UID:
almahu_9947414869502882
Format:
1 online resource (xv, 296 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
9780511559662 (ebook)
Content:
This book investigates how observed differences in institutions affect political and economic outcomes in various social, economic, and political systems. It also examines how the institutions themselves change and develop in response to individual and collective beliefs, preferences, and strategies. This volume tackles both monetary and real topics in an integrated way, and represents the first coherent empirical investigation of positive models of political economy. The various contributions discuss issues of great topicality not just for Europe, but for all developed economies: why do central banks matter? What determines their independence? How do central bank independence and exchange rate regimes affect monetary integration and activism? The volume also discusses the costs of a monetary union, unemployment benefits, and redistributive taxation.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Monetary institutions and policy --
,
Reputtional versus institutional solutions to the time-consistency problem in monetary policy /
,
Reciprocity and political business cycles in federal monetary unions /
,
Ultimate determinants of central bank indenpence /
,
Central bank autonomy and exchange rate regimes their effects on monetary accommodation and activism /
,
Uncertainty, instrument choice, and the uniqueness of nash equilibrium: microeconomic and macroeconomic examples /
,
New empirical evidence on the costs of European monetary union /
,
Exchange rate policy and redistribution --
,
Exchange rate anchors and inflation: a political economy approach /
,
Why capital controls? theory and evidence /
,
Political economy of the exchange rate mechanism /
,
unemployment benefits and redistributive taxation in the presence of labor quality externalities /
Additional Edition:
Print version: ISBN 9780521572156
Language:
English
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511559662
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
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