UID:
almafu_9959237153602883
Umfang:
1 online resource (xvi, 390 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
Ausgabe:
Second edition.
ISBN:
1-107-22714-3
,
1-139-17971-3
,
1-283-38252-0
,
9786613382528
,
1-139-18945-X
,
0-511-79145-3
,
1-139-18815-1
,
1-139-19075-X
,
1-139-18353-2
,
1-139-18584-5
Inhalt:
The Political Economy of Terrorism presents a widely accessible political economy approach to the study of terrorism. It applies economic methodology - theoretical and empirical - combined with political analysis and realities to the study of domestic and transnational terrorism. In so doing, the book provides both a qualitative and quantitative investigation of terrorism in a balanced up-to-date presentation that informs students, policy makers, researchers and the general reader of the current state of knowledge. Included are historical aspects, a discussion of watershed events, the rise of modern-day terrorism, examination of current trends, the dilemma of liberal democracies, evaluation of counterterrorism, analysis of hostage incidents and much more. The new edition expands coverage of every chapter, adds a new chapter on terrorist network structures and organization, accounts for changes in the Department of Homeland Security and the USA Patriot Act and insurance against terrorism. Rational-actor models of terrorist and government behavior and game-theoretic analysis are presented for readers with no prior theoretical training. Where relevant, the authors display graphs using data from International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), and other public-access data sets.
Anmerkung:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Cover; THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TERRORISM, SECOND EDITION; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Tables and Figures; Preface; ONE Terrorism An Introduction; DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM; Some Alternative Definitions; Domestic versus Transnational Terrorism; OTHER ASPECTS OF TERRORISM; POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF TERRORISM; ECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF TERRORISM; POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH; HISTORY OF TERRORISM; The Russian Anarchists and Revolutionaries; Terrorism and the State of Israel; Algeria and Cyprus; Irish Troubles after Independence; The Tupamaros
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Terrorism and a Palestinian StateSumming Up; SOME KEY CONCEPTS; PURPOSE OF THE BOOK; PLAN OF THE BOOK; TWO The Dilemma of Liberal Democracies; WHY ARE LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES PRONE TO TERRORISM?; BASIC DILEMMA OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES; IS THERE MORE TERRORISM IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES?; LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES: DOMESTIC VERSUS TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM; CIVIL LIBERTIES VERSUS PROTECTION TRADE-OFF; THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA; TERRORISM IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION; Significant Events at the Start of the Modern Era of Terrorism; Primary Terrorist Influences, 1968-1990; Fundamentalist Terrorists - the "Fourth Wave"
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CONCLUDING REMARKSTHREE Statistical Studies and the Dynamics of Terrorist Behavior; WHY USE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS?; THE ITERATE DATA SET; THE BEHAVIOR OF THE TERRORISM TIME SERIES; Hostage Takings and Assassinations; Threats and Hoaxes; Deaths and Casualties; SPECTRAL ANALYSIS: THE ANALYSIS OF CYCLES; INTERVENTION ANALYSIS; Estimating the Effect of Metal Detectors on Skyjackings; United Nations' Conventions and Resolutions; Estimating the Effect of the Libyan Bombing; Is Terrorism Becoming More Threatening?; Are the Dynamics of Terrorism Asymmetric?; DOMESTIC TERRORISM DATA
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The Need for Both Kinds of Terrorism DataThe GTD Data Set; On Decomposing GTD into Domestic and Transnational Terrorist Events; On the Dynamic Relationship between Domestic and Transnational Terrorism; CONCLUSION; APPENDIX 3.1: WORKING WITH THE GTD DATA SET; FOUR Counterterrorism; PROACTIVE POLICIES; DEFENSIVE POLICIES; GAME THEORY PRIMER; PROACTIVE VERSUS DEFENSIVE POLICIES; Deterrence and Other Defensive Measures; The Choice between Deterrence and Preemption; Further Remarks on Choosing between Proactive and Defensive Measures; WEAKEST-LINK CONSIDERATIONS; BEST-SHOT CONSIDERATIONS
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TERRORISM AT HOME: WHAT TO PROTECT?FURTHER STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF COUNTERTERRORISM; Terrorists versus the Government; GETTING AT THE ROOTS OF TERRORISM; CONCLUDING REMARKS; FIVE Transference; MODELS OF RATIONAL TERRORISM; The Resource Constraint; A FORMALIZATION OF THE MODEL; ANALYSIS OF A "BENEVOLENCE" COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY; SUICIDE BOMBERS AND RATIONAL BEHAVIOR; TESTS OF THE RATIONAL TERRORISM MODEL BASED ON THE TARGET OF THE ATTACKS; VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIONS AND ESTIMATES OF THE SUBSTITUTION EFFECT; VAR Results on Attack Modes; VAR Results on Target Substitution; CONCLUSION
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SIX International Cooperation Dilemma and Inhibitors
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English
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 0-521-18100-3
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 1-107-00456-X
Sprache:
Englisch
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511791451
URL:
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