Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (xv, 284 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).

ISBN: 9781139135542 (ebook)

Content: With limited authority over state lawmaking, but ultimate responsibility for the performance of government, how effective are governors in moving their programs through the legislature? This book advances a new theory about what makes chief executives most successful and explores this theory through original data. Thad Kousser and Justin H. Phillips argue that negotiations over the budget, on the one hand, and policy bills on the other are driven by fundamentally different dynamics. They capture these dynamics in models informed by interviews with gubernatorial advisors, cabinet members, press secretaries and governors themselves. Through a series of novel empirical analyses and rich case studies, the authors demonstrate that governors can be powerful actors in the lawmaking process, but that what they're bargaining over – the budget or policy – shapes both how they play the game and how often they can win it.

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). , Machine generated contents note: 1. One problem shared by 50 state governors; 2. The roots of executive power; 3. What do governors propose?; 4. Gubernatorial success; 5. Do governors set the size of government? 6. The power and perils of popularity; 7. The item veto: a negative or positive power?; 8. Legislative professionalism and gubernatorial power; 9. Governors and the comparative study of chief executives.

Additional Edition: Print version: ISBN 9781107022249

Language: English

URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139135542

UID:

Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xv, 284 pages) , digital, PDF file(s)

ISBN: 9781139135542

Content: With limited authority over state lawmaking, but ultimate responsibility for the performance of government, how effective are governors in moving their programs through the legislature? This book advances a new theory about what makes chief executives most successful and explores this theory through original data. Thad Kousser and Justin H. Phillips argue that negotiations over the budget, on the one hand, and policy bills on the other are driven by fundamentally different dynamics. They capture these dynamics in models informed by interviews with gubernatorial advisors, cabinet members, press secretaries and governors themselves. Through a series of novel empirical analyses and rich case studies, the authors demonstrate that governors can be powerful actors in the lawmaking process, but that what they're bargaining over – the budget or policy – shapes both how they play the game and how often they can win it

Content: Machine generated contents note: 1. One problem shared by 50 state governors; 2. The roots of executive power; 3. What do governors propose?; 4. Gubernatorial success; 5. Do governors set the size of government? 6. The power and perils of popularity; 7. The item veto: a negative or positive power?; 8. Legislative professionalism and gubernatorial power; 9. Governors and the comparative study of chief executives

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)

Additional Edition: ISBN 9781107022249

Additional Edition: ISBN 9781107611177

Additional Edition: Print version ISBN 9781107022249

Language: English

Keywords: USA ; Bundesstaat ; Gouverneur ; Politisches System ; Macht

DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139135542

URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)

UID:

Format: xv, 284 p.

Edition: Online-Ausg. 2011 Available via World Wide Web

ISBN: 9781107022249 , 9781107611177 , 9781139572736

Content: Includes bibliographical references and index

Content: Governors can be powerful actors in the lawmaking process, but what they're bargaining over shapes their strategy and effectiveness

Note: Description based upon print version of record , Cover; The Power of American Governors: Winning on Budgets and Losing on Policy; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; Acknowledgments; 1 One Problem Shared by 50 Governors; 1.1 States as Laboratories for the Study of Executive Power; 1.2 How We View Governors; 1.3 How We Explore the Powers of Governors; 1.3.1 Two New Data Sets; 1.3.2 Natural Experimental Case Studies; 1.3.3 Interviews and Qualitative Evidence; 1.4 Unveiling the Hidden Powers of American Governors; 1.4.1 The Puzzle of Weak Governors: Revisiting the Determinants of State Policy , 1.4.2 Policy versus Budget Games: The Empirical Implications of a Theoretical Distinction1.4.3 Can Governors Cash In Their Political Capital? First and Second Glances at Popularity; 1.5 Organization of the Book; 2 The Roots of Executive Power; 2.1 Two Different Games That Governors Play; 2.2 The Policy Game; 2.2.1 What Do Governors and Legislators Want?; 2.2.2 What Do Governors and Legislators Know?; 2.2.3 The Power of the Veto Pen; 2.2.4 The Power of Small Favors; 2.2.5 Powers Erode over Time; 2.2.6 Power Grows with Popularity; 2.2.7 The Implicit Stakes of a High-Profile Policy Proposal , 2.2.8 The Payoff of Position Taking2.2.9 The Legislature's Goals and Tactics; 2.2.10 The Logic That Drives the Game; 2.3 The Budget Game; 2.3.1 Which Governors Perform Best in Budget Bargaining?; 2.3.2 Governors Can Wait to Secure Their Legacies; 2.3.3 Governors Can Outwait Part-Time Legislatures; 2.4 Can Governors Accomplish Their Policy Goals through the Budget?; 2.5 Conclusion; 2.6 Appendix; 3 What Do Governors Propose?; 3.1 Coding State of the State Addresses; 3.2 What Did Governors Ask For?; 3.3 Agendas and Bargaining Circumstances; 3.4 Agendas and Gubernatorial Partisanship , 3.5 Conclusion3.6 Appendix; 4 Gubernatorial Success; 4.1 Tracking Gubernatorial Proposals; 4.2 Baseline Measures of Gubernatorial Success; 4.3 Determinants of Success; 4.3.1 Budgetary versus Policy Proposals; 4.3.2 Bargaining Patience; 4.3.3 Ideological Agreement; 4.3.4 Side Payments; 4.3.5 Position-Taking Bonus; 4.3.6 Features of the Proposal and Agenda; 4.3.7 State Fiscal Health; 4.3.8 The Empirical Importance of Two Bargaining Models; 4.4 Summary; 4.5 Appendix; 5 Do Governors Set the Size of Government?; 5.1 Competing Models of Budget Bargaining , 5.2 Measuring Governors' Proposals and Legislative Enactments5.3 What Do Governors Ask for, and Why?; 5.4 Evaluating Competing Models; 5.5 Disentangling Session Length from Salary and Staff; 5.6 Conclusion; 5.7 Appendix; 6 The Power and Perils of Popularity; 6.1 What Hurricanes and Scandals Teach Us about Political Capital; 6.1.1 A First Look at Gubernatorial Success: Batting Averages; 6.2 Why Popularity Shapes Both Agendas and Success; 6.3 A Closer Look at Gubernatorial Success: Agendas and Weighted Success; 6.3.1 Hurricane Katrina Natural Experiment; 6.3.2 Ohio's Coingate Scandal , 6.4 Lessons from a Hurricane and a Scandal , Available via World Wide Web

Additional Edition: ISBN 9781107022249

Additional Edition: Print version The Power of American Governors : Winning on Budgets and Losing on Policy

Language: English

Keywords: Electronic books

URL: Volltext

UID:

Format: XV, 284 S. , Ill., Kt. , 24 cm

ISBN: 9781107611177 , 9781107022249 , 110702224X , 1107611172

Content: "To assess whether American governors can effectively govern, the authors draw on strategic models, interviews with governors, and new datasets to show that that governors can be powerful actors in the lawmaking process, but that what they're bargaining over - the budget or policy bills - shapes both how they play the game and how often they win"--

Content: "Governors, just like American presidents, face a singular disadvantage when it comes to lawmaking. Though the public may look to governors to lead their states, credit them with any successes, and hold them accountable for most failures, state constitutions strip governors of any direct power to craft legislation. Legislators in this country hold a monopoly over the power to introduce, amend, and pass bills, giving them the ability to write laws and then present them as take-it-or-leave-it o ers to America's chief executives. A governor's only formal legislative power is a reactive one-- the ability to veto or sign bills that are passed by the other branch--and comes at the end of the lawmaking process. The dynamics of this relationship can be seen in the logistics of the annual rituals that bring the branches together. When presidents lay out legislative agendas in their State of the Union addresses, they head down Pennsylvania Avenue to do so from the Speaker's rostrum before a joint session of Congress"--

Note: Includes bibliographical references and index , Machine generated contents note: 1. One problem shared by 50 state governors; 2. The roots of executive power; 3. What do governors propose?; 4. Gubernatorial success; 5. Do governors set the size of government? 6. The power and perils of popularity; 7. The item veto: a negative or positive power?; 8. Legislative professionalism and gubernatorial power; 9. Governors and the comparative study of chief executives.

Language: English

Subjects: Political Science

Keywords: USA ; Bundesstaat ; Gouverneur ; Politisches System ; Macht