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UID:

Umfang: 1 online resource (x, 214 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).

Ausgabe: 1st ed.

ISBN: 1-107-11543-4 , 1-280-16185-X , 0-511-11703-5 , 0-511-01587-9 , 0-511-15632-4 , 0-511-32921-0 , 0-511-61331-8 , 0-511-05090-9

Inhalt: The central question of this book is whether the assignment of government functions to the individual jurisdictions in a federal state can ensure an optimal allocation of resources and a fair income distribution. The analysis thereby gives a new answer to the old question about the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a federal state. It shows that fiscal decentralization is a method to disclose the preferences of currently living and future generations for local public goods, to limit the size of the government, and to avoid excessive public debt finance. While the allocative branch of the government benefits from fiscal decentralization, it is difficult to obtain a distribution of incomes that differs from the outcome that the market brings along.

Anmerkung: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). , Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgments; CHAPTER 1 Fiscal Decentralization: Benefits and Problems; CHAPTER 2 Locational Efficiency and Efficiency-Supporting Tax Systems; CHAPTER 3 Perfect Interregional Competition; CHAPTER 4 Interregional Tax Competition for Mobile Capital; CHAPTER 5 Optimal Structure of Local Governments; CHAPTER 6 Incentive Equivalence through Perfect Household Mobility; CHAPTER 7 Efficiency and the Degree of Household Mobility; CHAPTER 8 Decentralized Redistribution Policy; CHAPTER 9 Decentralization and Intergenerational Problems , CHAPTER 10 Informational Asymmetry between the Regions and the Center CHAPTER 11 Conclusions; References; Index , English

Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 0-521-02687-3

Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 0-521-63035-5

Sprache: Englisch

URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613319

URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)

URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)

UID:

Umfang: x, 214 p. : , ill.

Ausgabe: Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.

Sprache: Englisch

Schlagwort(e): Electronic books.

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UID:

Umfang: 1 online resource (226 pages)

Ausgabe: 1st ed.

ISBN: 9780521630351 , 9780511156328

Inhalt: Giving a new answer to an old question, this book shows that fiscal decentralization is a method to disclose the preferences of currently living and future generations for local public goods, to limit the size of the government, and to avoid excessive public debt finance

Anmerkung: Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- CHAPTER 1 Fiscal Decentralization: Benefits and Problems -- 1.1 Assignment of Government Functions and Mobility -- 1.1.1 Assignment of Government Functions and Mobility -- 1.1.2 Mobility and Taxation: Empirical Facts -- 1.2 Purpose, Justification, and Limits of the Study -- 1.2.1 Purpose of the Book -- 1.2.2 Justification of the Study -- 1.2.3 Limits of the Study -- 1.3 Benefits of Fiscal Decentralization -- 1.3.1 Sensitivity to Diverse Regional Preferences -- 1.3.2 Preference Revelation by Household Mobility -- 1.3.3 Protecting the Interests of Future Generations -- 1.3.4 Restraining the Leviathan -- 1.4 Problems of Fiscal Decentralization -- 1.4.1 Inefficient Interregional Resource Allocation -- 1.4.2 Destructive Tax Competition for Mobile Factors -- 1.4.3 Tax Export and Spillover Effects -- 1.4.4 Suboptimal Income Distribution within Regions -- 1.4.5 Suboptimal Income Distribution across Regions -- 1.4.6 Suboptimal Stabilization Policy -- 1.4.7 Optimal Degree of Fiscal Decentralization -- 1.5 Outline of the Book -- Chapter 2 -- Chapter 3 -- Chapter 4 -- Chapter 5 -- Chapter 6 -- Chapter 7 -- Chapter 8 -- Chapter 9 -- Chapter 10 -- Chapter 11 -- CHAPTER 2 Locational Efficiency and Efficiency-Supporting Tax Systems -- 2.1 Efficient Locational Pattern -- 2.1.1 The Model -- 2.1.2 First-Order Conditions -- 2.1.3 Efficient Interregional Resource Distribution -- 2.2 Efficiency-Supporting Tax Systems -- 2.2.1 Private Behavior -- 2.2.2 Efficient Taxation -- CHAPTER 3 Perfect Interregional Competition -- 3.1 Fiscal Decentralization with a Complete Tax Instrument Set -- 3.1.1 Private Behavior -- 3.1.2 Local Government Behavior -- 3.2 Fiscal Decentralization with an Incomplete Tax Instrument Set -- 3.2.1 A Direct Household Tax Is Not Available , 10.4.1 First-Order Conditions of the Central Government Problem -- 10.4.2 First-Best Optimum -- CHAPTER 11 Conclusions -- 11.1 Efficiency and Decentralization -- 11.2 Redistribution and Decentralization -- 11.3 Policy Applications -- 11.3.1 Tax Autonomy of Local Governments -- 11.3.2 Interregional Tax Competition -- 11.3.3 Restructuring of Jurisdictional Boundaries -- 11.3.4 Degree of Higher Governmental Intervention -- 11.3.5 Redistribution Policy within the Regions of a Federal State -- 11.3.6 Redistribution Policy across the Regions of a Federal State -- 11.3.7 Harmonization of Debt and Pension Policies in the EU -- References -- Index , 3.2.2 A Direct Firm Tax Is Not Available -- 3.2.3 An Undistortive Tax Is Not Available -- 3.3 Appendix -- 3.3.1 First-Order Conditions and Migration Responses -- 3.3.2 Distortionary Taxation -- CHAPTER 4 Interregional Tax Competition for Mobile Capital -- 4.1 Underprovision of Local Public Goods -- 4.1.1 Private Behavior -- 4.1.2 Regional Government Behavior -- 4.1.3 Central Government Intervention -- 4.2 Tax Competition and Regional Size -- 4.3 The Advantage of Small Regions -- 4.4 Restraining the Leviathan by Interregional Tax Competition -- 4.4.1 Government Behavior -- 4.4.2 Fiscal Decentralization with Undistortive Taxes -- 4.4.3 Fiscal Decentralization with Interregional Tax Competition -- 4.5 Property Tax Incidence and Land Taxation -- 4.5.1 The Traditional View -- 4.5.2 The New View -- 4.5.3 The Benefit View -- 4.5.4 Land Taxation -- 4.6 Appendix -- CHAPTER 5 Optimal Structure of Local Governments -- 5.1 Tiebout and the Theory of Clubs -- 5.2 The Henry George Theorem -- 5.3 Overlapping Market Areas of Local Public Goods -- 5.3.1 The Optimal Allocation -- 5.3.2 Private Behavior -- 5.3.3 Decentralization through Competing Metropolitan Governments -- 5.3.4 Decentralization with Smaller Jurisdictions -- 5.4 Appendix -- 5.4.1 Optimal Allocation with Overlapping Market Areas -- 5.4.2 Optimal Decentralization through Metropolitan Governments -- CHAPTER 6 Incentive Equivalence through Perfect Household Mobility -- 6.1 Tax Export and Spillover Effects with Household Mobility -- 6.1.1 Private Behavior -- 6.1.2 Regional Government Behavior -- 6.2 Tax Competition and Household Mobility -- 6.2.1 Private Behavior -- 6.2.2 Regional Government Behavior -- 6.3 Appendix -- 6.3.1 Tax Export and Spillover Effects -- 6.3.2 Tax Competition -- CHAPTER 7 Efficiency and the Degree of Household Mobility -- 7.1 Efficient Allocation -- 7.1.1 The Model , 7.1.2 First-Order Conditions -- 7.2 Decentralized Nash Equilibrium -- 7.2.1 Private Behavior -- 7.2.2 Regional Government Behavior -- 7.2.3 Transfer-Constrained Region -- 7.3 Different Degrees of Household Mobility -- 7.3.1 Perfect Household Mobility -- 7.3.2 Perfect Immobility of Households -- 7.3.3 Imperfect Household Mobility -- 7.4 Appendix -- 7.4.1 First-Order Conditions -- 7.4.2 Expressions of a Transfer-Constrained Region -- CHAPTER 8 Decentralized Redistribution Policy -- 8.1 Uncoordinated Regional Redistribution Policy -- 8.1.1 Private Behavior -- 8.1.2 Socially Optimal Allocation -- 8.1.3 Regional Government Policy -- 8.2 Internalizing Fiscal Externalities -- 8.2.1 Central Government Intervention -- 8.2.2 Corrected Equilibrium -- 8.3 Appendix -- 8.3.1 Derivation of Welfare Effects -- 8.3.2 Central Government Intervention -- CHAPTER 9 Decentralization and Intergenerational Problems -- 9.1 Efficient Allocation -- 9.1.1 The Model -- 9.1.2 First-Order Conditions -- 9.2 Decentralized Environmental Policy -- 9.2.1 Private Behavior -- 9.2.2 Local Government Behavior -- 9.3 Local Public Debt -- 9.3.1 Private Behavior -- 9.3.2 Local Government Behavior -- 9.4 Appendix -- 9.4.1 Decentralized Environmental Policy -- 9.4.2 Nonneutrality of Local Public Debt -- CHAPTER 10 Informational Asymmetry between the Regions and the Center -- 10.1 Optimal Redistribution with Complete Information -- 10.1.1 Private Behavior -- 10.1.2 Regional Government Behavior -- 10.1.3 Socially Optimal Allocation -- 10.2 Incomplete Information, Adverse Selection, and Optimal Redistribution -- 10.2.1 Incentive Compatibility Constraints -- 10.2.2 Central Government Policy -- 10.3 Incomplete Information and Moral Hazard -- 10.3.1 Private Behavior -- 10.3.2 Regional Government Behavior -- 10.3.3 Optimal Policy with Incomplete Information -- 10.4 Appendix

Weitere Ausg.: Print version Wellisch, Dietmar Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,c2000 ISBN 9780521630351

Sprache: Englisch

Schlagwort(e): Electronic books

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