and the Growth Effects of 1992 -- 8.2.1. The Medium-run Growth Bonus from 1992 -- 8.2.2. The New Long-term Growth Bonus in Romer´s Model -- 8.3. The Data Versus the Traditional Growth Model -- 8.3.1. Traditional Theory and Growth -- 8.3.1.1. Some Aggregate Evidence Against the Traditional Model -- 8.3.1.2. The Traditional Model´s Rejoinder -- 8.3.2. Econometric Evidence Against Constant Returns to Scale -- 8.4. Policy Implications of Scale Economies -- 8.4.1. Specialized Inputs -- 8.4.2. Technology Spill-overs -- 8.4.2.1. Euro Rust Belts -- 8.4.3. Profit-motivated Innovation, Growth and 1992 -- 8.4.3.1. A Model of Endogenous Innovation and Growth -- 8.5. Calibrating the Growth Effects of 1992 -- 8.5.1. Quantifying the Medium-term Growth Bonus -- 8.5.1.1. The Plausibility of the Medium-run Bonus -- 8.5.2. Long-term Growth Effects of 1992 -- 8.5.2.1. Calibrating the Romer Model -- 8.5.2.2. Calibrating the Endogenous Innovations Model -- 8.5.3. Adding up the Output Effects -- 8.6. Conclusions -- Appendix 8A: A Formal Model and the Medium-Run Growth Bonus -- 8A.1. The Basic Model -- 8A.1.1. Technology and Endowments -- 8A.1.2. Preferences -- 8A.2. Within-period Equilibrium -- 8A.3. The Steady-state, Balanced Growth Path -- Appendix 8B: The Romer Model with a Variable Labour Input -- Acknowledgements -- References -- Chapter 9: One money for Europe?: Lessons from the US Currency Union -- Editor´s Introduction -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. Are Capital Controls Inimical to Economic Integration? -- 9.2.1. Capital Controls in Practice -- 9.2.2. Capital Controls in Theory -- 9.3. Does Removal of Capital Controls Require Monetary Harmonization? -- 9.4. Does Removal of Capital Controls Require Fiscal Harmonization? -- 9.4.1. Deficit Spending
Additional Edition:
Print version Wyplosz, Charles Thirty Years of Economic Policy Oxford : Oxford University Press,c2015 ISBN 9780198758105
Language:
English
Keywords:
Electronic books
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