UID:
almafu_9960117305402883
Umfang:
1 online resource (xiv, 239 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
1-316-23617-X
,
1-316-25509-3
,
1-316-25319-8
,
1-316-24941-7
,
1-316-25130-6
,
1-107-64986-2
,
1-316-24751-1
,
1-139-59999-2
,
1-316-23428-2
Inhalt:
The Politics of Market Discipline in Latin America uses a multi-method approach to challenge the conventional wisdom that financial markets impose broad and severe constraints over leftist economic policies in emerging market countries. It shows, rather, that in Latin America, this influence varies markedly among countries and over time, depending on cycles of currency booms and crises exogenous to policy making. Market discipline is strongest during periods of dollar scarcity, which, in low-savings commodity-exporting countries, occurs when commodity prices are high and international interest rates low. In periods of dollar abundance, when the opposite happens, the market's capacity to constrain leftist governments is very limited. Ultimately, Daniela Campello argues that financial integration should force the Left toward the center in economies less subject to these cycles, but not in those most vulnerable to them.
Anmerkung:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
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Cover; Half-title; Title page; Copyright information; Dedication page; Table of contents; List of illustrations; List of tables; Acknowledgments; 1 Globalization, Democracy, and Market Discipline; The Globalization of Finance in Emerging Economies; The Politics of Financial Globalization; Research Project: The Politics of Market Discipline in Latin America; Plan of the Book; 2 Between Votes and Capital: Redistribution and Uncertainty in Unequal Democracies; Capital Mobility and the Politics of Redistribution; Implications of the Model
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Nature's play: Exogenous Shocks, Currency Crises, and Policy Switches3 Investors' ""Vote'' in Presidential Elections; Creditors' Response to Partisanship; Government Ideology and Economic Policymaking; Investors' Response to Government Ideology; Research Design; Dependent Variable: Sovereign Risk; Explanatory Variables; Results; Conclusion; Appendix; Summary Data; 4 The Politics of Currency Booms and Crises: Explaining the Influence of Investors' ""Vote''; Currency Booms, Crises, and the Left; Political Systems and Capacity to Switch; Research Design and Empirical Analysis; Results
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ConclusionResearch Design: Case Studies; Appendix; 5 Currency Crisis, Policy Switch, and Ideological Convergence in Brazil; Background; The 2002 Presidential Election; Lula's First Presidency: No Plan B; Long-term Convergence: Political Discourse in 2006 and 2010; Conclusion; 6 Exogenous Shocks and Investors' Political Clout in Ecuador; The Dollarization of the Ecuadorean Economy; The Election of Lucio Gutiérrez; The Election of Rafael Correa; Conclusion; 7 One President, Different Scenarios: Crisis, Boom, and Market Discipline in Venezuela; Background: Neoliberalism in Venezuela
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The 1998 Presidential ElectionChavez's First Presidential Term; First Year: Honeymoon with the Markets; Second Phase: Confrontation and Instability; Third Phase: Boom and Consolidation; Chavez's Reelection: Socialism in the Twenty-first Century; Conclusion; 8 ""Vivir con Lo Nuestro'': Default and Market Discipline in Argentina; Convertibility and Confidence; Collapse and Default; Room to Maneuver in the Kirchner and Fernández Years; Room to Maneuver and the Reintegration into International Markets Under Cristina Fernández ; Conclusion; 9 Who Governs? Market Discipline in the Developed World
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Boom and Crisis in the EurozoneThe Confidence Game: Markets' and Governments' Responses to the Crisis; Conclusion; 10 Conclusion: Markets' Vote and Democratic Politics; Reinstating the Argument; Contribution of the Book; Implications for Democracy; References; Index
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English
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 1-316-24562-4
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 1-107-03925-8
Sprache:
Englisch
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139599993
URL:
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