Format:
1 online resource (264 pages)
Edition:
1st ed.
ISBN:
9780521801287
,
9780511152818
Content:
This 2001 book combines economics with computer science to analyse multidimensional auction mechanisms, the emerging pricing model for e-business. For professionals, consultants and dotcomers involved in designing, implementing and upgrading electronic markets, as well as researchers in: economics, information systems, operations management, computer science and observers of the e-commerce phenomenon
Note:
Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- copyright -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Electronic Commerce and Electronic Marketplaces -- 1.1 Market-Based Coordination -- 1.1.1 Markets vs. Hierarchies -- 1.1.2 The Impact of Information Technology -- 1.2 Fixed vs. Dynamic Pricing -- 1.3 Advanced Auction Design for Electronic Markets -- 1.4 The Structure of this Book -- 2 Internet Marketplaces - A Technical Perspective -- 2.1 The Role of Electronic Brokers -- 2.2 Electronic Brokerage Services on the Internet -- 2.3 Software Architectures of Electronic Commerce Applications -- 2.3.1 Web-Based Information Systems -- 2.3.1.1 The World Wide Web -- 2.3.1.2 Multi-Tier Software Architectures -- 2.3.2 Distributed Object Infrastructures -- 2.3.2.1 Object Frameworks -- 2.3.2.2 Distributed Object Standards -- 2.3.2.3 Electronic Commerce Frameworks -- 2.4 Services of an Electronic Broker -- 2.4.1 Enterprise Model -- 2.4.1.1 The Brokerage Service Provider -- 2.4.1.2 Customers of a Brokerage Service Provider -- 2.4.2 Architectural Model -- 2.4.2.1 The Yellow Pages Service -- 2.4.2.2 The Catalog Aggregation Service -- 2.4.2.3 The Notification Service -- 2.4.2.4 The Negotiation Service -- 2.5 OFFER - A Sample Implementation -- 2.5.1 The OFFER Yellow Pages and Catalog Aggregation Service -- 2.5.2 The OFFER Negotiation Service -- 2.6 Technical Challenges and Directions -- 2.6.1 The Interoperability Problem -- 2.6.2 Document-Centric Electronic Commerce Standards -- 3 The Difficulty of Setting Prices -- 3.1 Market Structures -- 3.1.1 The Ideal of a Perfectly Competitive Market -- 3.1.2 Monopolies, Bilateral Monopolies, and Monopsonies -- 3.1.3 Oligopolies and Oligopsonies -- 3.1.4 Monopolistic Competition -- 3.2 Setting Optimal Prices -- 3.2.1 Maximizing Profits in a Monopoly -- 3.2.2 Price and Product Differentiation -- 3.2.3 Personalization
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3.2.4 Group Pricing -- 3.2.5 Versioning -- 3.2.6 Product Bundling -- 3.3 Towards Dynamic Pricing -- 4 Methods for the Analyses and Design of Electronic Markets -- 4.1 Equilibrium Theory -- 4.2 Game Theory -- 4.2.1 Static Games with Complete Information -- 4.2.2 Repeated and Sequential Games -- 4.2.3 Games with Incomplete Information -- 4.3 Mechanism Design Theory -- 4.3.1 Basic Thoughts -- 4.3.2 Considering Incentive Constraints -- 4.3.3 Mechanism Design Guidelines -- 4.4 Experimental Economics -- 4.5 Computational Economics and Simulation -- 4.5.1 Economic Simulations -- 4.5.2 Agent-Based Computational Economics -- 5 Automated Negotiations - A Survey of State-of-the-Art Practices -- 5.1 A Roadmap to Negotiation Situations in Electronic Commerce -- 5.2 One-on-One Bargaining -- 5.2.1 Game-Theoretical Models of Bargaining -- 5.2.2 Negotiation Analysis and Negotiation Support Systems -- 5.2.3 Automated Agent-Based Bargaining -- 5.3 Multilateral Negotiations -- 5.3.1 Basic Auction Formats -- 5.3.2 The Independent Private Values (IPV) Model -- 5.3.3 Robustness of the IPV Results -- 5.3.3.1 Removing Bidder's Risk Neutrality -- 5.3.3.2 Removing Independence of Private Values -- 5.3.3.3 Removing Symmetry -- 5.3.3.4 Introducing Uncertainty about the Number of Bidders -- 5.3.3.5 Repeated Auctions -- 5.3.3.6 Bidder Collusion -- 5.3.4 Optimal Auction Design -- 5.3.5 The Common Value Model -- 5.3.6 Double Auctions -- 5.4 A Critical Review of Game-Theoretical Auction Models -- 5.4.1 Behavioral Aspects -- 5.4.2 Information Feedback in Open-Cry Auctions -- 5.4.3 Auctions in an Economic Context -- 5.4.4 Basic Assumptions of Game-Theoretical Models -- 5.5 Experimental Analysis of Standard Auction Mechanisms -- 5.5.1 Tests of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem -- 5.5.2 Analysis of Efficiency, Varying Numbers of Bidders, et cetera -- 5.5.3 Tests of Common Value Auctions
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5.6 Towards New Frontiers - Multi-Unit Auctions -- 5.6.1 Multi-Unit Auctions of Homogeneous Goods -- 5.6.2 Multi-Unit Auctions with Preferences Over Bundles -- 5.6.2.1 Sequential Auctions -- 5.6.2.2 Parallel Auctions -- 5.6.2.3 The Federal Communication Commission's Spectrum Auctions -- 5.6.2.4 Combinatorial Auctions -- 5.6.2.5 The Generalized Vickrey Auction -- 5.6.2.6 Determination of Winners in Combinatorial Auctions -- 5.6.3 Multi-Stage Extended Vickrey Auctions -- 5.6.4 The OptiMark Case -- 5.7 Analysis of Online Auctions -- 5.7.1 Empirical Data -- 5.7.2 Types of Goods Sold -- 5.7.3 Closing Rules and Auction Formats -- 5.7.4 Business Models -- 5.7.5 Fraud and Strategic Manipulation -- 5.7.6 Minimum Bids and Reserve Prices -- 5.7.7 Multi-Unit Online Auctions -- 5.8 Summary -- 6 Experimental Analysis of Multi-Attribute Auctions -- 6.1 Multi-Attribute Procurement Negotiations -- 6.2 Description of the Analyzed Mechanisms -- 6.3 Research Questions -- 6.4 Trading Financial Derivatives - A Sample Scenario -- 6.4.1 The Basics of Futures and Options -- 6.4.2 Trading Options -- 6.4.3 Option Pricing Models -- 6.4.4 OTC Trading of Derivatives -- 6.5 Implementation of an Electronic Brokerage Service -- 6.5.1 Overview and Bidding Process -- 6.5.2 Server-Side Implementation -- 6.5.3 Client-Side Implementation -- 6.5.3.1 Buyer Client -- 6.5.3.2 Bidder Client -- 6.6 Results of a Laboratory Experiment -- 6.6.1 Laboratory Procedures -- 6.6.2 Experimental Design, Subject Pool, and Reward Mechanism -- 6.6.2 Experimental Design, Subject Pool, and Reward Mechanism -- 6.6.3 Data and Results -- 6.6.3.1 Comparison of Multi-Attribute and Single-Attribute Auction Formats -- 6.6.3.2 Revenue Equivalence of Multi-Attribute Auction Formats -- 6.6.3.3 Strategic Equivalence between Second-Score and English Auctions -- 6.6.3.4 Efficiency of Multi-Attribute Auctions
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6.6.4 Discussion of the Results -- 6.6.4.1 Learning and Bidder Experience -- 6.6.4.2 Information Feedback and Number of Bidders -- 6.6.4.3 Number of Negotiable Attributes -- 7 Economic Models of Multi-Attribute Auctions -- 7.1 Previous Game-Theoretical Analysis -- 7.1.1 Independent Cost Model -- 7.1.2 Correlated Cost Model -- 7.2 Comparison of Conventional and Multi-Attribute Auctions -- 7.2.1 Simulation Languages -- 7.2.2 Description of the Simulation Model -- 7.2.3 Discussion of the Results -- 7.2.4 Simulation of OTC Markets for Derivatives -- 7.2.5 Discussion of the Results -- 7.3 Multi-Unit Extensions -- 7.3.1 Type A -- 7.3.2 Type B and C -- 7.3.3 Type D -- 7.3.4 Type E and F -- 7.3.5 A Model of Multi-Unit Auctions -- 7.4 Summary -- 8 Conclusions and Perspectives -- 8.1 Applicability and Prerequisites -- 8.2 The Role of Decision Support -- Appendix: Utility Theory and Decision Analysis Techniques -- A1 Basic Ideas of Utility Theory -- A1.1 Existence of a Utility Function -- A1.2 Optimal Choice -- A1.3 Certainty vs. Uncertainty -- A2 Multi-Objective Decision Analysis -- A2.1 General Process -- A2.2 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory -- A2.3 SMART -- A2.4 Analytic Hierarchy Process -- A2.5 Conjoint Analysis -- A2.6 Multi-Attribute Utility Models with Interaction -- A2.7 Using Software for Decision Analysis -- A2.8 Summary -- References -- Index
Additional Edition:
Print version Bichler, Martin The Future of E-Markets Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,c2001 ISBN 9780521801287
Language:
English
Keywords:
Electronic books
URL:
FULL
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