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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,
    UID:
    almafu_9960117483402883
    Format: 1 online resource (xii, 271 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).
    ISBN: 1-316-56408-8 , 1-316-56646-3 , 1-139-01768-3
    Series Statement: Political economy of institutions and decisions
    Content: Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy. Even more compelling is professionalism, which embeds its professional practitioners in professional norms and culture, and incidentally mitigates corruption. Financial examples are provided throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the role played by professionalized bureaucracies during the Great Recession.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 May 2016). , Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. The moral hazard of bureaucrats and politicians; 3. Political moral hazard and credible commitment; 4. Political moral hazard and bureaucratic autonomy; 5. 'Above politics': the separation of powers and bureaucratic autonomy; 6. The control paradox, trust, and leadership; 7. Professionalism and credible commitment; 8. The politicization of financial regulation; 9. The financial crisis and reregulation; 10. Conclusion. , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-107-00875-1
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-107-40131-3
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    UID:
    gbv_839845715
    Format: xii, 271 Seiten , Diagramme , 23 cm
    ISBN: 9781107401310 , 9781107008755
    Series Statement: Political economy of institutions and decisions
    Content: "Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy. Even more compelling is professionalism, which embeds its professional practitioners in professional norms and culture, and incidentally mitigates corruption. Financial examples are provided throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the role played by professionalized bureaucracies during the Great Recession"--
    Content: "Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy"--
    Content: Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. The moral hazard of bureaucrats and politicians; 3. Political moral hazard and credible commitment; 4. Political moral hazard and bureaucratic autonomy; 5. 'Above politics': the separation of powers and bureaucratic autonomy; 6. The control paradox, trust, and leadership; 7. Professionalism and credible commitment; 8. The politicization of financial regulation; 9. The financial crisis and reregulation; 10. Conclusion
    Note: Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 239-260 und Index , Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. The moral hazard of bureaucrats and politicians; 3. Political moral hazard and credible commitment; 4. Political moral hazard and bureaucratic autonomy; 5. 'Above politics': the separation of powers and bureaucratic autonomy; 6. The control paradox, trust, and leadership; 7. Professionalism and credible commitment; 8. The politicization of financial regulation; 9. The financial crisis and reregulation; 10. Conclusion.
    Language: English
    Subjects: Political Science
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: USA ; Verwaltung ; Politische Kontrolle ; Gewaltenteilung
    URL: Cover
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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