Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

UID:

Format: XIV, 542 S.

ISBN: 0-691-03308-0 , 0-691-01941-X

Series Statement: Princeton studies in international history and politics

Content: Drawing on recently declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American policymakers, among them several important figures speaking for public record for the first time, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein cast new light on the effect of nuclear threats in two of the tensest moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the several confrontations arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. In sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom, they conclude that the strategy of deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers. In the case of Cuba, deterrence was a principal cause of the crisis; eleven years later, it provided the umbrella under which both the United States and the Soviet Union pursued unilateral advantage, undermining the fragile foundations of their recent detente

Content: In the 1980s, Soviet evidence suggests, the Reagan arms buildup delayed rather than hastened the accommodation Gorbachev desired for internal political reasons. Both nations, the authors argue, expended lives and resources out of all reasonable proportion to their legitimate security interests, with destabilizing consequences that persist today

Content: . We All Lost the Cold War portrays the American-Soviet rivalry as a contest between insecure and domestically pressured leaders acting on divergent perceptions of national interest. While the danger of nuclear war is now much reduced with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the underlying dynamics of the Cold War continue to drive many of the conflicts that have emerged, or remain acute, in its aftermath. The lessons Lebow and Stein derive from the 1962 and 1973 cases are of abiding relevance in the post-Cold War era

Note: War zeitweise Open Access bei De Gruyter 1.7.2022

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, PDF ISBN 9781400821082 10.1515/9781400821082

Language: English

Subjects: Political Science

Keywords: Kubakrise ; Ost-West-Konflikt ; Jom-Kippur-Krieg ; Ost-West-Konflikt ; Abschreckung ; Ost-West-Konflikt

URL: http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=006425206&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA

URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis

URL: http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/prin031/93014206.html

URL: http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/prin031/93014206.html

URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis

URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis

URL: http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=006425206&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA

Author information: Lebow, Richard Ned 1942-

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (566 pages) : , illustrations.

Edition: Course Book.

Edition: Electronic reproduction. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1994. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Edition: System requirements: Web browser.

Edition: Access may be restricted to users at subscribing institutions.

ISBN: 9781400821082

Series Statement: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics

Content: Drawing on recently declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American policy-makers, among them several important figures speaking for public record for the first time, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein cast new light on the effect of nuclear threats in two of the tensest moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the confrontations arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. They conclude that the strategy of deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers.

Note: Frontmatter -- , CONTENTS -- , PREFACE -- , ABBREVIATIONS -- , CHAPTER ONE Introduction -- , CHAPTER TWO. Missiles to Cuba: Foreign-Policy Motives -- , CHAPTER THREE. Missiles to Cuba: Domestic Politics -- , CHAPTER FOUR. Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate? -- , CHAPTER FIVE. Why Did the Missiles Provoke a Crisis? -- , CHAPTER SIX. The Crisis and Its Resolution -- , CHAPTER SEVEN. The Failure to Prevent War, October 1973 -- , CHAPTER EIGHT. The Failure to Limit the War: The Soviet and American Airlifts -- , CHAPTER NINE. The Failure to Stop the Fighting -- , CHAPTER TEN. The Failure to Avoid Confrontation -- , CHAPTER ELEVEN. The Crisis and Its Resolution -- , CHAPTER TWELVE. How Crises Are Resolved -- , CHAPTER THIRTEEN. Deterrence and Crisis Management -- , CHAPTER FOURTEEN. Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Weapons -- , POSTSCRIPT: Deterrence and the End of the Cold War -- , NOTES -- , APPENDIX -- , NAME INDEX -- , GENERAL INDEX. , In English.

Language: English

DOI: 10.1515/9781400821082

URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400821082

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (557 pages)

ISBN: 9781400821082

Series Statement: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics Ser v.21

Content: Drawing on recently declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American policy-makers, among them several important figures speaking for public record for the first time, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein cast new light on the effect of nuclear threats in two of the tensest moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the confrontations arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. They conclude that the strategy of deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers.

Content: Book Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- CONTENTS.

Note: Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources

Additional Edition: ISBN 9780691019413

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9780691019413

Language: English

Keywords: Electronic books

URL: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kxp/detail.action?docID=581551

URL: Volltext

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (566 p.)

Edition: Course Book

ISBN: 9781400821082 , 9783110442496

Series Statement: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics ; 55

Content: Drawing on recently declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American policy-makers, among them several important figures speaking for public record for the first time, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein cast new light on the effect of nuclear threats in two of the tensest moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the confrontations arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. They conclude that the strategy of deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers.

Note: Frontmatter -- , CONTENTS -- , PREFACE -- , ABBREVIATIONS -- , CHAPTER ONE Introduction -- , PART ONE: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962 -- , CHAPTER TWO. Missiles to Cuba: Foreign-Policy Motives -- , CHAPTER THREE. Missiles to Cuba: Domestic Politics -- , CHAPTER FOUR. Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate? -- , CHAPTER FIVE. Why Did the Missiles Provoke a Crisis? -- , CHAPTER SIX. The Crisis and Its Resolution -- , PART TWO: THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OCTOBER 1973 -- , CHAPTER SEVEN. The Failure to Prevent War, October 1973 -- , CHAPTER EIGHT. The Failure to Limit the War: The Soviet and American Airlifts -- , CHAPTER NINE. The Failure to Stop the Fighting -- , CHAPTER TEN. The Failure to Avoid Confrontation -- , CHAPTER ELEVEN. The Crisis and Its Resolution -- , PART THREE: DETERRENCE, COMPELLENCE, AND THE COLD WAR -- , CHAPTER TWELVE. How Crises Are Resolved -- , CHAPTER THIRTEEN. Deterrence and Crisis Management -- , CHAPTER FOURTEEN. Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Weapons -- , POSTSCRIPT: Deterrence and the End of the Cold War -- , NOTES -- , APPENDIX -- , NAME INDEX -- , GENERAL INDEX , Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In: Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999, De Gruyter, 9783110442496

Language: English

DOI: 10.1515/9781400821082

URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400821082

URL: https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400821082

URL: Cover

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (557 p.)

Edition: Course Book

ISBN: 1-4008-0481-7 , 1-4008-0480-9 , 1-4008-1249-6 , 1-282-75182-4 , 9786612751820 , 1-4008-2108-8

Series Statement: Princeton studies in international history and politics

Content: Drawing on recently declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American policy-makers, among them several important figures speaking for public record for the first time, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein cast new light on the effect of nuclear threats in two of the tensest moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the confrontations arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. They conclude that the strategy of deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers.

Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Front matter -- , CONTENTS -- , PREFACE -- , ABBREVIATIONS -- , CHAPTER ONE Introduction -- , PART ONE: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962 -- , CHAPTER TWO. Missiles to Cuba: Foreign-Policy Motives -- , CHAPTER THREE. Missiles to Cuba: Domestic Politics -- , CHAPTER FOUR. Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate? -- , CHAPTER FIVE. Why Did the Missiles Provoke a Crisis? -- , CHAPTER SIX. The Crisis and Its Resolution -- , PART TWO: THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OCTOBER 1973 -- , CHAPTER SEVEN. The Failure to Prevent War, October 1973 -- , CHAPTER EIGHT. The Failure to Limit the War: The Soviet and American Airlifts -- , CHAPTER NINE. The Failure to Stop the Fighting -- , CHAPTER TEN. The Failure to Avoid Confrontation -- , CHAPTER ELEVEN. The Crisis and Its Resolution -- , PART THREE: DETERRENCE, COMPELLENCE, AND THE COLD WAR -- , CHAPTER TWELVE. How Crises Are Resolved -- , CHAPTER THIRTEEN. Deterrence and Crisis Management -- , CHAPTER FOURTEEN. Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Weapons -- , POSTSCRIPT: Deterrence and the End of the Cold War -- , NOTES -- , APPENDIX -- , NAME INDEX -- , GENERAL INDEX , English

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-691-03308-0

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-691-01941-X

Language: English

DOI: 10.1515/9781400821082