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  • 1
    Buch
    Buch
    Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] :MIT Press,
    UID:
    almafu_BV027265771
    Umfang: IX, 173 S.
    Ausgabe: 1. printing
    ISBN: 0-262-19431-7
    Serie: Contemporary philosophical monographs 1
    Sprache: Englisch
    Fachgebiete: Philosophie
    RVK:
    Schlagwort(e): Supervenienz ; Supervenienz ; Philosophie
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 2
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Cambridge, Mass. :MIT Press,
    UID:
    almahu_9949253273502882
    Umfang: 1 online resource (177 pages).
    ISBN: 9780262283366 , 0262283360 , 0262692309 , 9780262692304 , 0262194317 , 9780262194310
    Serie: Contemporary philosophical monographs ; 1
    Inhalt: A good understanding of the nature of a property requires knowing whether that property is relational or intrinsic. Gabriel Segal's concern is whether certain psychological properties -- specifically, those that make up what might be called the "cognitive content" of psychological states -- are relational or intrinsic. He claims that content supervenes on microstructure, that is, if two beings are identical with respect to their microstructural properties, then they must be identical with respect to their cognitive contents. Segal's thesis, a version of internalism, is that being in a state with a specific cognitive content does not essentially involve standing in any real relation to anything external. He uses the fact that content locally supervenes on microstructure to argue for the intrinsicness of content. Cognitive content is fully determined by intrinsic, microstructural properties: duplicate a subject in respect to those properties and you duplicate their cognitive contents. The book, written in a clear, engaging style, contains four chapters. The first two argue against the two leading externalist theories. Chapter 3 rejects popular theories that endorse two kinds of content: "narrow" content, which is locally supervenient, and "broad" content, which is not. Chapter 4 defends a radical alternative version of internalism, arguing that narrow content is a variety of ordinary representation, that is, that narrow content is all there is to content. In defending internalism, Segal does not claim to defend a general philosophical theory of content. At this stage, he suggests, it should suffice to cast reasonable doubt on externalism, to motivate internalism, and to provide reasons to believe that good psychology is, or could be, internalist.
    Sprache: Englisch
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 3
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Cambridge, Mass. :MIT Press,
    UID:
    almafu_9960950755102883
    Umfang: 1 online resource (177 pages).
    ISBN: 0-262-28336-0
    Serie: Contemporary philosophical monographs ; 1
    Inhalt: A good understanding of the nature of a property requires knowing whether that property is relational or intrinsic. Gabriel Segal's concern is whether certain psychological properties -- specifically, those that make up what might be called the "cognitive content" of psychological states -- are relational or intrinsic. He claims that content supervenes on microstructure, that is, if two beings are identical with respect to their microstructural properties, then they must be identical with respect to their cognitive contents. Segal's thesis, a version of internalism, is that being in a state with a specific cognitive content does not essentially involve standing in any real relation to anything external. He uses the fact that content locally supervenes on microstructure to argue for the intrinsicness of content. Cognitive content is fully determined by intrinsic, microstructural properties: duplicate a subject in respect to those properties and you duplicate their cognitive contents. The book, written in a clear, engaging style, contains four chapters. The first two argue against the two leading externalist theories. Chapter 3 rejects popular theories that endorse two kinds of content: "narrow" content, which is locally supervenient, and "broad" content, which is not. Chapter 4 defends a radical alternative version of internalism, arguing that narrow content is a variety of ordinary representation, that is, that narrow content is all there is to content. In defending internalism, Segal does not claim to defend a general philosophical theory of content. At this stage, he suggests, it should suffice to cast reasonable doubt on externalism, to motivate internalism, and to provide reasons to believe that good psychology is, or could be, internalist.
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 0-262-19431-7
    Sprache: Englisch
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
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