Format:
Online-Ressource (xii, 257 p)
,
ill
Edition:
Online-Ausg. 2011 Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
ISBN:
0191522228
,
9780191522222
Series Statement:
Clarendon lectures in economics
Content:
Incentives and Political Economy constructs a normative approach to constitutional design using recent developments in contract theory. It treats political economy as the study of the incentive problems created by the delegation of economic policy to self-interested politicians. Politicians are treated successively as informed supervisors or residual decision-makers. The optimal constitutional responses to the activities of interest groups are characterizedin various circumstances, as well as the optimal trade-off between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas when the incompleteness of the constitutional contract is recognized.
Content:
Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Political Economy with a Benevolent Monarch -- 1.2 The Design of Democratic Institutions -- 1.3 Political Economy in Democratic Countries -- 1.4 The Chicago View of Interest Group Politics -- 1.5 The Complete Contracting Approach -- 1.6 The Incomplete Contracting Approach -- 1.7 Adding Asymmetric Information -- 1.8 Endogenous Coalition formation -- I: Politicians as Informed Supervisors -- 2. The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 A Simple Supervision Model -- 2.3 Optimal Incentives for the Politician -- 2.4 Conclusion -- Appendix 2 -- 3. An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Separation of Powers and Yardstick Competition -- 3.3 A Model with Three Types -- 3.4 Single Non-benevolent Politician -- 3.5 Separation of Politicians -- 3.6 Generalization of the Results -- 3.7 Conclusion -- Appendix 3 -- 4. Checks and Balances -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Model -- 4.3 Optimal Symmetric Constitution -- 4.4 Supervision and Division of Tasks -- 4.5 Multidimensional Collusion Activities -- 4.6 A Model with Three Politicians -- 4.7 Optimal Supervisory Structures -- 4.8 Conclusion -- Appendix 4 -- II: Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design -- 5. Political Economy and Industrial Policy -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Political Interference in the Rent-Efficiency Trade-off -- 5.3 Ownership Matters -- 5.4 Incentives against Capture as a Constitutional Rule -- 5.5 Political Price Discrimination Versus Uniform Pricing -- 5.6 Information Asymmetries, Costly Redistribution and the Cost of Democracy -- 5.7 Conclusion -- Appendix 5 -- 6. Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Marginal Cost Pricing Rule -- 6.3 Frisch's Comment.
Note:
Includes bibliographical references (p. [231]-242) and index
,
1.IntroductionI.Politicians as Informed Supervisors.2.The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design.3.An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers.4.Checks and BalancesII.Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design.5.Political Economy and Industrial Policy.6.Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy.7.Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive RegulationIII.Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design.8.Optimal Constitutional Response to Coalition Formation.9.Collusion and Decentralization.10.Concluding Remarks.App.: Translations of Passages Quoted in French.
,
Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0198294247
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9780198294245
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Incentives and political economy
Language:
English
Keywords:
Electronic books
URL:
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