Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (351 pages)
Ausgabe:
University of Notre Dame Press edition
ISBN:
9780268158873
,
0268158878
Originaltitel:
Summa contra gentiles
Anmerkung:
Originally published: On the truth of the Catholic faith. Garden City, NY : Hanover House, 1956; first paperback edition 1956 by Image Books
,
Includes bibliographical references and index
,
The connection between the following considerations and the preceding ones -- That the consideration of creatures is useful for instruction of faith -- That knowledge of the nature of creatures serves to destroy errors concerning God -- That the philosopher and the theologian consider creatures in different ways -- Order of procedure -- That it is proper to God to be the source of the being of other things -- That active power exists in God -- That God's power is His substance -- That God's power is His action -- How power is attributed to God -- That something is said of God in relation to creatures -- That relations predicated of God in reference to creatures do not really exist in Him -- How the aforesaid relations are predicated of God -- That God is to all things the cause of being -- That God brought things into being from nothing -- That creation is neither motion nor change -- How objections against creation are solved -- That in creation no succession exists -- That no body is capable of creative action -- That the act of creating belongs to God alone -- That God is omnipotent -- That God does not act by natural necessity -- That God acts conformably to His wisdom -- How the omnipotent God is said to be incapable of certain things -- That the divine intellect is not confined to limited effects -- That the divine will is not restricted to certain effects -- How dueness is entailed in the production of things -- How absolute necessity can exist in created things -- That it is not necessary for creatures to have always existed -- Arguments of those who wish to demonstrate the world's eternity from the point of view of God -- Arguments of those who wish to prove the eternity of the world from the standpoint of creatures -- Arguments to prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of the making of things -- Solution of the foregoing arguments, and first of those taken from the standpoint of God -- Solution of the arguments proposed from the point of view of the things made -- Solution of the arguments taken from the point of view of the making of things -- Arguments by which some try to show that the world is not eternal -- That the distinction of things is not the result of chance -- That matter is not the first cause of the distinction of things -- That a contrariety of agents does not account for the distinction of things -- That the first cause of the distinction of things is not the world of secondary agents -- That the distinction of things is not caused by some secondary agent introducing diverse forms into matter -- That the distinction of things does not have its source in the diversity of merits or demerits -- The true first cause of the distinction of things -- That the perfection of the universe required the existence of some intellectual creatures -- That intellectual substances are endowed with will -- That intellectual substances have freedom of choice in acting -- That the intellectual substance is not a body -- That intellectual substances are immaterial -- That the intellectual substance is not a material form -- That in created intellectual substances, being and what is differ -- That in created intellectual substances there is act and potentiality -- That the composition of substance and being is not the same as the composition of matter and form -- That intellectual substances are incorruptible -- In what way an intellectual substance can be united to the body -- The position of Plato concerning the union of the intellectual soul with the body -- That in man there are not three souls, nutritive, sensitive, and intellective -- That man's possible intellect is not a separate substance -- That man derives his specific nature, not from the passive, but from the possible, intellect -- That this theory is contrary to the teaching of Aristotle -- Against Alexander's opinion concerning the possible intellect -- That the soul is not a temperament, as Galen maintained -- That the soul is not a harmony -- That the soul is not a body -- Against those who maintain that intellect and sense are the same -- Against those who hold that the possible intellect is the imagination -- How an intellectual substance can be the form of the body -- Solution of the arguments advanced above in order to show that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body as its form -- That according to the words of Aristotle the intellect must be said to be united to the body as its form -- That the soul is united to the body without intermediation -- That the whole soul is in the whole body and in each of its parts -- That there is not one possible intellect in all men -- Concerning the theory of Avicenna, who said that intelligible forms are not preserved in the possible intellect -- Solution of the seemingly demonstrative arguments for the unity of the possible intellect -- That the agent intellect is not a separate substance, but part of the soul -- That it is not impossible for the possible and agent intellect to exist together in the one substance of the soul -- That Aristotle held not that the agent intellect is a separate substance, but that it is a part of the soul -- That the human soul does not perish when the body is corrupted -- Arguments to prove that the corruption of the body entails that of the soul [and their solution] -- That the souls of brute animals are not immortal -- That the human soul begins to exist when the body does -- Solution of the preceding arguments -- That the soul is not made of God's substance -- That the human soul is not transmitted with the semen -- That the human soul is brought into being through the creative action of God -- Arguments designed to prove that the human soul is formed from the semen -- Solution of the preceding arguments -- That an intellectual substance is united only to a human body as its form -- That there are some intellectual substances which are not united to bodies -- Concerning the great number of separate substances -- Of the non-existence of a plurality of separate substances of one species -- That the separate substance and the soul are not of the same species -- How in separate substances genus and species are to be taken -- That separate substances do not receive their knowledge from sensible things -- That the intellect of a separate substance is always in act of understanding -- How one separate substance understands another -- That separate substances know material things -- That separate substances know singulars -- Whether separate substances have natural knowledge of all things at the same time.
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 9780268016807
Weitere Ausg.:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?-1274 Summa contra gentiles. Book two, Creation Notre Dame IN : University of Notre Dame Press, ©1976 ISBN 9780268016807
Sprache:
Englisch
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