UID:
almafu_9959234226102883
Format:
1 online resource (x, 230 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
1-107-19634-5
,
0-521-13826-4
,
0-511-64619-4
,
1-282-39064-3
,
9786612390647
,
0-511-65028-0
,
0-511-53251-2
,
0-511-53160-5
,
0-511-53342-X
Series Statement:
Cambridge studies in comparative politics
Content:
This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; 2 Electoral and Fiscal Institutions and Forms of Fiscal Governance; 3 An Account of Fiscal Norms and Rules in the European Union from 1985 to 2004; 4 How Forms of Fiscal Governance Affect Fiscal Performance; 5 Why Do Countries Have Different Fiscal Institutions?; 6 Institutional Choice in New Democracies; 7 EMU and Fiscal Governance in Europe; 8 Conclusion; Bibliography; Index
,
English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-511-75950-9
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-85746-5
Language:
English
Bookmarklink
