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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,
    UID:
    almahu_9947415041702882
    Format: 1 online resource (xvii, 217 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).
    ISBN: 9781139062084 (ebook)
    Content: A common presupposition in contemporary moral and political philosophy is that individuals should be provided with some basic threshold of goods, capabilities, or well-being. But if there is such a basic minimum, how should this be understood? Dale Dorsey offers an underexplored answer: that the basic minimum should be characterized not as the achievement of a set of capabilities, or as access to some specified bundle of resources, but as the maintenance of a minimal threshold of human welfare. In addition, Dorsey argues that though political institutions should be committed to the promotion of this minimal threshold, we should reject approaches that seek to cast the basic minimum as a human right. His book will be important for all who are interested in theories of political morality.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). , Introduction -- 1. On the concept (and some conceptions) of the basic minimum -- 2. A welfarist basic minimum -- 3. Adaptive preferences -- 4. The intrinsic value of the basic minimum -- 5. Against rights -- 6. On objections to welfarism.
    Additional Edition: Print version: ISBN 9781107017115
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    UID:
    gbv_1696560292
    Format: 1 online resource (238 pages)
    ISBN: 9781139230889
    Content: Offers a sustained defense of the claim that the basic social minimum should be characterized in terms of human welfare.
    Content: Cover -- THE BASIC MINIMUM -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- 0.1. QUESTIONS -- 0.2. ANSWERS -- 0.3. LIMITS -- 0.4. POLITICS AND NEUTRALITY -- CHAPTER 1: On the concept (and some conceptions) of the basic minimum -- 1.1. THE CONCEPT OF A BASIC MINIMUM -- 1.2. CONCEPTIONS -- 1.3. GOODS AND RESOURCES -- 1.4. SUBSISTENCE -- 1.5. SOCIAL NEEDS -- 1.6. BASIC NEEDS -- 1.7. CAPABILITIES -- 1.7.1. No Trade-offs -- 1.7.2. Expansive List, human dignity, and upward distribution -- 1.7.3. Capabilities Not Welfare -- 1.8. THE WELFARIST'S DILEMMA -- 1.9. CONCLUSION -- CHAPTER 2: A welfarist basic minimum -- 2.1. THE DIVERSITY OF WELFARE -- 2.2. A DISTINCTION IN GOODS -- 2.3. WHAT IS A PROJECT? -- 2.4. THESIS: TWO ARGUMENTS -- 2.4.1. A bare intuition -- 2.4.2. Shape, meaning, and self-direction -- 2.5. WHAT IS A VALUED PROJECT? -- 2.6. THE BASIC MINIMUM -- 2.7. OBJECTION: DIGNITY AND CAPABILITIES -- 2.8. OBJECTION: AUTONOMY -- 2.9. OBJECTION: TOO LOW, PART ONE -- 2.9.1. WBM, basic needs, and basic capabilities -- 2.9.2. Reconsidering Sarah -- 2.10. CONCLUSION AND THEORIES OF WELL-BEING -- CHAPTER 3: Adaptive preferences -- 3.1. NUSSBAUM ON ADAPTATION -- 3.2. ADAPTIVE PREFERENCES AND WELL-BEING -- 3.2.1. Preference for the worse -- 3.2.2. Adaptation and autonomy -- 3.2.3. Adaptation and proto-autonomy -- 3.3. CONCEPTIONS OF THE GOOD: A THEORY -- 3.3.1. Beliefs not desires -- 3.3.2. Coherence and completeness -- 3.3.3. Some comparisons -- 3.4. COHERENTISM AND ADAPTATION -- 3.5. TOO LOW, PART TWO: DEEP ADAPTATION AND PREFERENCE FOR THE WORSE -- 3.5.1. Preference for the worse and content-based assessment -- 3.5.2. Preference for the worse and no content-based assessment -- 3.6. CONCLUSION -- CHAPTER 4: The intrinsic value of the basic minimum -- 4.1. THE BASIC MINIMUM AS OVERRIDING -- 4.1.1. Guarantee -- 4.1.2. Maximize -- 4.2. STRATEGY.
    Note: Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources , Cover; THE BASIC MINIMUM; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Introduction; 0.1. QUESTIONS; 0.2. ANSWERS; 0.3. LIMITS; 0.4. POLITICS AND NEUTRALITY; CHAPTER 1: On the concept (and some conceptions) of the basic minimum; 1.1. THE CONCEPT OF A BASIC MINIMUM; 1.2. CONCEPTIONS; 1.3. GOODS AND RESOURCES; 1.4. SUBSISTENCE; 1.5. SOCIAL NEEDS; 1.6. BASIC NEEDS; 1.7. CAPABILITIES; 1.7.1. No Trade-offs; 1.7.2. Expansive List, human dignity, and upward distribution; 1.7.3. Capabilities Not Welfare; 1.8. THE WELFARIST'S DILEMMA; 1.9. CONCLUSION; CHAPTER 2: A welfarist basic minimum , 2.1. THE DIVERSITY OF WELFARE2.2. A DISTINCTION IN GOODS; 2.3. WHAT IS A PROJECT?; 2.4. THESIS: TWO ARGUMENTS; 2.4.1. A bare intuition; 2.4.2. Shape, meaning, and self-direction; 2.5. WHAT IS A VALUED PROJECT?; 2.6. THE BASIC MINIMUM; 2.7. OBJECTION: DIGNITY AND CAPABILITIES; 2.8. OBJECTION: AUTONOMY; 2.9. OBJECTION: TOO LOW, PART ONE; 2.9.1. WBM, basic needs, and basic capabilities; 2.9.2. Reconsidering Sarah; 2.10. CONCLUSION AND THEORIES OF WELL-BEING; CHAPTER 3: Adaptive preferences; 3.1. NUSSBAUM ON ADAPTATION; 3.2. ADAPTIVE PREFERENCES AND WELL-BEING , 3.2.1. Preference for the worse3.2.2. Adaptation and autonomy; 3.2.3. Adaptation and proto-autonomy; 3.3. CONCEPTIONS OF THE GOOD: A THEORY; 3.3.1. Beliefs not desires; 3.3.2. Coherence and completeness; 3.3.3. Some comparisons; 3.4. COHERENTISM AND ADAPTATION; 3.5. TOO LOW, PART TWO: DEEP ADAPTATION ANDPREFERENCE FOR THE WORSE; 3.5.1. Preference for the worse and content-based assessment; 3.5.2. Preference for the worse and no content-based assessment; 3.6. CONCLUSION; CHAPTER 4: The intrinsic value of the basic minimum; 4.1. THE BASIC MINIMUM AS OVERRIDING; 4.1.1. Guarantee; 4.1.2. Maximize , 4.2. STRATEGY4.3. THE BASIC MINIMUM AND SUB-MINIMUM GOODS; 4.3.1. Sub-minimum goods: satisfactions; 4.3.2. Sub-minimum goods: marginal, unvalued project-improvements; 4.4. LEXICAL; 4.5. TWO OBJECTIONS TO LEXICAL; 4.5.1. The sequence; 4.5.2. A distributive objection and varieties of lexical dominance; 4.6. SUPER-MINIMUM GOODS: A SIMPLE SOLUTION; 4.7. ALTERNATIVES TO PRIORITARIANESQUE; 4.7.1. Neutrality; 4.7.2. Egalitarianism; 4.7.3. Leximin; 4.7.4. Crispian sufficientarianism; 4.7.5. Prioritarianesque as Solution; 4.8. CONCLUSION; CHAPTER 5: Against rights; 5.1. THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW , 5.2. INTRODUCING RIGHTS5.3. BENEFIT RIGHTS; 5.3.1. Standard threats; 5.3.2. Practicalities; 5.3.3. A general argument against benefit rights; 5.3.4. Parsimony Reconsidered; 5.4. RIGHTS: AN ECUMENICAL COMMENT; 5.5. HONORING AND OTHER MORAL STANCES: SOMESCHEMATIC COMMENTS; 5.6. CONCLUSION; CHAPTER 6: On objections to welfarism; 6.1. EXPENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE TASTES; 6.2. IMPRUDENT CHOICES AND OFFENSIVE TASTESRECONSIDERED; 6.3. WELFARISM AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS; 6.4. THE CASH COMPENSATION ARGUMENT; 6.5. OPERATIONALISM, PUBLICITY, ANDAN ECUMENICAL PROPOSAL; 6.6. RISK , 6.7. CONCLUSION, AND UNFINISHED BUSINESS
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9781107017115
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9781107017115
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books
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