UID:
edocfu_9959242888802883
Format:
1 online resource (xvi, 347 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
1-107-18054-6
,
0-511-35507-6
,
9786611153373
,
1-281-15337-0
,
0-511-80011-8
,
0-511-35452-5
,
0-511-35394-4
,
0-511-57369-3
,
0-511-35559-9
Series Statement:
Cambridge studies in comparative politics
Content:
Examines the fundamental issue of how citizens get government officials to provide them with the roads, schools, and other public services they need by studying communities in rural China. In authoritarian and transitional systems, formal institutions for holding government officials accountable are often weak. The state often lacks sufficient resources to monitor its officials closely, and citizens are limited in their power to elect officials they believe will perform well and to remove them when they do not. The answer, Lily L. Tsai found, lies in a community's social institutions. Even when formal democratic and bureaucratic institutions of accountability are weak, government officials can still be subject to informal rules and norms created by community solidary groups that have earned high moral standing in the community.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Governance and informal institutions of accountability -- Decentralization and local governmental performance -- Local governmental performance : assessing village public goods provision -- Informal accountability and the structure of solidary groups -- Temples and churches in rural China -- Lineages and local governance -- Accountability and village democratic reforms -- The limitations of formal party and bureaucratic institutions.
,
English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-69280-6
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-87197-2
Language:
English
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