Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

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Format: 1 online resource (307 pages)

Edition: 1st ed.

ISBN: 9780521783330 , 9780511153235

Content: First published in 2000, this is a wide-ranging contribution to the literature on industrial economics by leading scholars from Europe and North America, combining theory and applied case studies, on the sometimes surprising effects of competition or anti-trust policy on industry structure

Note: Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Contributors -- Louis Phlips: a brief biography -- Introduction -- 1 Competition policy and game-theory: reflections based on the cement industry case -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Characteristics of the cement industry -- Demand -- Supply -- Factory costs and key factors of profitability -- The preponderance of transport costs -- The network and its rigidity -- Market structure and the implications of restructuring -- 3 Theoretical analysis of some relevant competition rules for the cement sector -- The role of the pricing system -- The impact of information exchange on prices -- More short-term competition but greater concentration in the long run -- Dynamic efficiency and selection process in the long run -- 4 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- 2 Legal standards and economic analysis of collusion in EC competition policy -- 1 Introduction -- 2 A framework for designing policy rules -- 3 The legal standard in the European Community -- Some coordination is unlawful -- 'Agreements' are associated with coordination -- Concerted practices and individual behaviour -- Concerted practices - weak direct evidence of coordination -- Legal standards: some conclusions -- 4 Economic counterfactuals in case law -- Alternative explanations not involving coordination -- The distinction between coordination itself and resulting behaviour -- Acceptance of weak reasoning by the defendants -- Inconsistency of burden of proof -- 5 Conclusions -- Bibliography -- 3 A guided tour of the Folk Theorem -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Some basics -- 3 The (original) Folk Theorem -- 4 Credibility of theorem 1 -- 5 Scope and appeal of theorems 2 and 3 -- 6 Finite repetition -- The Folk Theorem in finitely repeated games -- Theory clashes with experimental evidence -- 7 Imperfect monitoring , 6 Coordination Failures -- Speculative markets and bimodal distributions of signal s -- A class of examples with discontinuous profit and reaction functions -- Analysis of duopoly equilibria: symmetric equilibria -- Analysis of duopoly equilibria: asymmetric equilibria -- Analysis of duopoly equilibria: multiple equilibria -- Equilibrium correspondence and discontinuous jumps of equilibrium credit -- 7 Concluding Remarks -- Appendix -- A.1 Proof of proposition 3 -- A.2 Proof of proposition 4 -- A.3 An example in which S(x) is linear -- A.4 Proof of proposition 5 -- A.5 Proof of proposition 7 -- Bibliography -- 12 How the adoption of a new technology is affected by the interaction between labour and product markets -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The model -- The firm -- The workforce -- The labour market -- 3 The second stage: Cournot subgames -- 4 Technological choices -- 5 Discussion -- 6 Concluding remarks -- Bibliography -- Index , 8 Stationarity and structural time-dependence -- 9 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- 4 Predatory pricing and anti-dumping -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The nature and dimensions of the AD problem -- Nature of the problem -- At the conceptual level -- At the operational level -- Dimensions of the problem -- The proliferation of AD actions -- Effects of AD actions -- 3 The competition policy approach to predatory pricing -- The theory of predation: the swamp isn't what it used to be -- Identification of predatory pricing: lessons from competition policy -- 4 And if the swamp were fertile... -- 5 Concluding remarks -- Bibliography -- 5 Should pricing policies be regulated when firms may tacitly collude? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Some preliminary analysis -- 3 The model -- 4 Price equilibrium in the repeated-price game -- Mill pricing -- Discriminatory pricing -- 5 The welfare effects of deregulating firms' pricing policies -- Welfare comparisons: non-binding consumer reservation price -- Welfare comparisons: binding consumer reservation price -- 6 Conclusions -- 6 Mathematical appendix -- Bibliography -- 6 Tougher price competition or lower concentration: a trade-off for anti-trust authorities? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The model -- 3 Equilibrium computations -- Three-firm Cournot equilibrium -- Two-firm Bertrand equilibrium -- Three-firm Bertrand equilibrium -- 4 Welfare comparisons -- 5 Conclusions -- Bibliography -- 7 The strategic effects of supply guarantees: the raincheck game -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The homogeneous products case -- 3 Differentiated products with demand uncertainty -- 4 Simulation results with differentiated products -- 5 Concluding remarks -- Bibliography -- 8 Product market competition policy and technological performance -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Monopoly equilibrium with competition policy -- The market -- Modelling competition policy , Competition policy and static monopoly payoffs -- 3 Competition policy and innovation -- Monopoly -- Racing for cost-saving innovation -- Comparative statics with respect to g -- Duopoly -- Spillovers -- Non-cooperative R& -- D -- Operating entity joint venture -- Secretariat joint venture -- Results -- 4 Conclusion -- 5 Appendix: proof of theorem 2 -- Comparative statics, post-innovation market -- Comparative statics, pre-innovation market -- Bibliography -- 9 On some issues in the theory of competition in regulated markets -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Competition in regulated markets -- The basic one-firm model -- Multiple suppliers -- Bidding for contracts or franchises -- Regulation and entry -- Monopoly ownership of inputs: the access problem -- Incentive issues within the firm -- 3 Hold-up, renegotiation and multiple suppliers -- A simple model of sequential suppliers -- The result: the presence of multiple suppliers reduces inefficiency -- 4 Discussion and concluding remarks -- Bibliography -- 10 Modelling the entry and exit process in dynamic competition: an introduction to repeated-commitment models -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Previous results -- 3 The repeated-commitment approach: the main result -- 4 An economic application -- Further notation -- 5 Related results -- Economic applications -- Technical issues -- Bibliography -- 11 Coordination failures in the Cournot approach to deregulated bank competition -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The model -- Basic assumptions -- Timing of the game -- Liquidation costs -- 3 A model of the demand for loans -- 4 Behaviour of depositors and the bank's expected profit -- Withdrawal subgames -- Bank k depositors' expected utility -- Bank k's expected profit function -- Safe strategies, risky strategies -- 5 The banking oligopoly model -- Definition of equilibrium -- Types of strategies -- Symmetric candidate equilibria

Additional Edition: Print version Norman, George Market Structure and Competition Policy Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,c2000 ISBN 9780521783330

Language: English

Keywords: Electronic books

URL: FULL  ((OIS Credentials Required))

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (xii, 293 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).

Edition: 1st ed.

ISBN: 1-107-12093-4 , 1-280-15479-9 , 0-511-11880-5 , 0-511-04103-9 , 0-511-15323-6 , 0-511-32512-6 , 0-511-49257-X , 0-511-04643-X

Content: This 2000 text applies modern advances in game theory to the analysis of competition policy and develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. Containing contributions by leading scholars from Europe and North America, this book observes a common theme in the relationship between the regulatory regime and market structure. Since the inception of the new industrial organization, economists have developed a better understanding of how real-world markets operate. These results have particular relevance to the design and application of anti-trust policy. Analyses indicate that picking the most competitive framework in the short run may be detrimental to competition and welfare in the long run, concentrating the attention of policy makers on the impact on the long-run market structure. This book provides essential reading for graduate students of industrial and managerial economics as well as researchers and policy makers.

Note: A collection of 12 papers by European and North American scholars which develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. , Competition policy and game-theory : reflections based on the cement industry case / Claude d'Aspremont, David Encaoua and Jean-Pierre Ponssard -- Legal standards and economic analysis of collusion in EC competition policy / Damien J. Neven -- A guided tour of the Folk Theorem / James W. Friedman -- Predatory pricing and anti-dumping / P.K. Mathew Tharakan -- Should pricing policies be regulated when firms may tacitly collude? / George Norman and Jacques-François Thisse -- Tougher price competition or lower concentration : a trade-off for anti-trust authorities? / Claude d'Aspremont and Massimo Motta -- The strategic effects of supply guarantees : the raincheck game / Jonathan H. Hamilton -- Product market competition policy and technological performance / Stephen Martin -- On some issues in the theory of competition in regulated markets / Gianni De Fraja -- Modelling the entry and exit process in dynamic competition : an introduction to repeated-commitment models / Jean-Pierre Ponssard -- Coordination failures in the Cournot approach to deregulated bank competition / André de Palma and Robert J. Gary-Bobo -- How the adoption of a new technology is affected by the interaction between labour and product markets / Xavier Wauthy and Yves Zenou. , English

Additional Edition: ISBN 1-107-40326-X

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-521-78333-X

Language: English