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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Why the Iraqi resistance to the coalition invasion was so weak / (2007)
    Santa Monica, CA :Rand Corporation,
    Details
    UID:
    almahu_9949576895602882
    Format: 1 online resource (177 p.)
    Edition: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 1-281-18102-1 , 9786611181024 , 0-8330-4260-2
    Content: Coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were able to take down Saddam Hussein's regime in less than three weeks, at the cost of relatively few Coalition casualties. This monograph draws upon information derived primarily from interviews with and interrogations of senior Iraqi military and civilian officials to examine why the Iraqi resistance in March and April 2003 was so weak. The research focused on two questions: (1) Why did the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard forces do so little fighting? and (2) Why did Iraqi leaders fail to adopt certain defensive measures that would h
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Cover; Preface; Contents; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Chapter One - Introduction; The Weak Iraqi Resistance; The Iraqi Failure to Exploit More-Effective Defensive Options; Sources; Organization of the Monograph; Chapter Two - Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations; Saddam Was the Only Decision maker Who Mattered; Saddam's Decision making Was Seriously Flawed; Saddam Had a Record of Strategic Blunders; Saddam Made Several Strategic Miscalculations in 2003; The Consequences of Saddam's Strategic Misjudgments , Chapter Three - Saddam's Internal Security Concerns Weakened Iraqi Defenses Against External Attack Saddam's Personal Security Measures Were Extreme; Iraq's Forces Were Shaped to Forestall Coups, Uprisings; The Consequences of Saddam's Fixation on Internal Security; Chapter Four - Iraq's Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed; Saddam's Military Strategy Was Flawed; Iraqi Defensive Operations Were Poorly Managed and Executed; Iraqis Had to Operate with Reduced Inventories of Old Equipment; Chapter Five - Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively , Prewar Motivation and Morale Were Poor Most Iraqis Saw Defeat as Inevitable; Lack of Belief in the Justness and Necessity of the Cause; The Previous Barriers to Desertion Eroded; Air Attacks Had a Devastating Effect on the Iraqi Capability and Will to Fight; Why the Fedayeen Saddam, Ba'athist Militia, and Foreign Jihadists Were Motivated to Fight; The Effects of PSYOPS; The Effects of the Capture of Baghdad; Chapter Six - Superior Military Capabilities Gave Coalition Forces an Overwhelming Advantage; Iraqi Forces Could Not Withstand the Weight and Accuracy of Coalition Firepower , The Coalition Could Attack Iraqi Forces at Standoff Distances and at Night Coalition Armor Dominated in the Ground Fighting; The Speed of U.S. Maneuvers Surprised and Demoralized the Iraqi Defenders; Chapter Seven - Concluding Observations; The Coalition's Success Was Achieved Rapidly and at a Low Cost; But Decision makers Should Be Careful About the Lessons They Draw from OIF; OIF Set the Stage for the Insurgency That Followed; How OIF May Influence the Behavior of the United States' Future Adversaries; Bibliography , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 0-8330-4016-2
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    HU Berlin
    FU Berlin
    Charité
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Why the Iraqi resistance to the coalition invasion was so weak (2007)
    Santa Monica, CA : Rand Corporation
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_647030721
    Format: Online-Ressource (xxiv, 152 p) , 23 cm
    Edition: Online-Ausg. 2009 Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
    ISBN: 9780833040169 , 0833040162
    Content: Coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were able to take down Saddam Hussein's regime in less than three weeks, at the cost of relatively few Coalition casualties. This monograph draws upon information derived primarily from interviews with and interrogations of senior Iraqi military and civilian officials to examine why the Iraqi resistance in March and April 2003 was so weak. The research focused on two questions: (1) Why did the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard forces do so little fighting? and (2) Why did Iraqi leaders fail to adopt certain defensive measures that would h
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (p. [145]-152) , Cover; Preface; Contents; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Chapter One - Introduction; The Weak Iraqi Resistance; The Iraqi Failure to Exploit More-Effective DefensiveOptions; Sources; Organization of the Monograph; Chapter Two - Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations; Saddam Was the Only Decisionmaker Who Mattered; Saddam's Decisionmaking Was Seriously Flawed; Saddam Had a Record of Strategic Blunders; Saddam Made Several Strategic Miscalculations in 2003; The Consequences of Saddam's Strategic Misjudgments , Chapter Three - Saddam's Internal Security Concerns Weakened Iraqi Defenses Against External AttackSaddam's Personal Security Measures Were Extreme; Iraq's Forces Were Shaped to Forestall Coups, Uprisings; The Consequences of Saddam's Fixation on InternalSecurity; Chapter Four - Iraq's Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed; Saddam's Military Strategy Was Flawed; Iraqi Defensive Operations Were Poorly Managed andExecuted; Iraqis Had to Operate with Reduced Inventories of OldEquipment; Chapter Five - Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively , Prewar Motivation and Morale Were PoorMost Iraqis Saw Defeat as Inevitable; Lack of Belief in the Justness and Necessity of the Cause; The Previous Barriers to Desertion Eroded; Air Attacks Had a Devastating Effect on the IraqiCapability and Will to Fight; Why the Fedayeen Saddam, Ba'athist Militia, and ForeignJihadists Were Motivated to Fight; The Effects of PSYOPS; The Effects of the Capture of Baghdad; Chapter Six - Superior Military Capabilities Gave Coalition Forces an Overwhelming Advantage; Iraqi Forces Could Not Withstand the Weight andAccuracy of Coalition Firepower , The Coalition Could Attack Iraqi Forces at StandoffDistances and at NightCoalition Armor Dominated in the Ground Fighting; The Speed of U.S. Maneuvers Surprised and Demoralizedthe Iraqi Defenders; Chapter Seven - Concluding Observations; The Coalition's Success Was Achieved Rapidly and at aLow Cost; But Decisionmakers Should Be Careful About the LessonsThey Draw from OIF; OIF Set the Stage for the Insurgency That Followed; How OIF May Influence the Behavior of the UnitedStates' Future Adversaries; Bibliography , Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780833040169
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext
    URL: Volltext
    URL: Volltext
    URL: Volltext
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    Online Access
    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Why the Iraqi resistance to the coalition invasion was so weak (2007)
    Santa Monica, CA : Rand Corp
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1008650366
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xxiv, 152 pages)
    Edition: [S.l.] HathiTrust Digital Library 2010 Electronic reproduction
    ISBN: 9780833040169 , 0833042602 , 9781281181022 , 1281181021 , 9780833042606 , 0833040162
    Content: Draws upon information derived primarily from interviews with and interrogations of senior Iraqi military and civilian officials to examine why the Iraqi resistance in March and April 2003 was so weak. It focuses on two questions: (1) Why did the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard forces do so little fighting? and (2) Why did Iraqi leaders fail to adopt certain defensive measures that would have made the Coalition's task more difficult?
    Content: Draws upon information derived primarily from interviews with and interrogations of senior Iraqi military and civilian officials to examine why the Iraqi resistance in March and April 2003 was so weak. It focuses on two questions: (1) Why did the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard forces do so little fighting? and (2) Why did Iraqi leaders fail to adopt certain defensive measures that would have made the Coalition's task more difficult?
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (pages 145-152) , Use copy Restrictions unspecified star MiAaHDL , Electronic reproduction , Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780833040169
    Additional Edition: Druck-Ausgabe
    Additional Edition: Print version Hosmer, Stephen T Why the Iraqi resistance to the coalition invasion was so weak Santa Monica, CA : Rand Corp, 2007
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: kostenfrei
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    Fulltext
    Stabi Berlin
  • 4
    Book
    Book
    Why the Iraqi resistance to the coalition invasion was so weak (2007)
    Santa Monica, Calif. [u.a.] : Rand Project Air Force
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_527187372
    Format: XXIV, 152 S.
    ISBN: 0833040162 , 9780833040169
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation monograph series
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (S. 145 - 152)
    Language: English
    Keywords: Golfkrieg ; Militär ; Kampfkraft ; Analyse ; Geschichte 1991-2003
    URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis
    URL: http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0715/2007014369.html
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak (2007)
    [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : RAND Corporation
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1877803707
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    ISBN: 9780833042606 , 9780833040169
    Content: Draws upon information derived primarily from interviews with and interrogations of senior Iraqi military and civilian officials to examine why the Iraqi resistance in March and April 2003 was so weak. It focuses on two questions: (1) Why did the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard forces do so little fighting? and (2) Why did Iraqi leaders fail to adopt certain defensive measures that would have made the Coalition's task more difficult?
    Note: English
    Language: Undetermined
    URL: kostenfrei
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Stabi Berlin
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