UID:
almafu_9960117654102883
Umfang:
1 online resource (xiv, 313 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
1-107-21702-4
,
1-283-02080-7
,
9786613020802
,
1-139-00960-5
,
1-139-00908-7
,
1-139-01013-1
,
1-139-00798-X
,
1-139-00687-8
,
0-511-77894-5
Inhalt:
Is military power central in determining which states get their voice heard? Must states run a high risk of war to communicate credible intent? In this book, Slantchev shows that states can often obtain concessions without incurring higher risks when they use military threats. Unlike diplomatic forms of communication, physical military moves improve a state's expected performance in war. If the opponent believes the threat, it will be more likely to back down. Military moves are also inherently costly, so only resolved states are willing to pay these costs. Slantchev argues that powerful states can secure better peaceful outcomes and lower the risk of war, but the likelihood of war depends on the extent to which a state is prepared to use military threats to deter challenges to peace and compel concessions without fighting. The price of peace may therefore be large: states invest in military forces that are both costly and unused.
Anmerkung:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Part I. Coercion and Credibility: -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Commitment and signaling in coercive bargaining: -- A stylization of a crisis -- The purely informational approach -- The search for credibility: Costly signaling ; Constraining future choices ; Manipulating incentives -- Conclusion -- Part II. A Theory of Military Threats -- 3. A model of military threats: Characteristics of a military threat: -- Military moves are inherently costly ; Military moves change the distribution of power ; Military moves can reveal capability -- Modeling military threats: The technology of conflict ; The military crisis game -- Threats with complete information -- Threats under uncertainty -- Conclusion with an aside on reputation -- 4. Comparing the instruments of coercion -- Stability and expected mobilization -- The basic simulation setup -- Comparing threat instruments: Functions of coercive instruments ; Escalation and resistance -- Threats and stability: Appeasement ; Escalation stability ; Crisis stability -- Gaining more by risking less: Power, risk, and gain in crisis bargaining ; Why stronger types must run higher risks ; Risk and gain with non-military threats ; Risk and gain with military threats -- Choosing the instrument of coercion -- Typing the knot of war : a conjecture.
,
Part III. Elements of Militarized Deterrence: -- 5. Militarization and the distribution of power and Interest -- Stability and deterrence failure -- System militarization and military threats -- System militarization and deterrence --The distribution of power and interest -- The Sino-Indian war of 1962 -- 6. The expansion of the Korean war, 1950 -- An outline of the argument -- militarized deterrence in Korea -- The evolution of US War aims and Chinese signals : Liberation without unification ; Unification becomes a tempting possibility ; The closing of the window of opportunity ; The Chinese make up their minds -- Did the US Irrationally dismiss clear Chinese threats? -- Conclusion -- 7. The price of peace and military threat effectiveness -- The paradoxical burden of peace : Stability and the costs of war ; High war costs and aggressive mobilization -- Do audience costs improve the prospects for peace? -- Deterrent Efficacy of military threats : power or beliefs? -- Bluffs, sham crises, and deterrence -- Part IV. Conclusions: -- 8. Implications -- Appendix A : Formalities for Chapter 2 -- Appendix : formalities for chapter 3 -- appendix C : formalities for chapter 4 -- Appendix D : Formalities for chapter 5.
,
English
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 1-107-40555-6
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 0-521-76318-5
Sprache:
Englisch
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511778940
URL:
Volltext
(URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
URL:
Volltext
(URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
Bookmarklink
