UID:
almafu_9959781825902883
Umfang:
1 online resource (316 p.)
ISBN:
9780674036437
Inhalt:
In Order without Law, Robert Ellickson shows that law is far less important than is generally thought. He demonstrates that people largely govern themselves by means of informal rules—social norms—that develop without the aid of a state or other central coordinator. Integrating the latest scholarship in law, economics, sociology, game theory, and anthropology, Ellickson investigates the uncharted world within which order is successfully achieved without law. The springboard for Ellickson’s theory of norms is his close investigation of a variety of disputes arising from the damage created by escaped cattle in Shasta County, California. In “The Problem of Social Cost”—the most frequently cited article on law—economist Ronald H. Coase depicts farmers and ranchers as bargaining in the shadow of the law while resolving cattle-trespass disputes. Ellickson’s field study of this problem refutes many of the behavioral assumptions that underlie Coase’s vision, and will add realism to future efforts to apply economic analysis to law. Drawing examples from a wide variety of social contexts, including whaling grounds, photocopying centers, and landlord–tenant relations, Ellickson explores the interaction between informal and legal rules and the usual domains in which these competing systems are employed. Order without Law firmly grounds its analysis in real-world events, while building a broad theory of how people cooperate to mutual advantage.
Anmerkung:
Frontmatter --
,
Preface --
,
Contents --
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Introduction --
,
Part I. Shasta County --
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1. Shasta County and Its Cattle Industry --
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2. The Politics of Cattle Trespass --
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3. The Resolution of Cattle-Trespass Disputes --
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4. Who Pays for Boundary Fences --
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5. Disputes Arising out of Highway Collisions Involving Livestock --
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6. The Effects of Closed-Range Ordinances --
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Part II. A Theory of Norms --
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7. The System of Social Control --
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8. Shortcomings of Current Theories of Social Control --
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9. The Puzzle of Cooperation --
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10. A Hypothesis of Welfare-Maximizing Norms --
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11. Substantive Norms: Of Bees, Cattle, and Whales --
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12. Remedial Norms: Of Carrots and Sticks --
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13. Procedural and Constitutive Norms: Of Gossip, Ritual, and Hero Worship --
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14. Controller-Selecting Norms: Of Contracts, Custom, and Photocopies --
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Part III. The Future of Norms --
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15. Testing the Content of Norms --
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16. Conclusions and Implications --
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Appendix. Research Methods --
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Index
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In English.
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.4159/9780674036437
URL:
https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674036437
URL:
https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674036437
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