UID:
almahu_9947414134602882
Format:
1 online resource (xii, 296 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
9780511510274 (ebook)
Series Statement:
Cambridge studies in comparative politics
Content:
This 2006 book provides a theory of the logic of survival of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), one of the most resilient autocratic regimes in the twentieth century. An autocratic regime hid behind the facade of elections that were held with clockwise precision. Although their outcome was totally predictable, elections were not hollow rituals. The PRI made millions of ordinary citizens vest their interests in the survival of the autocratic regime. Voters could not simply 'throw the rascals out of office' because their choices were constrained by a series of strategic dilemmas that compelled them to support the autocrats. The book also explores the factors that led to the demise of the PRI. The theory sheds light on the logic of 'electoral autocracies', among the most common type of autocracy, and is the only systematic treatment in the literature today dealing with this form of autocracy.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Equilibrium party hegemony -- Structural determinants of mass support for the PRI -- Budget cycles under PRI hegemony -- The politics of vote buying -- Judging economic performance in hard times -- Ideological divisions in the opposition camp -- How voters choose and mass coordination dilemmas -- Electoral fraud and the game of electoral transitions -- Conclusion.
Additional Edition:
Print version: ISBN 9780521862479
Language:
English
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510274
URL:
Volltext
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