UID:
almahu_9947414058802882
Format:
1 online resource (xii, 213 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
9780511627880 (ebook)
Series Statement:
Cambridge studies in philosophy
Content:
In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold. His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 17 Feb 2016).
,
First-Person Authority.
,
The problem.
,
Scepticism about first-person authority --
,
The Basic and Extended Accounts.
,
A preliminary account.
,
Defending the basic account.
,
Extending the basic account.
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Objections.
,
The problem of scope --
,
Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism.
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Arguments from content externalism.
,
Deflationary self-knowledge: Davidson and Barge.
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Externalism and first-person authority.
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Psychological properties as secondary.
Additional Edition:
Print version: ISBN 9780521560931
Language:
English
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511627880
URL:
Volltext
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