UID:
almahu_9949419193502882
Format:
1 online resource (xi, 406 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
9781009201995 (ebook)
Content:
Was Churchill correct when he claimed the Second World War could easily have been prevented if Chamberlain had not appeased Hitler? How far did Churchill and Chamberlain differ on defence and foreign policy? To what extent was Chamberlain responsible for military defeats in 1940? In this new account of appeasement, G. C. Peden addresses these questions and provides a comparative analysis of Chamberlain and Churchill's views on foreign policy and strategic priorities, explores what deterrence and appeasement meant in the military, economic and political context of the 1930s and where Chamberlain and Churchill agreed and disagreed on how best to deter Germany. Beginning in 1931 when Chamberlain became Chancellor of the Exchequer, this book explores the evolution of British policy towards Germany through to the Munich Agreement and its aftermath within the context of Britain's power to influence international affairs in the 1930s and of contemporary intelligence.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 16 Nov 2022).
,
Chamberlain : guilty man? -- Why historians differ on appeasement -- Two contrasting personalities -- Who was who in Whitehall -- The intelligence services -- Churchill and Whitehall in the 1930s -- Measuring power -- Sea power -- Air power -- Land power -- Defence industries -- The wider economy -- Public opinion and national morale -- Collective security -- Intelligence and perceptions of power -- Dealing with the great depression -- The war debts controversy -- Manchuria and the end of the ten year rule -- Disarmament and defence requirements, 1932-34 -- Reshaping grand strategy, 1934 -- Anglo-Japanese relations -- The German threat increases -- The Ethiopian crisis -- Drawing up the rearmament programme -- The Rhineland crisis and after -- Rearmament and the role of the army -- Financing rearmament -- Relations with the United States and Japan -- Seeking a general settlement in Europe -- The Inskip defence review -- Eden's resignation -- First reactions to the threat to Czechoslovakia -- From May 'crisis' to September crisis -- Berchtesgaden and Godesberg -- Munich -- The aftermath of Munich -- Towards a continental commitment -- Chamberlain still hoping for the best -- The end of Czechoslovakia -- The guarantee to Poland -- Negotiations with the Soviets -- Secret contacts with Germans -- The decision for war -- The 'phoney war' -- Norway and the fall of Chamberlain's government -- Finest hour -- The limits of British power -- What would Churchill have done? -- Would it have been better to fight in 1938? -- Concluding reflections.
Additional Edition:
Print version: ISBN 9781009201988
Language:
English
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009201995
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