UID:
almafu_9960117439202883
Format:
1 online resource (xix, 284 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
Edition:
Second edition.
ISBN:
1-107-45342-9
,
1-107-46050-6
,
1-139-03515-0
Content:
Employing macroeconomic performance as a lens to evaluate democratic institutions, the author uses models of political behavior that allow for opportunism on the part of public officials and shortsightedness on the part of voters to see if democratic institutions lead to inferior macroeconomic performance. We have learned more about how and why democracy can work well or badly in the years since the first edition was published. It was not previously apparent how much the good performance of democracy in the United States was contingent on informal rules and institutions of restraint that are not part of the definition of democracy. Since that first edition, the United States has experienced soaring indebtedness, unintended adverse consequences of housing policy, and massive problems in the financial system. Each of these was permitted or encouraged by the incentives of electoral politics and by limitations on government, the two essential features of democratic institutions.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-17867-3
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-107-00414-4
Language:
English
Subjects:
Economics
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139035156
Bookmarklink
