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  • 1
    UID:
    almafu_9959238875202883
    Format: 1 online resource (xiv, 351 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).
    ISBN: 1-139-88911-7 , 1-139-79416-7 , 1-139-77829-3 , 1-283-74645-X , 1-139-77981-8 , 1-139-77677-0 , 1-139-78374-2 , 1-139-78280-0 , 1-139-15237-8
    Content: "Developing a new and highly innovative theory of economic policy, this book deals with conflicts between strategic actions by public and private agents. It builds on the Lucas critique but also applies the tools introduced by Tinbergen and Theil to dynamic policy games and from there derives a new theory of economic policy. Its main propositions describe such properties in the models currently used for policy-making as neutrality and equilibrium existence; uniqueness; and multiplicity. These properties are key to understanding the impact of concepts such as rational expectations, time inconsistency, communication and the use of policy announcements. As the numerous examples show, they are useful both for model building and for devising optimal institutions. The Theory of Economic Policy in a Strategic Context is an essential but accessible tool for economic researchers involved in policy questions"--
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). , Machine generated contents note: List of figures; List of tables; Preface; Common symbols; 1. An overview: the realm of economic policy; Part I. The Classical Theory of Economic Policy: 2. Statics; 3. Dynamics; Part II. From the Classical to the New Theory of Economic Policy: 4. The Lucas critique; 5. Policy games: an introduction; Part III. The New Theory of Economic Policy: Statics: 6. A theory of strategic conflict: foundations; 7. From individual players to system controllability; 8. Conflicts and coordination among groups; 9. Announcements as a coordination mechanism; Part IV. The New Theory of Economic Policy: Dynamics: 10. Controllability in a strategic dynamic setting; 11. Dynamic policy games with rational expectations; 12. Credibility, dynamic controllability and rational expectations; 13. Institution building: inflation, sustainable growth and debt control; 14. Conclusions; References. , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-107-02386-6
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040792003
    Format: XIV, 351 S. , graph. Darst.
    Edition: 1. publ.
    ISBN: 9781107023864
    Note: "Developing a new and highly innovative theory of economic policy, this book deals with conflicts between strategic actions by public and private agents. It builds on the Lucas critique but also applies the tools introduced by Tinbergen and Theil to dynamic policy games and from there derives a new theory of economic policy. Its main propositions describe such properties in the models currently used for policy-making as neutrality and equilibrium existence; uniqueness; and multiplicity. These properties are key to understanding the impact of concepts such as rational expectations, time inconsistency, communication and the use of policy announcements. As the numerous examples show, they are useful both for model building and for devising optimal institutions. The Theory of Economic Policy in a Strategic Context is an essential but accessible tool for economic researchers involved in policy questions"-- Provided by publisher. , Includes bibliographical references and index
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics , Political Science
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: Wirtschaftspolitik ; Rationale Erwartung ; Wirtschaftspolitik ; Theorie ; Wirtschaftspolitik ; Wirtschaftsphilosophie
    URL: Cover
    Author information: Hughes Hallett, Andrew 1947-
    Author information: Acocella, Nicola 1939-
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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