Format:
Online-Ressource (300 p)
ISBN:
9780813123356
Content:
In the past thirty years, Congress has dramatically changed its response to unpopular deficit spending. While the landmark Congressional Budget Act of 1974 tried to increase congressional budgeting powers, new budget processes created in the 1980s and 1990s were all explicitly designed to weaken member, majority, and institutional budgeting prerogatives. These later reforms shared the premise that Congress cannot naturally forge balanced budgets without new automatic mechanisms and enhanced presidential oversight. So Democratic majorities in Congress gave new budgeting powers to Presidents Rea
Note:
Description based upon print version of record
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Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; List of Tables; Acknowledgments; Introduction: Congressional Delegation of Power-Now More than Ever; PART I: DELEGATION OF POWER AND REPRESENTATION; 1. Origins and Significance of Delegation of Power; Causes of Delegation of Power; Delegation as Electoral and Policy Strategy; Old and New Institutional Capacity Problems; Significance of Delegation; Conclusion; 2. Reforming the Reforms: A Brief History of Congressional Budgeting; 1789-1920: Congress in Controlof the Federal Budget Process
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1921-1974: Presidential Control Increasingwith Intermittent Congressional ResistancePost-1914: Anti-Congress Backlash; Recent Unsuccessful Budget Reform Initiatives; Balanced Budget Constitutional Amendment; Biennial Budgeting; Conclusion; PART II: INSTITUTIONAL SELF-DIAGNOSIS AND BUDGET REFORM, 1974-1996; 3. 1974 Budget Act: Congress Takes Control; Background of the 1914 Act; Fiscal Issues; Institutional Issues; Passage of the Bill; Provisions of the 1974 Act; The Budget Committees; The Congressional Budget Office; The New Budget Timetable; The Impoundment Provisions
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Conclusions on the 1974 ActStrategy and Reform; Institutional Self-Diagnosis and Reform; 4. Congress Attacks Deficits (and Itself) with Gramm-Rudman-Hollings; Background of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings I; Fiscal Issues; Partisan Issues; Institutional Issues; Passage of the Act; Major Provisions of the 1985 Act; Expedited Judicial Review and Fallback Procedures; Fiscal and Legal Outcomes ofGRH Iand Background to GRHII; Bowsher v. Synar; The Balanced Budget and Emergency DeficitReduction Reaffirmation Act of 1987; Representative David Obey disagreed:
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Similar pros and cons were debated on the Senate floor. Carl Levin(D-MI) also defended the conference report:And Senator Pete Domenici disagreed:; Conclusions on Gramm-Rudman-Hollings; Strategy and Reform; Institutional Self-Diagnosis and Reform; 5. Old Problems and New Tools of Self-Restraint: The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990; Background of the 1990 Act; Fiscal Issues; Partisan Issues; Institutional Issues; Passage of the Act; And Mike Synar (D-OK) agreed:; Major Provisions of the 1990 Act; Deficit-Reduction Schedule, Spending Caps, ""PAYGO,""and New Sequestration Provisions
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Conclusions on the 1990 Budget Enforcement ActStrategy and Reform; Institutional Self-Diagnosis and Reform; 6. Stop Us Before We Spend Again: The Line-Item Veto Act of 1996; Background of the 1996 Act; Fiscal Issues; Institutional Issues; Representative Dan Glickman (D-KS) agreed:; Passage of the Act; Major Provisions of the 1996 Act; How the Item Veto Worked; Clinton v. City of New York; Conclusions on the Line-Item Veto Act; Strategy and Reform; Institutional Self-Diagnosis and Reform; Conclusion: Understanding Delegation of Power; Is Process the Fundamental Problem?
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Ambivalence, not Abdication, for Now
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9780813156743
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9780813123356
Additional Edition:
Print version Passing the Buck : Congress, the Budget, and Deficits
Language:
English
Keywords:
Electronic books
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