UID:
almafu_9960117199202883
Format:
1 online resource (vi, 261 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
1-316-59009-7
,
1-316-58876-9
,
1-316-53434-0
Content:
This book considers the political and constitutional consequences of Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004), where the Supreme Court held that partisan gerrymandering challenges could no longer be adjudicated by the courts. Through a rigorous scientific analysis of US House district maps, the authors argue that partisan bias increased dramatically in the 2010 redistricting round after the Vieth decision, both at the national and state level. From a constitutional perspective, unrestrained partisan gerrymandering poses a critical threat to a central pillar of American democracy, popular sovereignty. State legislatures now effectively determine the political composition of the US House. The book answers the Court's challenge to find a new standard for gerrymandering that is both constitutionally grounded and legally manageable. It argues that the scientifically rigorous partisan symmetry measure is an appropriate legal standard for partisan gerrymandering, as it logically implies the constitutional right to individual equality and can be practically applied.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 08 Mar 2016).
,
Cover -- Half title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- 1 The Unnoticed Revolution -- The Electoral Consequences: A Systematic Republican Advantage until 2022 -- The Constitutional Consequences: The End of Equality? -- Can the vieth Decision Be Challenged? -- The Example of Pennsylvania -- Why Was It Unnoticed? -- Plan of Book -- 2 The Jurisprudence of Districting -- Early Districting and Pre-vieth Jurisprudence -- Debate over Justiciability: Political Question versus Equal Protection -- The vieth v. jubelirer Decision -- Conclusion -- 3 Measuring Partisan Bias -- Partisan Gerrymandering and How to Measure It -- Partisan Bias at the National Level -- Partisan Bias at the State Level -- Partisan Bias and Compactness -- Conclusion -- Appendix 3A - Results -- Appendix 3B - Methodology -- 4 Geographic Explanations for Partisan Bias -- The Urban Concentration Hypothesis -- Majority-Minority Districts and the Voting Rights Act -- Geographical Information Systems and Improved Technology -- Conclusion: Demography Is Not Destiny -- Appendix - What, if Anything, Can We Learn from the United Kingdom? -- 5 Political Explanations of Partisan Bias -- Does Politics Explain Where We Find Partisan Bias? -- Did State Legislatures District for Partisan Advantage More after 2010? -- Why Are So Many State Governments Dominated by One Party While Competitive at Federal Elections? -- Conclusion -- Appendix 5A - Voter Turnout (as a Percentage of VAP) in State Gubernatorial Elections, 1993-2012 -- 6 Constitutional Implications of Vieth: The Revenge of the Anti-Federalists -- The Great Compromise and the House of Representatives -- Apportionment and Districting - the States Strike Back -- American Democracy after vieth -- Conclusion -- 7 Answering Justice Scalia's Challenge to Equality: Does Equal Protection Imply Majority Rule?.
,
Justice Scalia's Challenge to the Majority Rule Principle -- Deriving the Majority Rule Principle from Individual Rights to Equal Protection -- Applying Majority Rule as a Judicially Manageable Standard: The Symmetry Test -- Conclusion -- 8 Conclusion: Vieth, Majority Rule, and One Person, One Vote -- Postscript - July 2015 -- The House of Representatives and the 2014 Election -- Litigation -- Bibliography -- Index.
,
English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-316-50767-X
Additional Edition:
ISBN 1-107-14325-X
Language:
English
URL:
Volltext
(URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316534342
Bookmarklink
