UID:
almafu_9960118507202883
Format:
1 online resource (xvii, 410 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
1-108-78863-7
,
0-511-89479-1
Content:
How can the stunning diversity of social systems and behaviours seen in nature be explained? Drawing on social evolution theory, experimental evidence and studies conducted in the field, this book outlines the fundamental principles of social evolution underlying this phenomenal richness.To succeed in the competition for resources, organisms may either 'race' to be quicker than others, 'fight' for privileged access, or 'share' their efforts and gains. The authors show how the ecology and intrinsic attributes of organisms select for each of these strategies, and how a handful of straightforward concepts explain the evolution of successful decision rules in behavioural interactions, whether among members of the same or different species. With a broad focus ranging from microorganisms to humans, this is the first book to provide students and researchers with a comprehensive account of the evolution of sociality by natural selection.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 30 Jul 2021).
,
Cover -- Half-title -- Title page -- Copyright information -- Dedication -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 A Historical Perspective -- 1.2 Dealing with Competition -- 1.2.1 Competition for Food -- 1.2.2 Competition for Shelter -- 1.2.3 Competition for Mates and Social Partners -- 1.2.4 Competition for Multiple Resources -- 1.3 The Tension between Conflict and Cooperation -- 1.4 Conceptual and Semantic Confusions -- 1.5 The Focus of this Book -- 2 Non-interference Rivalry -- 2.1 Competition: The Engine of Natural Selection -- 2.2 Ecological Influences on the Nature of Competition -- 2.2.1 Resource Availability and Renewal -- 2.2.2 Clumping in Space and Time -- 2.2.3 Predictability in Space and Time -- 2.2.4 Divisibility -- 2.2.5 Predation and Other Ecological Features -- 2.3 Scramble Strategies and Animal Distributions -- 2.3.1 Evolving Scramble Effort -- 2.4 Competition and Collective Movement -- 2.5 Competition for Information -- 2.5.1 Social Learning and Recruitment of Others -- 2.5.2 Producers, Scroungers and Deception -- 2.6 Social Influences on Competition -- 2.6.1 Population Density and Competition -- 2.6.2 Sexual Conflict -- 2.6.3 Alternative Reproductive Tactics -- 2.6.4 Conditional Strategies -- 2.7 Conclusions -- 3 Conflict -- 3.1 Conflict and Cooperation -- 3.2 Sources of Conflict in Social Groups -- 3.2.1 Conflict over Group Membership -- 3.2.2 Conflict over Rank -- 3.2.2.1 Dominance-Submission -- 3.2.3 Conflict over Reproduction -- 3.2.3.1 Reproductive Skew -- 3.2.3.2 Mating Skew -- 3.2.3.3 Parental Care -- 3.2.3.4 Conflict over Helping -- 3.3 Social Conflict: Theoretical Approaches -- 3.3.1 Structured Population Models -- 3.3.2 Sealed Bid Models: Battleground and Resolution -- 3.3.2.1 Battleground Models -- 3.3.2.2 Resolution Models -- 3.3.2.3 Evolving Peace.
,
3.3.3 Behavioural Conflict: Threats, Negotiation and Assessment -- 3.3.3.1 Threats and Coercion: Sequential Models -- 3.3.3.2 Negotiation Models -- 3.3.3.3 Assessment Models -- 3.4 Evolutionary Routes to Conflict Reduction -- 3.4.1 Kin Selection -- 3.4.2 Repression of Competition -- 3.4.2.1 Reproductive Dictatorship -- 3.4.2.2 Reproductive Levelling -- 3.4.2.3 Life History Segregation -- 3.4.2.4 Outgroup Threat -- 3.5 Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation -- 3.5.1 Consequences of Intergroup Conflict: Empirical Patterns -- 3.5.2 Intergroup Cooperation and the Major Transitions -- 3.6 Conclusions -- 4 Cooperation -- 4.1 Cooperation for Fitness Benefits -- 4.1.1 By-product Benefits or Mutualism -- 4.1.2 Correlated Pay-offs -- 4.1.2.1 Reciprocity -- 4.1.2.1.1 Three Types of Information -- Three Types of Reciprocity -- 4.1.2.1.2 Generalized Reciprocity -- 4.1.2.1.3 Direct Reciprocity -- 4.1.2.1.4 Indirect Reciprocity -- 4.1.2.1.5 The Importance of Information -- 4.1.2.1.6 Cooperation on Networks and Graphs -- 4.1.2.1.7 When Should We Expect Reciprocity? -- 4.1.2.1.8 Which Type of Reciprocity Should We Expect? -- 4.1.2.1.9 Negotiations and Trading -- 4.1.2.2 Kin Selection -- 4.1.2.2.1 Evidence for Kin-directed Care in Social Systems -- 4.1.2.2.2 Mechanisms to Promote Kin-directed Helping -- 4.1.2.2.3 Inadvertent Kin-directed Care -- 4.1.2.2.3.1 Longevity as a Driver for Inadvertent Kin-directed Cooperation -- 4.1.2.2.3.2 Limited Natal Dispersal -- 4.1.2.2.3.3 High Breeding Site Fidelity -- 4.1.2.2.3.4 Lekking and Mate Sharing -- 4.1.2.2.3.5 Dispersal in Kin Coalitions -- 4.1.2.2.4 Kin Discrimination Involving Kin Recognition -- 4.1.2.2.5 Mechanisms Underlying Active Kin Discrimination -- 4.1.2.2.6 Ecological Determinants of Kin-clustering and Cooperation -- 4.1.2.2.7 Kin Selection and Sexual Conflict Resolution.
,
4.1.2.2.8 Kin Associations Do Not Always Lead to Cooperation -- 4.1.2.2.9 Inbreeding and Kin-selected Benefits -- 4.1.2.2.10 Absence of Adjustment of Social Behaviour to Kinship -- 4.2 Forced Cooperation -- 4.2.1 Coercion -- 4.2.1.1 Power Symmetry -- 4.2.1.2 Power Asymmetry -- 4.2.2 Surreptitious Exploitation -- 4.3 Conclusions -- 5 Interspecific Relations -- 5.1 Types of Interspecific Interactions -- 5.2 Non-interference Rivalry -- 5.2.1 Character Displacement -- 5.2.2 Specialists versus Generalists -- 5.3 Conflict -- 5.3.1 Interspecific Resource Monopolization -- 5.3.2 How to Deal with Predators: Interspecific Associations -- 5.3.3 Host-Parasite Relations -- 5.4 Cooperation -- 5.4.1 Commensalism -- 5.4.2 Mutualism -- 5.4.3 Reciprocity -- 5.4.4 Manipulation -- 5.5 Conclusions -- 6 Synopsis -- 6.1 Race -- 6.2 Fight -- 6.3 Share -- 6.4 Interspecific Interactions -- 6.5 General Conclusions -- 6.5.1 Optimal Responses to Competition -- 6.5.2 Future Directions -- 6.5.3 Less Encouraged -- 6.5.4 Final Inference -- Conflict -- References -- Subject Index -- Taxonomic Index.
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-108-74616-0
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-107-01118-3
Language:
English
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9780511894794
Bookmarklink
