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  • 1
    Book
    Book
    New York :Russell Sage Foundation [u.a.],
    UID:
    almafu_BV016877395
    Format: XVII, 317 S. : , graph. Darst.
    ISBN: 0-691-09989-8 , 978-0-691-09989-7 , 0-691-09988-X
    Series Statement: Princeton paperbacks
    Language: English
    Subjects: Political Science
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    Keywords: Veto ; Politisches System ; Veto ; Gesetzgebung ; Veto ; Politische Institution ; Veto ; Institutionenökonomie ; Mitgliedsstaaten ; Regierung ; Politische Entscheidung ; Politische Institution ; Entscheidungstheorie
    Author information: Tsebelis, George 1952-
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Princeton, N.J. :Princeton University Press,
    UID:
    edocfu_9959234801302883
    Format: 1 online resource
    Edition: Course Book
    ISBN: 1-280-49425-5 , 9786613589484 , 1-4008-3145-8
    Content: Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? Veto Players advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political actors veto power over policy choices. Drawing richly on game theory, he develops a scheme by which governments can thus be classified. He shows why an increase in the number of "veto players," or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo. Policy stability affects a series of other key characteristics of polities, argues the author. For example, it leads to high judicial and bureaucratic independence, as well as high government instability (in parliamentary systems). The propositions derived from the theoretical framework Tsebelis develops in the first part of the book are tested in the second part with various data sets from advanced industrialized countries, as well as analysis of legislation in the European Union. Representing the first consistent and consequential theory of comparative politics, Veto Players will be welcomed by students and scholars as a defining text of the discipline. From the preface to the Italian edition: ? "Tsebelis has produced what is today the most original theory for the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary regimes. . . . This book promises to remain a lasting contribution to political analysis."--Gianfranco Pasquino, Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna
    Note: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph , pt. 1. Veto players theory -- pt. 2. Veto players and institutional analysis -- pt. 3. Policy effects of veto players -- pt. 4. Systemic effects of veto players. , Issued also in print. , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 0-691-09988-X
    Additional Edition: ISBN 0-691-09989-8
    Language: English
    Subjects: Political Science
    RVK:
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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