UID:
almafu_9960117316202883
Umfang:
1 online resource (xiii, 274 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
Ausgabe:
First edition.
ISBN:
1-316-59816-0
,
1-316-59900-0
,
1-316-53428-6
Inhalt:
In democracies, power is obtained via competition. Yet, as women gain access to parliaments in record numbers, worldwide collaboration appears to be on the rise. This is puzzling: why, if politicians can secure power through competition, would we observe collaboration in Congress? Using evidence from 200 interviews with politicians from Argentina and a novel dataset from 23 Argentine legislative chambers over an 18-year period, Gendering Legislative Behavior reexamines traditional notions of competitive democracy by evaluating patterns of collaboration among legislators. Although only the majority can secure power via competition, all legislators - particularly those who do not have power - can influence the policy-making process through collaboration. Tiffany D. Barnes argues that as women have limited access to formal and informal political power, they collaborate more than men to influence policy-making. Despite the benefits of collaboration, patterns of collaboration vary among women because different legislative contexts either facilitate or constrain women's collaboration.
Anmerkung:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 06 Jun 2016).
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Cover -- Half-title -- Title page -- Copyright information -- Dedication -- Table of contents -- List of tables -- List of figures -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction -- Central Theoretical Argument -- Can Democracy Be Collaborative? -- Why Do Women Collaborate? -- When Do Women Collaborate? -- Evidence of Women's Legislative Collaboration -- Observing Legislative Collaboration -- Why Argentina? -- Beyond Argentina -- The Importance of Studying Women's Legislative Collaboration -- Organization of this Book -- Appendix 1.1: Gender Quota Laws in the Argentine Provinces -- 2 A Theory of Legislative Collaboration -- Can Democracy Be Collaborative? -- Democracy and Competition -- Incentives to Collaborate -- Costs of Collaboration -- Out-of-Power Legislators and Incentives to Collaborate -- Why Do Women Collaborate? -- Women Are Marginalized in the Legislature -- Women Collaborate to Overcome Marginalization -- When Do Women Collaborate? -- Between-Chamber Variation -- Party Constraints -- Party Constraints and Women's Collaboration -- Women's Numeric Representation -- Impact of Women's Numeric Representation Conditional on Party Constraints -- Within-Chamber Variation -- Governor's Party -- Seniority -- Women's Issues Legislation -- Membership in a Women's Committee or Women's Caucus -- Conclusion -- 3 Can Democracy Be Collaborative? -- Legislative Collaboration: Bill Cosponsorship Data -- Bill Cosponsorship: A Reliable Measure of Collaboration -- Bill Cosponsorship: A Valid Measure of Collaboration -- Bill Cosponsorship: A Comparable Measure of Collaboration -- Evidence of Collaboration: Cosponsorship Patterns in Argentina -- Patterns of Collaboration for the Governor's Party and Opposition Parties -- Patterns of Collaboration for Majority and Minority Political Parties -- Patterns of Collaboration for Men and Women.
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Patterns of Collaboration with Female Colleagues -- Conclusion -- Appendix 3.1: Provincial Chambers Included in the Cosponsorship Analyses -- 4 Why Do Women Collaborate? -- Women's Political Power: Access to Chamber-Wide Leadership Posts -- Legislative Power: Committees and Leadership Posts -- How Committee Appointments and Leadership Appointments are Made -- Patterns of Women's Committee Appointments and Leadership Posts -- Women's Committees Appointments -- Women's Committee Leadership Posts -- Women's Committee Appointments: Multivariate Analysis -- Control Variables -- Determinants of Committee Appointment -- Women's Access to Power: Gender Differences in Committee Appointments -- Women's Leadership Appointments: Multivariate Analysis -- Determinants of Leadership Posts -- Women's Access to Power: Gender Differences in Leadership Posts -- Leadership Appointments by Committee Type -- Conclusion -- 5 When Do Women Collaborate? -- Evaluating Legislative Collaboration -- Key Factors: Sex, Women's Numeric Representation, and Party Constraints -- Empirical Model -- Determinants of Women's Chamber-wide Collaboration -- Chamber-wide Collaboration: The Effects of Women's Numeric Representation Conditional on Party Constraints -- Determinants of Women's Collaboration across Party Lines -- Collaboration across Party Lines: The Effects of Women's Numeric Representation Conditional on Party Constraints -- Conclusion -- Appendix 5.1: Control Variables for Empirical Models -- Appendix 5.2: Alternative Specifications -- Appendix 5.3: Determinants of Gender Cosponsorship Score -- 6 When Do Women Collaborate? -- Governor's Party and Women's Legislative Collaboration -- Empirical Investigation: Governor's Party -- Results: Governor's Party and Chamber-wide Collaboration -- Results: Governor's Party and Collaboration across Party Lines.
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Seniority and Women's Legislative Collaboration -- Empirical Investigation: Seniority -- Results: Seniority and Chamber-wide Collaboration -- Results: Seniority and Collaboration across Party Lines -- Women's Issues and Women's Legislative Collaboration -- Empirical Investigation: Collaboration on Women's Issues -- Results: Women's Issues and Chamber-wide Collaboration -- Results: Women's Issues and Collaboration across Party Lines -- Conclusion -- Appendix 6.1: The Effects of Affiliation with the Governor's Party on the Gender Cosponsorship Score -- Appendix 6.2: The Effects of Seniority on the Gender Cosponsorship Score -- Appendix 6.3: Determinants of the Gender Cosponsorship Score, Women's Issues Legislation -- 7 Collaboration in a Cross-National Context -- Collaborating to Advance Women's Rights in Rwanda -- Evidence of Collaboration beyond the Legislature in Rwanda -- Women's Marginalized Status in Rwanda -- Weak Party Constraints: Reserved Seats and Women-Only Elections -- Forum of Rwandan Women Parliamentarians -- Conclusions for the Rwandan Parliament -- The U.S. Senate: A Culture of Collaboration -- Evidence of Women's Collaboration in the U.S. Senate -- Women's Marginalized Status in the U.S. Senate -- Weak Party Constraints: Primary Elections and Dual-seat Constituencies -- Entrenched Seniority in the U.S. Senate -- Conclusions for the U.S. Senate -- The Cost of Collaboration in Uruguay -- Evidence of Women's Collaboration on Women's Issues in Uruguay -- Women's Marginalized Status in the Uruguayan Congress -- Strong Faction Constraints: Sub-party Lists in the Uruguayan Congress -- The Bicameral Women's Caucus -- Conclusions for the Uruguayan Congress -- The South African Parliament: A Case of Partisan Constraint -- Foiled Efforts to Collaborate in South Africa -- Women's Marginalized Status in South Africa.
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Extreme Party Constraints: Closed-List PR with Large District Magnitude -- Women's Caucus Fails to Promote Collaboration -- Conclusions for the South African Parliament -- Comparing Collaboration across Cases -- 8 Conclusion -- Main Argument and Findings: Summary -- Collaboration beyond Marginalization -- Women Continue to Face Marginalization -- The Norm of Collaboration Will Become Institutionalized -- Policy Implications: Women's Rights Legislation -- Getting Women's Rights on the Agenda -- The Quality of Women's Rights Legislation -- Autonomous Women's Movements -- Women's Representation and Electoral System Design -- Collaboration and other Historically Marginalized Groups -- Incentives for Legislators from Reserved Seats to Collaborate -- Opportunities for Legislators from Reserved Seats to Collaborate -- Alternative Institutional Arrangements, Minority Representation, and Collaboration -- Minority Women and Collaboration -- Concluding Thoughts -- References -- Index.
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English
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 1-107-14319-5
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 1-316-50765-3
Sprache:
Englisch
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