Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
Type of Medium
Language
Region
Library
Years
Person/Organisation
Access
  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,
    UID:
    almahu_9947413985702882
    Format: 1 online resource (xii, 239 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).
    ISBN: 9781107337015 (ebook)
    Content: Contrary to popular assumption, the development of stronger oversight mechanisms actually leads to greater secrecy rather than the reverse. When Should State Secrets Stay Secret? examines modern trends in intelligence oversight development by focusing on how American oversight mechanisms combine to bolster an internal security system and thus increase the secrecy of the intelligence enterprise. Genevieve Lester uniquely examines how these oversight mechanisms have developed within all three branches of government, how they interact, and what types of historical pivot points have driven change among them. She disaggregates the concept of accountability into a series of specified criteria in order to grapple with these pivot points. This book concludes with a discussion of a series of normative questions, suggesting ways to improve oversight mechanisms based on the analytical criteria laid out in the analysis. It also includes a chapter on the workings of the CIA to which a number of CIA officers contributed.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). , An analytical approach : intelligence, accountability and oversight -- Organizing secrecy : the CIA and institutional control -- External accountability : the development of congressional oversight -- Congress and oppositional oversight -- An independent judiciary? : the domestic implications of intelligence and the politics of secret oversight -- Conclusions.
    Additional Edition: Print version: ISBN 9781107042476
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    UID:
    almafu_BV042715171
    Format: xii, 239 Seiten ; , 23 cm.
    ISBN: 978-1-107-04247-6 , 978-1-107-61653-0
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index
    Language: English
    Keywords: Geheimdienst ; Geheimhaltung ; Parlamentarische Kontrolle
    URL: Cover
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,
    UID:
    edocfu_9960117017502883
    Format: 1 online resource (xii, 239 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).
    ISBN: 1-316-23440-1 , 1-316-23629-3 , 1-107-33701-1
    Series Statement: Gale eBooks
    Content: Contrary to popular assumption, the development of stronger oversight mechanisms actually leads to greater secrecy rather than the reverse. When Should State Secrets Stay Secret? examines modern trends in intelligence oversight development by focusing on how American oversight mechanisms combine to bolster an internal security system and thus increase the secrecy of the intelligence enterprise. Genevieve Lester uniquely examines how these oversight mechanisms have developed within all three branches of government, how they interact, and what types of historical pivot points have driven change among them. She disaggregates the concept of accountability into a series of specified criteria in order to grapple with these pivot points. This book concludes with a discussion of a series of normative questions, suggesting ways to improve oversight mechanisms based on the analytical criteria laid out in the analysis. It also includes a chapter on the workings of the CIA to which a number of CIA officers contributed.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). , An analytical approach : intelligence, accountability and oversight -- Organizing secrecy : the CIA and institutional control -- External accountability : the development of congressional oversight -- Congress and oppositional oversight -- An independent judiciary? : the domestic implications of intelligence and the politics of secret oversight -- Conclusions. , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-107-61653-0
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-107-04247-X
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Did you mean 9781107012776?
Did you mean 9781107022676?
Did you mean 9781107002470?
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. Further information can be found on the KOBV privacy pages