Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (356 pages)

ISBN: 9780443152313

Content: Functional safety is the task of developing and implementing automatic safety systems used to manage risks in many industries where hazardous processes and machinery are used. Functional Safety from Scratch: A Practical Guide to Process Industry Applications provides a practical guide to functional safety, as applied in the chemical process industry, including the oil and gas, petrochemical, pharmaceutical and energy sectors. Written by a seasoned professional with many years of functional safety experience, this book explains the purpose of the relevant international standard IEC 61511 and how to achieve compliance efficiently. It provides in-depth coverage of the entire lifecycle of a functional safety system, assuming no prior knowledge of functional safety and only a basic understanding of process safety concepts. SIL assessment, the functional safety management plan, the safety requirements specification, verification, validation and functional safety assessment are covered in particular detail. Functional Safety from Scratch: A Practical Guide to Process Industry Applications is a highly practical source for process and instrumentation engineers, engineering managers and consultants, whether new to the field or already experienced. Focuses on the 'how to' aspects of functional safety Provides detailed explanation and guidance on how to develop the safety requirements specification Includes extensive coverage of safety lifecycle verification, SIS validation, and functional safety assessment Provides numerous practical exercises to confirm understanding and promote further thought Includes tips for those preparing for functional safety examinations Oriented towards an international audience, especially those for whom English is not their first language.

Note: Front Cover -- Functional Safety from Scratch -- Functional Safety from Scratch -- Copyright -- Contents -- About the author -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Glossary -- Introduction -- Which industries are covered? -- Who is the book suitable for? -- Who developed this book? -- 1 - Introduction to functional safety -- 1.1 What could possibly go wrong? -- 1.2 Hazard and risk -- 1.2.1 What is a hazard? -- 1.2.2 What is harm? -- 1.2.3 What is risk? -- 1.2.4 What is tolerable risk? -- 1.2.5 Risk management through functional safety -- 1.3 Functional safety standards: IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 -- 1.3.1 Purpose of the standards -- 1.3.2 Scope of IEC 61511 -- 1.3.3 Why comply with IEC 61511? -- 1.4 IEC 61511 key concepts -- 1.4.1 The functional safety lifecycle -- 1.4.2 Intrinsically safer design -- 1.4.3 The safety requirements specification (SRS) -- 1.4.4 Assuring that functional safety is achieved -- 1.4.5 Random and systematic failures -- 1.4.6 Competency -- 1.5 The structure of IEC 61511 -- 1.6 The origins of IEC 61511 -- Exercises -- Answers -- Question 1-Answer -- Question 2-Answer -- Question 4-Answer -- References -- Further reading -- 2 - Basic terminology: SIF, SIS and SIL -- 2.1 The meaning of SIF, SIS and SIL -- 2.1.1 What is a SIF? -- 2.1.2 What is a SIS? -- 2.1.3 SIL, reliability, and integrity -- 2.1.4 What is an interlock (or trip)? -- 2.2 Anatomy of a SIF -- 2.2.1 The sensor subsystem -- Other components of the sensor subsystem -- The MooN concept for initiators -- 2.2.2 The logic solver subsystem -- 2.2.3 The final element subsystem -- Actuated valves -- Motor control circuits -- Other final elements -- Other elements of the final element subsystem -- The MooN concept for final elements -- 2.2.4 Permissives and inhibit functions -- 2.2.5 Other important aspects of a SIF -- 2.3 Development of a SIF -- 2.3.1 SIL assessment. , 2.3.2 SIL verification -- 2.4 Failure -- 2.4.1 Failure modes -- 2.4.2 Failure rates -- 2.4.3 Hardware fault tolerance -- Exercises -- Answers -- Question 1-Answer -- Question 2-Answer -- Question 3-Answer -- Question 4-Answer -- Question 5-Answer -- Question 6-Answer -- Question 7-Answer -- Question 8-Answer -- References -- 3 - Risk evaluation -- 3.1 Identifying hazardous scenarios -- 3.2 Expressing risk in numbers -- 3.3 Tolerable risk -- Defining a tolerable risk per event -- Defining a total tolerable risk per risk receptor -- 3.4 How much precision is needed? -- 3.5 The ALARP concept -- Exercises -- Answers -- Question 1-Answer -- Question 2-Answer -- Question 3-Answer -- References -- 4 - Introduction to SIL assessment -- 4.1 Safety instrumented function (SIF) operating modes -- 4.1.1 What are low demand, high demand and continuous modes? -- 4.1.2 Selecting an operating mode -- 4.1.3 Formal definition of operating modes -- 4.1.4 The significance of operating modes -- Definition of SIL -- Failure rates -- SIL assessment methodology -- 4.1.5 Tips on selecting the operating mode -- 4.2 The objectives of SIL assessment -- 4.2.1 Low demand mode SIFs -- 4.2.2 High demand and continuous mode SIFs -- 4.2.3 Why not use default SIL targets? -- 4.2.4 Prevention or mitigation? -- 4.3 Identifying and documenting SIFs -- 4.3.1 Objective -- 4.3.2 Using process control narratives, interlock descriptions -- 4.3.3 Using cause & -- effect diagrams (C& -- EDs) -- 4.3.4 Using HAZOP and old SIL assessment study reports -- Should BPCS trips be included? -- 4.3.5 Using binary logic diagrams -- 4.3.6 Using interlock logic diagrams -- 4.3.7 Using piping & -- instrumentation diagrams (P& -- IDs) -- 4.4 Separating complex interlocks into SIFs -- 4.5 The double jeopardy rule -- 4.6 Independent protection layers -- 4.6.1 Pressure relief devices (PRDs). , 4.6.2 Alarms with operator response -- 4.6.3 Control loops -- 4.6.4 Autostart of standby equipment -- 4.6.5 BPCS interlocks -- 4.6.6 Interlocks in other PLCs -- 4.6.7 Check valves -- 4.6.8 Other mechanical protective devices -- 4.6.9 Operating procedures -- 4.6.10 Spill containment -- 4.6.11 Trace heating -- 4.6.12 Backup utility supplies -- 4.6.13 Another SIF -- 4.6.14 Typical IPL credit available -- 4.6.15 Examples of insufficient independence -- 4.7 Critical common element analysis -- Exercises -- Answers -- Question 1-Answer -- Question 2-Answer -- Question 3-Answer -- Question 4-Answer -- Question 5-Answer -- Question 6-Answer -- Question 7-Answer -- Question 8-Answer -- Question 9-Answer -- Question 10-Answer -- Question 11-Answer -- Question 12-Answer -- Question 13-Answer -- References -- 5 - SIL assessment methodology -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Overview of SIL assessment methods -- Features of SIL assessment common to all methods -- 5.3 Selecting initiating events -- Typical initiating events -- Determine the initiating event in sufficient detail -- Control loop malfunctions -- Failure of safeguards as initiating events -- 5.4 Assessing the likelihood of initiating events -- 5.5 Assessing the consequence severity -- 5.6 Documenting the SIL assessment study -- 5.7 Risk matrix method -- 5.7.1 Method overview -- 5.7.2 Likelihood and severity categories -- 5.7.3 The risk matrix -- 5.7.4 Calibration of the risk matrix -- 5.7.5 Handling multiple initiating events -- 5.7.6 Handling enabling conditions and conditional modifiers -- 5.7.7 Handling independent protection layers (IPLs) -- 5.7.8 Estimating the SIF demand rate -- 5.7.9 Risk matrix and ALARP -- 5.7.10 High demand and continuous mode SIFs -- 5.8 Risk Graph method -- 5.8.1 Method overview -- 5.8.2 Parameters used in Risk Graph -- 5.8.3 Risk Graph examples. , 5.8.4 Selecting parameter categories -- Demand frequency (W parameter) -- Exposure (F parameter) -- Avoidance (P parameter) -- 5.8.5 Calibration of the Risk Graph -- 5.8.6 Handling multiple initiating events -- 5.8.7 Handling enabling conditions and conditional modifiers -- 5.8.8 Handling independent protection layers (IPLs) -- 5.8.9 Estimating the SIF demand rate -- 5.8.10 High demand and continuous mode SIFs -- 5.9 Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) -- 5.9.1 Method overview -- 5.9.2 Enabling conditions -- 5.9.3 Conditional modifiers -- 5.9.4 Handling multiple initiating events -- 5.9.5 Estimating the SIF demand rate -- 5.9.6 Example LOPA worksheet -- 5.9.7 High demand and continuous mode SIFs -- 5.10 Fault tree analysis -- 5.10.1 Method overview -- 5.10.2 Documenting Fault Tree analysis -- 5.11 Cost/benefit analysis -- 5.11.1 Introduction -- 5.11.2 Calculating the cost of the outcome -- Example -- 5.11.3 Calculating the cost of the SIF -- 5.11.4 Selecting the optimal solution -- 5.12 The SIL assessment workshop -- 5.12.1 The SIL assessment team -- 5.12.2 Overall objectives of the SIL assessment workshop -- Exercises -- Answers -- Question 1-Answer -- Question 2-Answer -- Question 3-Answer -- Question 4-Answer -- Question 5-Answer -- Question 6-Answer -- Question 7-Answer -- Question 8-Answer -- Question 9-Answer -- Question 10-Answer -- Question 11-Answer -- Question 12-Answer -- Question 13-Answer -- Question 14-Answer -- Question 15-Answer -- Question 16-Answer -- Question 17-Answer -- Question 18-Answer -- References -- 6 - SIL assessment: special topics -- 6.1 Redundant initiators -- Handling redundant initiators -- 6.2 Redundant safety functions -- What determines if two SIFs are redundant? -- One SIF as backup to another -- Redundant SIFs in low risk situations -- 6.3 One SIF-two hazards -- 6.4 The IPLs vary depending on demand case. , 6.5 The demand case is activation of another SIF -- 6.6 One SIF cascades to another -- 6.7 Initiating event involves multiple simultaneous failures -- Example 1 -- Example 2 -- 6.8 Permissives -- Demand frequency -- Defining physical initiators and final elements -- 6.9 Multiple sensors distributed across a wide area -- 6.10 Operator action as initiator -- 6.11 Duty and standby pumps -- Variable number of pumps running -- Duty pump switchover -- 6.12 Alarms from cascade control loops -- 6.13 Final elements are shared between the basic process control system (BPCS) and the SIS -- 6.14 Selecting primary final elements -- 6.14.1 Introduction -- 6.14.2 The safe state -- 6.14.3 Selecting primary final elements -- Exercises -- Answers -- Question 1-Answer -- Question 2-Answer -- Question 3-Answer -- Question 4-Answer -- Question 5-Answer -- Question 6-Answer -- Question 7-Answer -- Question 8-Answer -- Question 9-Answer -- Reference -- 7 - Key functional safety documents -- 7.1 The how and why of documentation -- 7.2 The functional safety management plan -- 7.2.1 Introduction -- 7.2.1 Introduction -- 7.2.2 The functional safety lifecycle -- 7.2.2 The functional safety lifecycle -- What information is needed for each lifecycle phase? -- 7.2.3 Management of change and configuration management -- 7.2.3 Management of change and configuration management -- Management of change -- Configuration management -- 7.2.4 Management requirements in the FSMP -- 7.2.4 Management requirements in the FSMP -- Overall planning -- Document management -- Competency management -- Action item management -- Contractor management -- SIL capability management -- Assurance planning -- 7.2.5 Why the FSMP is important -- 7.2.5 Why the FSMP is important -- 7.3 The Safety Requirements Specification (SRS) -- 7.3.1 Introduction -- 7.3.1 Introduction -- 7.3.2 What is the purpose of the SRS?. , 7.3.2 What is the purpose of the SRS?.

Additional Edition: Print version: Clarke, Peter Functional Safety from Scratch San Diego : Elsevier,c2023 ISBN 9780443152306

Language: English