UID:
almafu_9960117285502883
Format:
1 online resource (xix, 218 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
Edition:
First edition.
ISBN:
1-316-49444-6
,
1-316-49675-9
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1-316-10429-X
Series Statement:
Econometric Society monographs ; 56
Content:
Pioneered by American economist Paul Samuelson, revealed preference theory is based on the idea that the preferences of consumers are revealed in their purchasing behavior. Researchers in this field have developed complex and sophisticated mathematical models to capture the preferences that are 'revealed' through consumer choice behavior. This study of consumer demand and behavior is closely tied up with econometrics (especially nonparametric econometrics), where testing the validity of different theoretical models is an important aspect of research. The theory of revealed preference has a very long and distinguished tradition in economics, but there was no systematic presentation of the theory until now. This book deals with basic questions in economic theory, such as the relation between theory and data, and studies the situations in which empirical observations are consistent or inconsistent with some of the best known theories in economics.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 07 Jan 2016).
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Cover -- Half-title -- Series page -- Title page -- Copyright information -- Dedication -- Table of contents -- Preface -- 0.1 What is revealed preference theory? -- 0.2 Different approaches in revealed preference -- 0.3 Scope of the book -- 1 Mathematical Preliminaries -- 1.1 Basic definitions and notational conventions -- 1.1.1 Relations -- 1.1.2 Partially ordered sets -- 1.1.3 Euclidean spaces -- 1.2 Preference and utility -- 1.2.1 Properties of preferences -- 1.2.2 Utility -- 1.3 Order pairs, acyclicity, and extension theorems -- 1.4 Cyclic monotonicity -- 1.5 Theorem of the Alternative -- 1.6 Chapter references -- 2 Classical Abstract Choice Theory -- 2.1 Strong rationalization -- 2.1.1 Weak axiom of revealed preference -- 2.1.2 Maximal rationalizability -- 2.1.3 Quasitransitivity -- 2.2 Satisficing -- 2.3 Weak rationalization -- 2.4 Subrationalizability -- 2.5 Experimental elicitation of choice -- 2.6 Chapter references -- 3 Rational Demand -- 3.1 Weak rationalization -- 3.1.1 Proof of Afriat's Theorem -- 3.1.2 Constructive proof of Afriat's Theorem -- 3.1.3 General budget sets -- 3.2 Strong rationalization -- 3.2.1 Smooth utility -- 3.2.2 General budget sets -- 3.2.3 Partially observed prices and consumption -- 3.3 Revealed preference graphs -- 3.4 Chapter references -- 4 Topics in Rational Demand -- 4.1 Discrete goods: Supermodular and submodular rationalizations -- 4.2 Divisible goods -- 4.2.1 Homotheticity -- 4.2.2 Separability -- 4.2.3 Quasilinear utility -- 4.2.4 Gross complements and substitutes -- 4.3 Chapter references -- 5 Practical Issues in Revealed Preference Analysis -- 5.1 Measures of the severity of a violation of GARP -- 5.1.1 Afriat's efficiency index -- 5.1.2 Varian's version of AEI -- 5.1.3 The Money Pump Index -- 5.2 Power of testing GARP -- 5.2.1 Bronars' index -- 5.2.2 Engel curve correction.
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5.3 An overview of empirical studies -- 5.3.1 Panel data -- 5.3.2 Cross-sectional data -- 5.3.3 Time-series data -- 5.3.4 Experimental data -- 5.4 Chapter references -- 6 Production -- 6.1 Cost minimization -- 6.2 Profit maximization -- 6.2.1 Unobserved factors of production -- 6.2.2 Measuring violations from rationalizability -- 6.3 Chapter references -- 7 Stochastic Choice -- 7.1 Stochastic rationality -- 7.1.1 Proof of Theorem 7.2 -- 7.2 Luce's model -- 7.2.1 Proof of Theorem 7.6 -- 7.2.2 Luce's model and the logit model -- 7.3 Random expected utility -- 7.4 Chapter references -- 8 Choice Under Uncertainty -- 8.1 Objective probability -- 8.1.1 Notation -- 8.1.2 Choice over lotteries -- 8.1.3 State-contingent consumption -- 8.2 Subjective probability -- 8.2.1 The Epstein Test -- 8.2.2 Subjective expected utility -- 8.3 Complete class results -- 8.4 Subjective expected utility with an act-dependent prior -- 8.5 Chapter references -- 9 General Equilibrium Theory -- 9.1 The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem -- 9.1.1 Sketch of the proof of the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem -- 9.2 Homothetic preferences -- 9.3 Prices and endowments -- 9.4 The core of exchange economies -- 9.5 Chapter references -- 10 Game Theory -- 10.1 Nash equilibrium -- 10.1.1 Choice from all game forms -- 10.1.2 Choice from a subset of game forms -- 10.1.3 Zero-sum games -- 10.2 Bayesian Nash equilibrium -- 10.3 Bargaining theory -- 10.4 Stable matching theory -- 10.5 Chapter references -- 11 Social Choice and Political Science -- 11.1 Testable implications of preference aggregation functions -- 11.1.1 Utilitarian rationalizability -- 11.2 Models in formal political science -- 11.2.1 Refuting Euclidean preferences -- 11.2.2 Rational voting when policy positions are known -- 11.3 Chapter references -- 12 Revealed Preference and Systems of Polynomial Inequalities.
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12.1 Linear inequalities: The Theorem of the Alternative and revealed preference -- 12.1.1 Linear systems from first-order conditions -- 12.1.2 The existence of a rationalizing utility -- 12.2 Polynomial inequalities: The Positivstellensatz -- 12.2.1 Application: Nash bargaining -- 12.3 Chapter references -- 13 Revealed Preference and Model Theory -- 13.1 A model for observables, data, and theories -- 13.1.1 Empirical content -- 13.1.2 Relative theories -- 13.2 Application: Status quo preferences -- 13.3 Choice theory and empirical content -- 13.4 Chapter references -- References -- Index.
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English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-107-45811-0
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-107-08780-5
Language:
English
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