UID:
almahu_9947415082402882
Format:
1 online resource (x, 307 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
9780511571497 (ebook)
Content:
Dominant theories of regulatory choice privilege the goals and actions of district-oriented legislators and organized groups. Presidents, Parties, and the State challenges this conventional frame, placing presidential elections and national party leaders at the centre of American regulatory state development. Historically the 'out-party' in national politics between 1884 and 1936, the Democratic party of Grover Cleveland, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt confronted a severe political quandary, one which pit long-term ideological commitments against short-term electoral opportunities. In short, Democrats, when in power, were forced to choose between enacting the regulatory agenda of their traditional party base, or legislating the programs of voting blocs deemed pivotal to the consolidation of national party power. Coalition-building imperatives drove Democratic leaders to embrace the latter alternative, prompting legislative intervention to secure outcomes consistent with national party needs. In the end, the electoral logic that fuelled Democratic choice proved consequential for the trajectory of American state development.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Introduction: Parties, Presidential Elections, and Regulatory Choice -- A Party System Perspective --
,
Swing States, Business Mugwumps, and the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 --
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The Progressive Party Vote and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 --
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Progressive Republicans and the "Death Sentence" for Public Utility Holding Companies During America's Second New Deal --
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Conclusion: Parties and the American Regulatory State.
Additional Edition:
Print version: ISBN 9780521662772
Language:
English
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511571497
URL:
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