Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (xvii, 304 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).

ISBN: 9781139108553 (ebook)

Series Statement: Cambridge studies in comparative politics

Content: Why are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals.

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). , The puzzle of opposition coordination -- A theory of pecuniary coalition formation -- The emergence of financial reprisal regimes -- The political control of banking -- The liberalization of capital -- The political alignment of business -- Opposition bargaining across ethnic cleavages -- Multiethnic opposition coalitions in African elections -- Democratic consolidation in Africa -- Appendix A: Commercial banking sector size and opposition coalitions in Africa -- Appendix B: Sources on commodity exports and ethnic production by country -- Appendix C: Variables: definitions, sources, and summary statistics -- Appendix D: Multiethnic opposition coalitions in Africa, 1990-2005.

Additional Edition: Print version: ISBN 9781107021112

Language: English

URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139108553

UID:

Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xvii, 304 pages) , digital, PDF file(s)

ISBN: 9781139108553

Series Statement: Cambridge studies in comparative politics

Content: Why are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals

Content: The puzzle of opposition coordination -- A theory of pecuniary coalition formation -- The emergence of financial reprisal regimes -- The political control of banking -- The liberalization of capital -- The political alignment of business -- Opposition bargaining across ethnic cleavages -- Multiethnic opposition coalitions in African elections -- Democratic consolidation in Africa -- Appendix A: Commercial banking sector size and opposition coalitions in Africa -- Appendix B: Sources on commodity exports and ethnic production by country -- Appendix C: Variables: definitions, sources, and summary statistics -- Appendix D: Multiethnic opposition coalitions in Africa, 1990-2005

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)

Additional Edition: ISBN 9781107021112

Additional Edition: ISBN 9781107605435

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9781107021112

Language: English

DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139108553

URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)

UID:

Format: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (330 p.))

ISBN: 9781139570961

Series Statement: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

Content: Cover; Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns; Dedication; Series; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Tables; Preface and Acknowledgments; List of abbreviations; 1 The Puzzle of Opposition Coordination; THE PROBLEM OF OPPOSITION COORDINATION IN AFRICA; EXISTING EXPLANATIONS FOR OPPOSITION COORDINATION; Ethnic Mobilization; Patronage Politics; Electoral Institutions; Economic Interests; ARGUMENT OF THE BOOK; IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT; ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK; 2 A Theory of Pecuniary Coalition Formation. - ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND DEMOCRATIC CONTESTATIONTHE FORMATEUR'S COMMITMENT PROBLEM; THE PECUNIARY STRATEGY; THE CASE STUDIES: CAMEROON AND KENYA; CONCLUSION; 3 The Emergence of Financial Reprisal Regimes; THE COLONIAL FOUNDATION OF STATE-CAPITAL RELATIONS IN AFRICA; THE ARTICULATION OF INDIGENOUS BUSINESS GRIEVANCES; A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CREDIT PROBLEM; THE LINKAGE ROLE OF BUSINESS; BUSINESS DEPENDENCE ON STATE CONTROLLED CAPITAL; REINTERPRETING THE BUSINESS-STATE RELATIONSHIP; CONCLUSION; 4 The Political Control of Banking; UNEQUAL CAPITAL ACCUMULATION ACROSS CONSTITUENCIES. - A POLITICAL RATIONALE FOR CONTROLLING BANKINGPOLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES AND COMMERCIAL BANKING SECTOR SIZE; POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES AND COMMERCIAL BANKING OWNERSHIP; DATA AND METHODS FOR ASSESSING COMPETING EXPLANATIONS; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKING SECTOR SIZE; CAMEROON AND KENYA: DIVERGENT BANKING NARRATIVES; Cameroon: Restricted Banking Entry; Kenya: Open Banking Entry; CONCLUSION; 5 The Liberalization of Capital; SELF-UNDERMINING FINANCIAL DIRIGISME; EXISTING EXPLANATIONS: CRISES, GROUPS, AND RENTS; BUSINESS-STATE RELATIONS AND FINANCIAL REFORM

Content: Africa's long-ruling incumbents stay in power because opposition politicians struggle to secure the finances required to build electoral coalitions

Note: Description based upon print version of record , Cover; Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns; Dedication; Series; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Tables; Preface and Acknowledgments; List of abbreviations; 1 The Puzzle of Opposition Coordination; THE PROBLEM OF OPPOSITION COORDINATION IN AFRICA; EXISTING EXPLANATIONS FOR OPPOSITION COORDINATION; Ethnic Mobilization; Patronage Politics; Electoral Institutions; Economic Interests; ARGUMENT OF THE BOOK; IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT; ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK; 2 A Theory of Pecuniary Coalition Formation , ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND DEMOCRATIC CONTESTATIONTHE FORMATEUR'S COMMITMENT PROBLEM; THE PECUNIARY STRATEGY; THE CASE STUDIES: CAMEROON AND KENYA; CONCLUSION; 3 The Emergence of Financial Reprisal Regimes; THE COLONIAL FOUNDATION OF STATE-CAPITAL RELATIONS IN AFRICA; THE ARTICULATION OF INDIGENOUS BUSINESS GRIEVANCES; A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CREDIT PROBLEM; THE LINKAGE ROLE OF BUSINESS; BUSINESS DEPENDENCE ON STATE CONTROLLED CAPITAL; REINTERPRETING THE BUSINESS-STATE RELATIONSHIP; CONCLUSION; 4 The Political Control of Banking; UNEQUAL CAPITAL ACCUMULATION ACROSS CONSTITUENCIES , A POLITICAL RATIONALE FOR CONTROLLING BANKINGPOLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES AND COMMERCIAL BANKING SECTOR SIZE; POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES AND COMMERCIAL BANKING OWNERSHIP; DATA AND METHODS FOR ASSESSING COMPETING EXPLANATIONS; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANKING SECTOR SIZE; CAMEROON AND KENYA: DIVERGENT BANKING NARRATIVES; Cameroon: Restricted Banking Entry; Kenya: Open Banking Entry; CONCLUSION; 5 The Liberalization of Capital; SELF-UNDERMINING FINANCIAL DIRIGISME; EXISTING EXPLANATIONS: CRISES, GROUPS, AND RENTS; BUSINESS-STATE RELATIONS AND FINANCIAL REFORM , ASSESSING THE SOURCES OF FINANCIAL REFORMEMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF REFORM; Structural Adjustment Compliance; Private Credit Provision; CAMEROON AND KENYA: DIVERGENT REFORM NARRATIVES; Financial Control in Cameroon; FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION IN KENYA; CONCLUSION; 6 The Political Alignment of Business; THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF BUSINESS; THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AS CORPORATIST INSTITUTION; ASSESSING THE DETERMINANTS OF CHAMBER PRESIDENCY TENURE; EXPLAINING THE DURATION OF CHAMBER PRESIDENCY; CAMEROON AND KENYA: DIVERGENT ALIGNMENT NARRATIVES; Business Alignment in Cameroon , Cameroonian Business Supports Opposition DemandsCameroon's Bamileke Entrepreneurs Realign with Biya; Cameroon's Bamileke Entrepreneurs Become Ruling Party Stalwarts; Business Alignments in Kenya; Kenyan Business Vacillates During the Transition; Kenya's Kikuyu Entrepreneurs are Courted by the Incumbent; CONCLUSION; 7 Opposition Bargaining across Ethnic Cleavages; ETHNICITY AND CLIENTELISM IN FORMATEUR SELECTION; THE BARGAINING NARRATIVE IN CAMEROON; Bargaining Modalities; Candidate Jockeying; Financial Leverage; THE BARGAINING NARRATIVE IN KENYA; Bargaining Modalities; Candidate Jockeying , Financial Leverage

Additional Edition: ISBN 9781107021112

Additional Edition: Buchausg. u.d.T. Multiethnic coalitions in Africa

Language: English

Keywords: Electronic books

URL: Volltext

URL: Volltext