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  • 1
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,
    UID:
    almahu_9947415048802882
    Umfang: 1 online resource (ix, 233 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).
    ISBN: 9781139062114 (ebook)
    Inhalt: Language users ordinarily suppose that they know what thoughts their own utterances express. We can call this supposed knowledge minimal self-knowledge. But what does it come to? And do we actually have it? Anti-individualism implies that the thoughts which a person's utterances express are partly determined by facts about their social and physical environments. If anti-individualism is true, then there are some apparently coherent sceptical hypotheses that conflict with our supposition that we have minimal self-knowledge. In this book, Anthony Brueckner and Gary Ebbs debate how to characterize this problem and develop opposing views of what it shows. Their discussion is the only sustained, in-depth debate about anti-individualism, scepticism and knowledge of one's own thoughts, and will interest both scholars and graduate students in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and epistemology.
    Anmerkung: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). , Introduction -- 1. Brains in a vat / Anthony Brueckner -- 2. Scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats / Gary Ebbs -- 3. Ebbs on scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats / Anthony Brueckner -- 4. The dialectical context of Putnam's argument that we are not brains in vats / Gary Ebbs -- 5. Trying to get outside your own skin / Anthony Brueckner -- 6. Can we take our words at face value? / Gary Ebbs -- 7. Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? / Anthony Brueckner -- 8. Is scepticism about self-knowledge coherent? / Gary Ebbs -- 9. The coherence of scepticism about self-knowledge / Anthony Brueckner -- 10. Why scepticism about self-knowledge is self-undermining / Gary Ebbs -- 11. Scepticism about self-knowledge redux / Anthony Brueckner -- 12. Self-knowledge in doubt / Gary Ebbs -- 13. Looking back / Anthony Brueckner.
    Weitere Ausg.: Print version: ISBN 9781107017139
    Sprache: Englisch
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 2
    Buch
    Buch
    Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press
    UID:
    gbv_687452066
    Umfang: IX, 233 S.
    ISBN: 1107017130 , 9781107017139
    Inhalt: "Language users ordinarily suppose that they know what thoughts their own utterances express. We can call this supposed knowledge minimal self-knowledge. But what does it come to? And do we actually have it? Anti-individualism implies that the thoughts which a person's utterances express are partly determined by facts about their social and physical environments. If anti-individualism is true, then there are some apparently coherent sceptical hypotheses that conflict with our supposition that we have minimal self-knowledge. In this book, Anthony Brueckner and Gary Ebbs debate how to characterize this problem and develop opposing views of what it shows. Their discussion is the only sustained, in-depth debate about anti-individualism, scepticism and knowledge of one's own thoughts, and will interest both scholars and graduate students in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and epistemology"--
    Inhalt: "Language users ordinarily suppose that they know what thoughts their own utterances express. We can call this supposed knowledge minimal self-knowledge. But what does it come to? And do we actually have it? Anti-individualism implies that the thoughts which a person's utterances express are partly determined by facts about their social and physical environments. If anti-individualism is true, then there are some apparently coherent sceptical hypotheses that conflict with our supposition that we have minimal self-knowledge. In this book, Anthony Brueckner and Gary Ebbs debate how to characterize this problem and develop opposing views of what it shows. Their discussion is the only sustained, in-depth debate about anti-individualism, scepticism and knowledge of one's own thoughts, and will interest both scholars and graduate students in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and epistemology"--
    Anmerkung: Machine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. Brains in a vat Anthony Brueckner; 2. Scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats Gary Ebbs; 3. Ebbs on scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats Anthony Brueckner; 4. The dialectical context of Putnam's argument that we are not brains in vats Gary Ebbs; 5. Trying to get outside your own skin Anthony Brueckner; 6. Can we take our words at face value? Gary Ebbs; 7. Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? Anthony Brueckner; 8. Is scepticism about self-knowledge coherent? Gary Ebbs; 9. The coherence of scepticism about self-knowledge Anthony Brueckner; 10. Why scepticism about self-knowledge is self-undermining Gary Ebbs; 11. Scepticism about self-knowledge redux Anthony Brueckner; 12. Self-knowledge in doubt Gary Ebbs; 13. Looking back Anthony Brueckner; Bibliography; Index.
    Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe Brueckner, Anthony, 1953 - Debating self-knowledge Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012 ISBN 9781107017139
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 1107017130
    Sprache: Englisch
    Fachgebiete: Philosophie
    RVK:
    Schlagwort(e): Selbsterkenntnis ; Individualismus ; Aufsatzsammlung
    URL: Cover
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 3
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    UID:
    gbv_883478447
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (ix, 233 pages) , digital, PDF file(s)
    ISBN: 9781139062114
    Inhalt: Language users ordinarily suppose that they know what thoughts their own utterances express. We can call this supposed knowledge minimal self-knowledge. But what does it come to? And do we actually have it? Anti-individualism implies that the thoughts which a person's utterances express are partly determined by facts about their social and physical environments. If anti-individualism is true, then there are some apparently coherent sceptical hypotheses that conflict with our supposition that we have minimal self-knowledge. In this book, Anthony Brueckner and Gary Ebbs debate how to characterize this problem and develop opposing views of what it shows. Their discussion is the only sustained, in-depth debate about anti-individualism, scepticism and knowledge of one's own thoughts, and will interest both scholars and graduate students in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and epistemology
    Inhalt: Introduction -- 1. Brains in a vat / Anthony Brueckner -- 2. Scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats / Gary Ebbs -- 3. Ebbs on scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats / Anthony Brueckner -- 4. The dialectical context of Putnam's argument that we are not brains in vats / Gary Ebbs -- 5. Trying to get outside your own skin / Anthony Brueckner -- 6. Can we take our words at face value? / Gary Ebbs -- 7. Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? / Anthony Brueckner -- 8. Is scepticism about self-knowledge coherent? / Gary Ebbs -- 9. The coherence of scepticism about self-knowledge / Anthony Brueckner -- 10. Why scepticism about self-knowledge is self-undermining / Gary Ebbs -- 11. Scepticism about self-knowledge redux / Anthony Brueckner -- 12. Self-knowledge in doubt / Gary Ebbs -- 13. Looking back / Anthony Brueckner
    Anmerkung: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9781107017139
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9781107540910
    Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9781107017139
    Sprache: Englisch
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 4
    Buch
    Buch
    Cambridge [u.a.] :Cambridge Univ. Press,
    UID:
    almahu_BV040115251
    Umfang: IX, 233 S.
    Ausgabe: 1. publ.
    ISBN: 978-1-107-01713-9 , 1-1070-1713-0
    Sprache: Englisch
    Fachgebiete: Philosophie
    RVK:
    Schlagwort(e): Selbsterkenntnis ; Philosophie ; Selbsterkenntnis ; Skeptizismus ; Individualismus ; Aufsatzsammlung
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 5
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Cambridge [u.a.] :Cambridge Univ. Press,
    UID:
    edocfu_BV043928828
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (IX, 233 S.).
    ISBN: 978-1-139-06211-4
    Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Hardcover ISBN 978-1-107-01713-9
    Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 978-1-107-54091-0
    Sprache: Englisch
    Fachgebiete: Philosophie
    RVK:
    Schlagwort(e): Selbsterkenntnis ; Philosophie ; Selbsterkenntnis ; Skeptizismus ; Individualismus ; Aufsatzsammlung
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
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